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ABSTRACTS

External Ambition and Economic Performance

By M. KAHLER

Realist approaches to international politics raise the possibility that external policies based on expanding military power may undermine the economic bases of that power. The links between external strategy and economic performance can be classified as fiscal (macroeconomic effects), structural (microeconomic and structural effects), and protectionist (effects on foreign economic policy). The case of prewar Japan suggests that, for countries at an intermediate position in the international power hierarchy and in the international division of labor, the positive effects of external ambition on economic performance may dominate. Other cases—National Socialist Germany, contemporary developing countries, and the postwar superpowers—seem to confirm that international position is a principal determinant of these effects.

The United States, the Soviet Union, and the Politics of Opposites

By M. NINCIC

The notion that the attitudes of the American public vis-à-vis the Soviet Union are driven essentially by emotion, and that they are more extreme and volatile than those of the government itself, is widely believed but may not be valid. While the public typically desires a combination of tough and conciliatory policies, it also tends to express, at any given moment, particular concern about whichever of the two it feels is most slighted in U.S. policy. Thus, the public will tend to seek conciliatory behavior from hawkish administrations while preferring a tough stance from administrations it deems dovish. By so doing, the public is likely to have a moderating effect on official behavior toward Moscow. The proposition is tested with reference to shifts in public approval of presidential Soviet policy, and certain implications are suggested for the manner in which political leadership perceives of its mandate.

Economic and Political Explanations of Human Rights Violations

By N. J. MITCHELL AND J. M. McCORMICK

This research note aims to measure human rights conditions crossnationally and to account for variations in these conditions. The measure conceptualizes human rights along two dimensions: the imprisonment of political dissidents, and the killing and torture of prisoners. The authors apply these measures to 122 countries and attempt to account for variations in terms of several well-known economic and political hypotheses.

Lessons from History, or the Perfidy of English Exceptionalism and the Significance of Historical France

By R. H. BATES

Theories of development are derived from readings of history. Modern historical research challenges many of the basic beliefs about how economies develop. More specifically, recent research suggests that the lessons drawn from the history of industrialization in England are highly misleading. The article thus challenges the empirical foundations for much of classical and Marxian development theory.

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Japanese Foreign Economic Policy Formation:

EXPLAINING THE REACTIVE STATE

By K. E. CALDER

The concept of the "reactive state" is useful in understanding the foreign economic policy behavior of Japan and certain other middle-range powers deeply integrated in the global political economy, particularly during periods of economic turbulence when international regimes do not fully safeguard their economic interests. The essential characteristics of the reactive state are two-fold: (1) it fails to undertake major independent foreign-policy initiatives although it has the power and national incentives to do so; (2) it responds to outside pressure for change, albeit erratically, unsystematically, and often incompletely.

In the Japanese case, reactive state behavior flows from domestic institutional characteristics as well as from the structure of the international system. Domestic features such as bureaucratic fragmentation, political factionalism, powerful mass media, and the lack of a strong central executive have played an especially important part in Japanese financial, energy, trade, and technology policy formation since 1971.

Implementing the Final Solution:

THE ORDINARY REGULATING OF THE EXTRAORDINARY

By H. L. MASON

The implementation of the Final Solution is discussed in terms of the divergent interpretations characteristic of the "functionalists" and the "intentionalists." The routines of two sets of implementors are described: the mass liquidations perpetrated by the *Einsatzgruppen* and the "barbaric-civil orderliness" of the bureaucrats carrying out the deportation of the German Jews. In the final section, Lifton's concept of the medicalization of the killings is introduced, with attention also to his thoughts on "doubling" and the extension of his concerns "beyond Auschwitz" to the sphere of nuclear catastrophe.

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THE IMPACT OF INTELLIGENCE ON THE PROSPECTS FOR PEACE AND WAR

By William E. Odom

Lieutenant General, USA

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THE UNITED STATES AND JAPAN:

Emerging Economic and Security Issues

Papers from an International Conference
"Japan and the United States in the Emerging Pacific Basin Era"

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EXTERNAL AMBITION AND ECONOMIC PERFORMANCE

By MILES KAHLER*

AMBITION imposes a price; that moral lesson runs deep within our culture. Nowhere has it exerted a greater influence than in our treatment of the rise and fall of nations. Writers, beginning in classical times, have expressed their belief, sometimes with a shudder, sometimes with scarcely concealed pleasure, that national success and imperial ambition carry within themselves the seeds of their own destruction. Like other adages and bits of folk wisdom, however, this belief requires scrutiny rather than simple acceptance.

Aside from a longstanding fascination with the causes of national economic decline (particularly among those currently on top), there are two reasons for interest in this question, one theoretical and crossnational, one concerned with policy and closer to home. The relationship between strategic choices and economic well-being should be a central theoretical concern in international relations and international political economy. Realists and neorealists have long been absorbed in defining and estimating the bases of international power. Underlying such analysis has been the mercantilist assumption that wealth and power are complementary. Robert O. Keohane describes the "key trade-offs" in such a view as "not between power and wealth, but between the long-term power/wealth interests of the state and the partial interests of individual merchants, workers, or manufacturers on the one hand or short-term interests of the society on the other."[1] Instead of a straightforward trade-off between consumption and investment, however, others have suggested a more complex relationship between the quest for international power and its effects on the economy that supports this quest, raising the possibility that the search for power may erode wealth, and that seeking hegemony may be bad for the national economic well-being.

Chief among those who have posed this possibility is Robert G. Gilpin, whose work, *War and Change in World Politics*, continues and broadens a line of investigation that began with his study of American power and

* Revised version of a paper delivered at the Annual Meeting of the American Political Science Association, August 29-September 1, 1985. This research was supported by a Rockefeller Foundation International Relations Fellowship.

[1] Keohane, *After Hegemony* (Princeton University Press, 1984), 23.

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multinational investment.[2] Gilpin pays attention to the external elements that may produce hegemonic decline, but he also points to several purely internal consequences of international power that may in themselves induce a decline in the economic position of states. Gilpin's sweeping and original account brings the debate back to its central position in neorealist argument, but leaves several questions unanswered. Do the dynamics of decline apply to other than hegemonic or dominant states in the international system, to any state that attempts what I will call an "ambitious" foreign policy? Why, given Gilpin's rational-choice, cost-benefit frame, do states (which are viewed as unitary) make the miscalculations that produce decline?

Those concerned with economic prescriptions have also debated the precise causal connections between ambitious external policies (and associated military spending) and domestic economic performance. The importance of the military in episodes of economic acceleration and decline since the Industrial Revolution has left a wide field for interpretation by historians and social scientists. In the realm of public policy, the question of foreign policy burdens and economic outcomes has recently become a pressing issue in the United States in view of the Reagan administration's efforts to reverse the relative balance between military and non-military spending in the national budget.[3] The administration's view of the economic impact of defense expenditures on the superpowers is positive or negligible for the United States and negative for the Soviet Union.

In the first section of this paper, arguments that link economic performance and an ambitious external strategy are gathered in a model that emphasizes three paths—fiscal, structural, and protectionist—by which strategy affects the economy. Some of the arguments are drawn from the debate over military spending, others from the literature on imperialism. Most are riddled with the biases of observers who aim for either a more restrained foreign policy stance (and a lower share of national resources devoted to external goals) or a more activist posture with its consequent higher expenditure and allegedly beneficial side effects.

In the second part of the paper, I reexamine one controversial national experience—that of Japan in the 1930s—and suggest that some of the broad generalizations set out in the first section, and based on national experience since 1945, need to be modified or specified more precisely. In

[2] Gilpin, *War and Change in World Politics* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1981), esp. chap. iv; *U.S. Power and the Multinational Corporation* (New York: Basic Books, 1975).

[3] Bruce Russett documents the shift in "Defense Expenditures and National Well-being," *American Political Science Review* 76 (December 1982), 767-77.

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the decade before World War II, Japan combined a pattern of external expansion with an economic performance that can only be described as remarkable for an industrializing economy. It is difficult to determine the precise causal relationships, if any, between military build-up, external expansion, and economic dynamism. Even if such relationships exist, the weight of external ambition in Japan's economic record during this period must be compared to the effects of other variables that influence economic growth.

In the final section of the paper, I apply the tentative conclusions drawn from the Japanese case to other instances in which external ambition seems to have shaped economic resurgence or decline: National Socialist Germany, contemporary developing and newly industrializing countries, and the superpowers. Though the experience of the newly industrializing countries resembles that of Japan most clearly, the similarities and differences in this universe of cases permit some further refinement of the posited linkages between external strategy and the national economy, as well as speculation about the effects of those linkages on international politics.

Modeling the Linkage between External Ambition and Economic Performance

At least three possible effects of an ambitious external strategy on the domestic economy can be distilled from the welter of arguments surrounding military spending, imperial expansion, and their relationship to economic growth and decline. First, military spending may have purely macroeconomic effects—on the rate of inflation, for example, or on the balance of payments; I shall call this the *fiscal* effect. Second, military spending may also have longer-term implications for the growth path of an economy and for its international competitiveness, through firm efficiency and technological innovation; these microeconomic and sectoral effects may be labeled the *structural* effects of an ambitious foreign policy. Finally, through an ambitious foreign policy, a state may attempt to exercise external influence over other economies or to increase national power by other than military means. In particular, such instruments of foreign economic policy as the construction of trade and currency blocs may distort external economic transactions in the interest of the state's goals, with implications for domestic economic performance. This cluster of less well-defined effects can be described as the *protectionist* effects of an ambitious foreign policy. The relations can be sketched as follows:

Feedback effects on domestic economic performance (defined as eco-

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

FIGURE 1
LINKS BETWEEN EXTERNAL STRATEGY AND ECONOMIC PERFORMANCE

nomic growth) are the central issue. It is not important to define the line between "normal" and "ambitious" foreign policy; what is of concern are the intermediate and measurable consequences of foreign policy—increased military expenditure and the use of foreign economic policy for political ends. If feedback effects are strongly positive, improved economic performance will support an expansive external strategy; if they are negative, they will tend to undercut external goals.

Defining the avenues through which external strategy affects economic performance and specifying the conditions in which the signs of these feedbacks may be positive or negative is not sufficient, however. Some effort must also be made to weigh the importance of these effects on the economy against other determinants of economic performance—a much more difficult task. The case of Japan in the 1930s will suggest that these effects were real, but that they were overestimated for much of the decade. A further qualification concerns the behavior of other states: some research strongly suggests that the war/peace division will affect the scale of the intermediate consequences and possibly the direction of the feedback effects. My concern will be with peacetime effects, though that will pose problems of definition in the case of Japan.

The first step in constructing a set of predictions for the economic consequences of external ambition is a closer scrutiny of the constituent fiscal, structural, and protectionist effects and their likely impact—positive or negative—on economic performance.

FISCAL EFFECTS OF MILITARY SPENDING: ARE DEFENSE DOLLARS DIFFERENT?

Attitudes toward military spending underwent a transformation in the late 1950s and early 1960s: as a corollary of the triumph of Keynesian eco-

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nomics, the notion of an absolute ceiling on peacetime military spending was discarded. No longer was it believed that high military expenditures would "bankrupt" the economy. As Hitch and McKean asserted in a work that codified the new wisdom: "There is no presumption that the defense budget is now, or should be, near any immovable upper limit" *if* other economic policies are changed to accommodate it and to maintain fiscal balance.[4]

To those who stress the detrimental effects of military spending on macroeconomic equilibrium, internal and external, the reply has typically been that military spending is public spending, and that its economic effects should be regarded as the same as other public spending.[5] If the fiscal deficit is too large, any of the categories of public spending could be reduced (or taxes increased) to the same effect. Yet, purely in terms of macroeconomics, and leaving aside the impact on firm efficiency and economic structure, arguments have been made that military spending is different and less desirable; the *composition* of military spending is particularly important to such arguments.

The debate over the significance of fiscal deficits and possible "crowding out" as the result of deficits does not concern military spending alone: on this score, all public spending can be viewed as roughly equivalent. But it may be more difficult to manage fiscal balance if public spending shifts toward military spending with a high component of investment (procurement, research and development, military construction) as opposed to operating expenditure. Military spending of this sort may be harder to control than other forms of public spending, largely because of a tendency to underestimate the costs of major weapons systems.[6] A further drawback—again in a high procurement budget—is the possibility that military spending will contribute to cost-push inflation before full employment is reached, particularly if the increase in military spending is rapid, and capacity in the principally affected industries is limited.[7]

A more fundamental and global argument concerns the crowding-out effects that military spending may have on other sectors of the economy—private consumption, non-military government spending, and private investment. Even stern critics of military spending find little evi-

[4] Charles J. Hitch and Roland N. McKean, *The Economics of Defense in the Nuclear Age* (New York: Atheneum, 1965), 47.

[5] Gavin Kennedy, *Defense Economics* (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1983), 186, 204.

[6] James R. Capra, "The National Defense Budget and Its Economic Effects," *Federal Reserve Bank of New York Quarterly Review* (Summer, 1981), 25-27.

[7] *Ibid.*, 28-30; Robert W. DeGrasse, Jr., *Military Expansion, Economic Decline: The Impact of Military Spending on U.S. Economic Performance* (Armonk, NY: M. E. Sharpe, 1983), 117-25.

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dence that private consumption has been compressed in its favor; nor, despite considerable comparative analysis, has much evidence of a direct trade-off between civilian and military expenditures been discovered.[8] More controversial (because the relationship to economic performance is assumed to be direct, and because the evidence is mixed) is the potential trade-off between private investment and defense expenditure. Here, some studies have found a negative relationship between investment and military spending.[9] A number of cautions are necessary in interpreting these relationships, however. Once again, the effect of public spending must be separated from the narrower impact of defense spending; as Kennedy states, "the selection of defense as the inhibitor of investment is a value judgement because all public expenditure on non-market activity acts as an inhibitor."[10] In certain countries, the investment alternatives to military spending may be no more productive of economic growth, and possibly less. (One of the explanations for evidence that military spending and economic growth are associated in developing countries is precisely the possibility of inefficient investment alternatives.)[11] Most of the assumptions of a trade-off omit the possibility of foreign borrowing to offset military expenditure, an honored tradition since at least the time of Edward III. Finally, even if there are plausible reasons to explain the trade-off across a broad spectrum of societies—the direct competition of military procurement with private firms for skilled workers and investment goods—as well as historical episodes that clearly illustrate the trade-off, the substitution of military spending for investment rests on *political* choices and *political* processes.[12] The difficulty for advanced industrialized societies—even nondemocratic ones—may be the impossibility of reducing private consumption expectations in the face of apparently unshakable military needs. In less industrialized societies and in other his-

[8] On private consumption, see *ibid.*, 50; on possible trade-offs with civilian public expenditures, in addition to DeGrasse, see Russett (fn. 3), 771; William K. Domke, Richard C. Eichenberg, and Catherine M. Kelleher, "The Illusion of Choice: Defense and Welfare in Advanced Industrial Democracies, 1948-1978," *American Political Science Review* 77 (March 1983), 33; Kennedy (fn. 5), 192.

[9] R. P. Smith, "Military Expenditure and Capitalism," *Cambridge Journal of Economics* 1 (March 1977), 72-73; DeGrasse (fn. 7), 47-48 and Appendix B.

[10] Kennedy (fn. 5), 204.

[11] The principal study is that of Emile Benoit, *Defense and Economic Growth in Developing Countries* (Lexington, MA: D. C. Heath, 1973); also "Growth and Defense in Developing Countries," *Economic Development and Cultural Change* 26 (January 1978), 271-80.

[12] Perhaps the best-documented case in which military expenditures collided with investment needs to the detriment of the long-term growth prospects of an economy is that of Britain during the Korean War rearmament; see Sidney Pollard, *The Wasting of the British Economy* (London: Croom Helm, 1982), 36-37. The choice in favor of consumption and military expenditures over investment has been argued for the Soviet Union by Myron Rush, "Guns over Growth in Soviet Policy," *International Security* 7 (Winter 1982/83), 167-79.

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torical periods, those political constraints and the trade-off may not be as severe.

Microeconomic Efficiency and Sectoral Bias: Baroque Arsenal or Engine of Innovation?

The potential trade-off between military spending and investment points toward a second set of economic consequences that are *structural* in nature. One cluster of arguments has linked military expenditure with *declining firm efficiency*; even more attention has been devoted to defense expenditures as either a spur or a drag to *technological innovation*. Unfortunately, arguments at the microeconomic and structural level are often vague, and evidence tends toward the anecdotal; the counter-factual (what would the outcome have been in the absence of military expenditure?) is more difficult.

The rise of a discernible group of firms with close ties to military bureaucracies and high dependence on military budgets dates from the industrialization of warfare in the 19th century: Krupp, Vickers, and Wendel were the ancestors of today's defense contractors.[13] The peculiarities of the defense sector of the economy could be detected early on: the state as monopsonist with price determination by negotiation; concentration and a low level of competition among suppliers because of barriers to entry and the exclusion of foreign suppliers.[14] In reviewing the American defense industry before the current build-up, Jacques Gansler asserted that

> it is first absolutely essential to recognize that there is no free market at work in this area and that there likely cannot be one because of the dominant role of the federal government. . . . Perhaps the dominant characteristic of the conduct of defense business is the lack of competition for most of the dollars involved.[15]

A recent evaluation of the American defense sector after four years of vastly increased spending maintains that inefficiency has not diminished in an era of budgetary largesse.[16]

If such an anticompetitive pattern can be generalized across economies and time (though government procurement policies may alter certain fea-

[13] William H. McNeill, *The Pursuit of Power* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1982), 269-94.

[14] Kennedy (fn. 5), 164; also see Murray Weidenbaum, *The Economics of Peacetime Defense* (New York: Praeger, 1974), 44-49.

[15] Gansler, *The Defense Industry* (Cambridge: MIT Press, 1980), 69, 92. Similar arguments are a major theme in the work of Seymour Melman.

[16] Richard Stubbing, "The Defense Program: Buildup or Binge?" *Foreign Affairs* 63 (Spring 1985), 865-68.

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tures), diversion of resources into the defense sector of the economy will lower economic performance. Firms in which X-inefficiency is high would benefit (and probably become more inefficient), and overall economic welfare would be less than with a different pattern of government spending. Another useful perspective on the defense sector can be borrowed from Janos Kornai's work on socialist economies: defense firms are subject to the "soft" rather than the "hard" budget constraint experienced by firms in more competitive circumstances.[17] (Evidence in the United States is provided by the Lockheed bailout and the cosseting of the shipbuilding industry).

A second and countervailing structural effect of defense spending is also highly dependent on sector-by-sector analysis. Since Hitch and McKean, most students of the economic impact of defense spending have admitted (or promoted) its contribution to research and development and technological innovation. These technological spin-off effects may result from direct sponsorship of research by the military or, often related, the provision of a protected market for technologically advanced goods prior to their successful commercialization.[18]

This positive reading of the technological effects of military spending has been challenged; the arguments of challengers and their targets revolve around the technological preferences of the military consumer: Are they cutting-edge or conservative, closely tied to civilian uses, or arcane and unrelated to the needs of nonmilitary consumers? Those on either side have emphasized different sectors. The American computer and semiconductor industries have been cited as examples of the beneficial effects of military spending on technologically advanced industries. In the first, the government actually sponsored research and development directly; in the second, it guaranteed a market if the prototypes met its needs. In successive waves of innovation in these industries, a large commercial market quickly emerged that soon overshadowed the market provided by the military budget. Key benefits of early Defense Department support included the government's encouragement of smaller, more innovative firms:

> Few of the leading producers of the electron tube managed to retain their component market positions in the new technologies. In this reshuffling process, defense and aerospace procurement created a market incentive for

[17] Kornai, *Economics of Shortage*. Vol. B (Amsterdam: North-Holland Publishing Company, 1980), esp. chaps. 13 and 22.

[18] Gansler, for example, notes the "leading edge" quality of much military R & D and the ease of its transfer to civilian uses (if they exist), while also criticizing the trend toward concentration of research and development in fewer and larger firms rather than in small firms that may have a better record at innovation (fn. 15), chap. 4.

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entrepreneurial, technological risk-taking and thereby helped create an independent sector of semiconductor component manufacturers.[19]

If semiconductors and computers represent the positive impact of defense spending on industrial development, shipbuilding is often cited as the nightmare case. Shipbuilding is the centerpiece of Mary Kaldor's "baroque arsenal," and the decline of the British company Vickers is symbolic of the technologically inhibiting effects of dependence on military expenditures:

> The warship was the perfect expression of the competitive dynamism of nineteenth-century industry and the traditional conservatism of the armed forces—a foretaste of the relationship between modern armourers and the military that has produced the weapons system of today. . . . [Military spending] reinforced the "mummification" of British industry and put off the day when the necessary structural adjustments would have to be made. . . . Arms did not simply postpone the kind of restructuring necessary for the survival of old industries: they also removed the necessity of entering new ones.[20]

The portrait that Kaldor paints is reinforced by Gansler's account of the American shipbuilding industry: wholly dependent on military spending, it is noncompetitive, with very low innovation and a poor record in cost reduction.[21]

Just as analyses of the fiscal effects of military spending have been plagued by excessive aggregation, so the effects of military spending on firm efficiency and technological development require a more systematic choice of cases across time and sectors rather than the careful (and possibly biased) selection of the critics and supporters of defense spending. The core of the technological debate turns on an assessment of the effects of government intervention on defense industries, over and above the possible anticompetitive effects described earlier. Do military consumers encourage conservative technological solutions, or do they force the search for more advanced technology? Does the research and development that they encourage diverge systematically over time from the demands of the private market, inhibiting the possibility for beneficial spin-offs?[22] The

[19] John Zysman and Laura Tyson, eds., *American Industry in International Competition: Government Policies and Corporate Strategies* (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1983), 155; on government assistance in the early years of the semiconductor industry, see pp. 150-56. On this and other sectors, see Richard R. Nelson, *High-Technology Policies: A Five-Nation Comparison* (Washington, DC: American Enterprise Institute, 1984), 42-45, 51-52, 78-80. For a more negative view of the role of military procurement in the semiconductor industry, see DeGrasse (fn. 7), 84-96.

[20] Kaldor, *The Baroque Arsenal* (New York: Hill & Wang, 1981), 34, 40-41.

[21] Gansler (fn. 15), 184-203.

[22] Ira C. Magaziner and Robert B. Reich raise this possibility in *Minding America's Business* (New York: Harcourt Brace Jovanovich, 1982), 233.

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answers to these questions are likely to vary over time and across sectors and firms. For example, the economic historian Clive Trebilcock has argued, in contrast to Kaldor, that British armament firms at the turn of the century did enjoy beneficial spin-offs from military spending in their commercial operations, and that they were highly competitive internationally.[23]

Protectionism and Economic Decline

Nations pursuing ambitious foreign policies may incur economic benefits or costs that are distinct from the economic effects of increased military spending. Not all ambitious foreign policies are costly in terms of the government budget or a large military sector: some empires, notably the British, managed to lower budgetary costs by forcing many expenses onto colonial budgets and by hewing to standards of rigorous financial orthodoxy.

Even if fiscal and structural effects on the domestic economy are insignificant, however, other effects can be traced to the instruments of foreign economic policy used to pursue external aims. In an earlier period, trade, monetary transactions, and investment were all shaped (and, economists would say, distorted) by metropolitan policies designed to intensify economic relations within empires and to exclude or discriminate against transactions with those outside. The result, in the case of some of the European empires, was the creation of a high-cost and relatively inefficient trading and monetary bloc that was stripped away only with decolonization.[24]

Past imperial roles have shaped foreign economic policy long after empires disappeared. The attachment of Britain to the sterling area and an illusory international role for its currency has been used to explain part of the poor economic performance of the British economy since 1945.[25] In the postcolonial world, privileged regional trading relations have persisted, often tied to the pursuit of foreign policy goals; export controls directed against strategic adversaries are another variant of foreign economic policy that can have substantial economic consequences.

These protectionist or trade-distorting results of a particular external

[23] Trebilcock, " 'Spin-off' in British Economic History: Armaments and Industry, 1760-1914," *Economic History Review*, 2nd series, 22 (December 1969), 485-90.

[24] Jacques Marseille suggests that privileged colonial markets in the interwar period served to trap French resources in declining sectors and to skew French trade patterns even after decolonization. See his *Empire colonial et capitalisme français* (Paris: Albin Michel, 1984), 84-86.

[25] For the debilitating effect of stop-go policies on British investment, see Sidney Pollard, *The Wasting of the British Economy: British Economic Policy 1945 to the Present* (London: Croom Helm, 1982), chap. 6.

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strategy are far more difficult to estimate than the fiscal and structural effects. They bear a close resemblance to the negative structural effects of military spending: potentially conservative and economically stultifying outcomes of state policies designed to achieve political or strategic ends.

Japan in the 1930s: Testing the Effects of an Ambitious Strategy

The economic consequences surrounding the fiscal, structural, and protectionist effects of an ambitious external strategy are likely to be negative for the domestic economy. They usually involve expenditures that are hard to control and that may crowd out private investment; anticompetitive effects on firms in the defense sector; and a foreign economic policy tilted toward protectionism. Only the possibility of technological gains (one element of the structural effects) points to clear benefits—though that view, as mentioned above, is contested.

Because the signs in Figure 1 are more likely to be negative than positive, a country case that combines external ambition, rising military burdens, and economic dynamism is anomalous; it indicates that some of the arguments outlined above should be qualified or amended. Japan in the 1930s offers such an anomalous case, an ideal first test for examining the linkages—fiscal, structural, and protectionist—between stellar economic performance and external aggrandizement, and for weighing those explanations against others that have been offered for Japan's economic record during this period.

A description of the Japan of fifty years ago, between the Depression and Pearl Harbor, resembles later records of the postwar "economic miracle":

> . . . Japan passed through a period of exceptionally rapid economic growth. In manufacturing industry her progress was especially remarkable. She demonstrated her command of new skills and technologies. She made extensive additions to her capital equipment at home and she invested heavily in regions beyond her own shores. At a time when international trade was stagnating, her exports flourished. In a wide range of products and in a diversity of markets she became a formidable competitor of the older industrial countries of the West. . . .[26]

The outlines of that decade are clear: high growth, a shift to more capital-intensive industry, a brilliant export record. There was, however, a darker side to this expansion even in purely economic terms. Dualism grew more pronounced within the economy and its wage structure, and

[26] G. C. Allen, *Japan's Economic Expansion* (London: Oxford University Press, 1965), 1.

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productivity growth tapered off in the later part of the decade.[27] Nevertheless, the contrast with other, more advanced, industrial economies in an era of depression is striking.

Equally striking, and the principal point of this inquiry, is the coupling of Japan's economic record with military expansion, which had begun before the Manchurian incident in 1931, but took on new dynamism during the decade. In contrast to postwar Japan, which has been a favored example of the benefits of low military spending and forced decolonization, Japan in the 1930s offers an example of an apparently strong and positive relationship between external burdens and economic performance.

Closer scrutiny of the Japanese economic record during the 1930s has long been avoided for fear of embarrassment. For the Japanese, a decade that led to the catastrophe of the Pacific War is best forgotten, particularly since a different postwar strategy produced enviable economic success. For outsiders as well, it has been easier to view the 1930s through the dark lens of Japanese aggression. For the left, the economic record of that era was contaminated with militarism and war; for conservatives, there was, in addition, a growing state involvement in the economy. The present effort to reexamine the economic consequences of choices made in the 1930s does not mean that those choices should be condoned. Criticism of aggression on the ground that it does not pay for the aggressor state is a weak moral argument; conversely, the argument that military expansion may produce economic benefits does not mean that aggression should be applauded.

A second caveat should be registered. Since my concern is with the economic consequences of an ambitious foreign policy and not with war, the period before the beginning of full-scale aggression against China in 1937 is of greatest interest here. Some attention will be given to the post-1937 period, but the shift to wartime footing had significant economic consequences that are not under discussion.[28]

Keynes in a Uniform? Fiscal Effects of Military Expansion

An observer of Japanese economic policy in the 1920s—a decade of relatively poor economic performance—would have been surprised at the turn taken after 1932. For Japan in the 1920s closely resembled Britain after 1945: its attachment to the international rules of the game led to

[27] Described by Michio Morishima, *Why Has Japan Succeeded?* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1982), 112, 130-31.

[28] Admittedly, the line blurs because Japan, by one estimate, was involved in ten internal or international conflicts between the Meiji Restoration and 1945. Nevertheless, with the possible exception of the Russo-Japanese War, the level of economic mobilization remained low until 1937.

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stop-go economic policies aimed at reestablishing the yen at its pre-1914 gold parity. With a stiff dose of deflation, Finance Minister Inoue succeeded at precisely the wrong moment: just when the Great Depression caused a collapse in the market for Japan's exports (particularly raw silk).[29] As deflation was exacerbated by world depression, a dramatic policy change was brought about after December 1931 by growing political discontent and military pressure: "What followed probably could not have been anticipated: one of the most successful combinations of fiscal, monetary, and foreign exchange rate policies, in an adverse international environment, that the world has ever seen."[30]

The Japanese cabinet, led by Finance Minister Korekiyo Takahashi, implemented a classic Keynesian pump-priming strategy from 1932 to 1936: deficit spending (a lid on taxes, increased public expenditure), a lowering of interest rates, and, perhaps most critically, going off the gold standard, devaluing the yen, and introducing exchange controls. The results of this package of policies were equally classic: fiscal stimulus and sharp recovery in exports produced a rapid increase in output, a reinforcement of the shift toward heavy and capital-goods industry, and an increase in investment. As one observer noted, by 1937 (*before* the invasion of China), Japan "could claim to be an industrialized state," and by 1940, "one of the great trading nations of the world," surpassed as an exporter only by the United States, Britain, and Germany—a feature that has not been emphasized in the conventional and distorted portrait of autarchy.[31]

The Takahashi "break with orthodoxy" included an increase in government expenditure, the greatest share of which went to the military. How critical was the increase in military spending to Japanese economic expansion in the first half of the 1930s? It was hardly dramatic at first: as a percentage of central government expenditures, it surpassed the level of 1920 only in 1937; as a percentage of net domestic product, it hovered around 6 percent (slightly below the level of 1920-21) until the big jump in 1937.[32] Even the relative share of military spending in the increase in

[29] Hugh Patrick, "The Economic Muddle of the 1920s," in James William Morley, ed., *Dilemmas of Growth in Prewar Japan* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1971), 239-44, 255; Allen (fn. 26), 1-2.

[30] Patrick (fn. 29), 256.

[31] Allen (fn. 26), 6, 227; on the Takahashi program, see Patrick (fn. 29), 256-59, and Takafusa Nakamura, *Economic Growth in Prewar Japan* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1983), chap. 9. Gross national expenditure grew at an average annual rate of 4.6% during the decade of the 1930s, more than during any preceding period; the percentage share of heavy industry in manufacturing output grew from 32.8% in 1930 to 43.5% in 1935, and to 58.8% in 1940. See Nakamura, Tables 1.5 and 1.15, pp. 7 and 23.

[32] Patrick (fn. 29), Table 8, p. 251; Nakamura (fn. 31), Table 1.22, p. 39.

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government expenditure is open to some reinterpretation because the Takahashi budgets directed spending toward two centers of discontent—rural areas and the military. If one combines local and central government expenditures, relief (principally directed to rural areas) surpassed military spending in the Takahashi years.[33] Despite the surge in demand for the underutilized heavy industries that military spending provided, the impact of direct military demand (as compared to the multiplier effects of increased government spending and the resultant general increase in demand) was relatively small: on one estimate, in the first half of the decade, government (including military) demand for steel represented only about 10 percent of the total. As Nakamura notes, "Although the mood was one of expanding military demand, the scale of actual demand was limited."[34]

Military spending was only one element in the novel economic program that Japan instituted in 1931-1936 to overcome economic depression; it served the positive role of such expenditure in a period of excess capacity. Because the conquest of Manchuria was, as even Kenneth Boulding admits, "almost fantastically cheap," and the depression was a very deep one, negative fiscal effects of the new course took some time to appear. The Takahashi economic program responded to military demands, but these became pre-eminent—though still not uncontested—only after an attempted coup by radical officers (the February 26 incident of 1936), which resulted in the assassination of Takahashi and other political leaders.

Following that incident, the new Finance Minister, Baba Eiichi, conceded the budgetary demands of the military by increasing government expenditure in an economy nearing full employment, in which heavy industry was embarking on an investment surge. The result was as classic an example of overheating as the Takahashi policy had been of pump-priming: imports ballooned and the balance-of-payments deficit widened. At the same time the military pressed for massive investment plans that would build up strategic industries in Japan and the empire (particularly Korea and Manchuria). These conflicting adamantine demands, confronting the constraint of the balance of payments, necessarily pointed

[33] *Ibid.*, 238.

[34] *Ibid.*, 248; compare Nakamura's evaluation with a contemporary one: "relatively small orders for armaments and munitions helped to develop industries which produced a much larger volume of chemical fertilizers, industrial chemicals, metals and machinery for general industrial purposes." See Elizabeth B. Schumpeter, ed., *The Industrialization of Japan and Manchukuo, 1930-1940: Population, Raw Materials, and Industry* (New York: Macmillan, 1940), 14-15. Both Nakamura and Schumpeter diverge somewhat from the overall assessment of the impact of military spending given by Henry Rosovsky in *Capital Formation in Japan, 1868-1940* (New York: Free Press, 1961), 27.

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toward a widening of direct controls over external transactions—a course favored by some before the outbreak of war with China, and one mandated soon after.[35]

The semi-war economy of 1936-1937 and a proliferation of controls during the war with China typified one fiscal effect of military spending that Japan was finally unable to avoid: its uncontrollable increase—in this case not caused by inflation or the peculiarities of procurement, but by the institutional power of the military and their grandiose plans to expand production while pursuing a full-scale war in China. The crowding out that occurred in these circumstances, however, was *not* a crowding out of investment, but of private consumption—a pattern that appeared well before the war with the United States.[36] The trade-off was set by two constants: military preferences and *external* constraints—no foreign borrowing and the need to maintain sufficient non-yen bloc exports to pay for those imports essential to strategic industries and military procurement.[37]

Structural Effects of Expansion: State Intervention, Competition, and Innovation

Associated with the image of military-driven economic growth in Japan in the 1930s is that of an economy increasingly cartellized, dominated by the great *zaibatsu* (industrial combines), and subjected to state direction and control. It is a package viewed with intense distaste by most Western economists; others have offered the image as a distorted preview of the beneficial role that the Japanese state was to play in the economy of the 1950s and 1960s. That conventional image—whether viewed in a positive or a negative light—is inaccurate in certain respects. Yet the structural effects of Japan's expanded military role are still worth examining. How was Japan able to escape some of the inefficiencies and drags on innovation that have been attributed to an enlarged defense industry?

The Japanese political economy in the 1930s was not necessarily an in-

[35] For accounts of this period (1936-1940), see Arthur E. Tiedemann, "Big Business and Politics in Prewar Japan," in Morley (fn. 29), 302-9; Nakamura (fn. 31), chap. 10; Schumpeter, "Conclusion: Industrial Development and Government Policy, 1936-1940," in Schumpeter (fn. 34).

[36] Nakamura (fn. 31), 290-91; the slow growth of consumption as compared with investment was characteristic of the 1930s (and the 1950s): *ibid.*, 7. Jerome B. Cohen notes that during the Pacific War, consumers in Japan were hit harder than those of any other major belligerent; see his *Japan's Economy in War and Reconstruction* (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1949), 56.

[37] At earlier times of military exertion, particularly 1893-1913, Japan had turned to the international capital markets to supplement its domestic savings. The collapse of the international capital markets during the Great Depression closed this option during the 1930s. On the question of foreign borrowing, see William W. Lockwood, *The Economic Development of Japan*, expanded ed. (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1968), 253-58.

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creasingly cozy and collusive relationship between a monolithic, directive state intent on military build-up and a highly concentrated industry. Japanese politics in the 1930s and even the 1940s was reminiscent of pre-1914 Germany, displaying the same pattern of oligarchic competition in a setting of economic dynamism, military adventurism, and diplomatic ineptitude. The Japanese "state" remained a set of unstable coalitions, with each of the principal actors—the military, the civilian bureaucrats, and the *zaibatsu*—divided internally. Even in a wartime political setting after 1937, military cabinets were forced to govern as other cabinets had governed in the past—"by informal coalitions or working agreements with career civilian bureaucrats" and, it might be added, with the necessary cooperation of the *zaibatsu*.[38] By 1940, "the government, despite its numerous powers on the statute books, was not a cohesive, unifying directive force in the economic sphere"; at the outbreak of the Pacific War, after years of controls, there was "no centralized responsibility for planning and executive economic mobilization."[39]

State intervention in industry did expand over the decade, with 1937 marking a watershed here as it did in macroeconomic management. Since the Meiji Restoration, strategic industries had received special attention from the state. During the 1920s, however, and even during the years of recovery and initial armament before 1936, direct state involvement in industry was minimal: "there was no economic regimentation, no control of consumption and little or no restriction on the investment of capital in Japan." The principal instruments for influencing industrial structure were the Major Industries Control Law (1931), which encouraged the formation of cartels in order to restrict competition, and subsidies that favored the shipping and shipbuilding industries. These measures were generally ineffective: the cartels tended to be "weak and unstable"; the influence of the Ministry of Commerce and Industry was largely hortatory (through its Rationalization Bureau); and one instrument that was potentially useful in an industrial policy—import protection—was rendered largely superfluous by the devaluation of the yen. The government did encourage concentration in the steel industry, but protection of the industry was weakened at times to encourage imports of needed supplies from abroad. Apart from steel and shipbuilding, a clear-cut state design to encourage heavy industry selectively was hard to discern.[40]

[38] Robert M. Spaulding, "The Bureaucracy as a Political Force, 1920-1945," in Morley (fn. 29), 76.

[39] Cohen (fn. 36); cf. the judgments cited in Chalmers Johnson, *MITI and the Japanese Miracle* (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 1982), 153-54.

[40] See G. C. Allen's excellent contemporary account, "Japanese Industry: Its Organization and Development to 1937," in Schumpeter (fn. 34).

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Among the military and the reform bureaucrats allied to them, an emphasis on state ownership, planning, and direction of the economy in the interests of national military power had been growing for some time. After the annexation of Manchuria, these programs found expression in a succession of plans produced before the outbreak of the war with China, most notably the Five-Year Plan for Key Industries. The plans were designed to extend state control and to develop militarily significant heavy industries—steel, coal, metals, armaments, machine tools, automobiles, and chemicals. Consumer-goods industries were given short shrift.[41]

The contribution of such government plans to the growth of heavy industry in the late 1930s was probably slight. As described above, a shift to heavy industrial production and exports had accelerated with only a modest military stimulus in the early 1930s: that sectoral development would have continued, as it had begun, without direct state intervention. Ironically, the overly ambitious investment plans introduced in 1937 were soon undercut by the demands of the war in China: the military could not have both its desired expansion of industrial capacity and the war. The plans subsumed in the system of wartime controls "were not so much plans as ex post facto responses to conditions. . . ."[42] The pressures of war did bring about an intensification of the shift to Japan's new industrial structure (soon to be destroyed by American bombing), but, because of the tight constraints imposed on imports, only at the expense of consumers and the industries that met their needs.

The structural effects of military expansion in the 1930s may not have produced a closely guided march toward a new industrial structure, but emphasis on external military goals certainly did not hinder the structural change. The Japanese military favored innovation and a shift toward the most advanced sectors of the world economy; whatever the impact of their formal plans, they did not want an out-dated arsenal. Certain sectors, such as automobiles and aircraft, did owe their existence directly to military influence and state nurturing.[43] The military provided additional demand for sectors that were the "cutting edge" of the time; much of their expansion was based on linkages (chemicals-electricity-metals) and on the existence of civilian demand for the same industrial products.

Military demands pushed Japan toward an industrial structure that it

[41] For accounts of the plans, see Nakamura (fn. 31), 276-85, 300-301; Johnson (fn. 39), 130-32; Mark R. Peattie, *Ishiwara Kanji and Japan's Confrontation with the West* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1975), 185-216.

[42] Nakamura (fn. 31), 276, 300; Peattie (fn. 41), 216-19.

[43] It is hard to imagine a time when Japan did not produce automobiles, but here the military expansion of the 1930s was also a turning point: starting with 500 units in 1930, Japan reached a level of 48,000 units in 1941; aircraft went from 400 to 5,000. See Cohen (fn. 36), 2-3.

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would finally achieve in the 1950s and 1960s. Paradoxically, the *failure* of its tightly designed plans for industry meant that an expanding military sector stimulated competition rather than fostering a group of favored inefficient firms. Military demands on heavy industry served to weaken the grip of the old *zaibatsu*, whose power had reached its peak in the 1920s and early 1930s, because they were relatively weak in that part of the economy.[44] Sectoral trends in the 1930s gave an important edge to "new *zaibatsu*," such as Japan Nitrogen or Nissan. More directly, military suspicion of the established leaders of business reinforced these trends, since officers turned to newer enterprises for partners in imperial economic development. In Manchuria, after the Kwantung Army failed to develop the territory through state control, the military discovered that rapid development was possible only through the hated capitalists. To achieve their development goals without rewarding the old combines, they turned to the new *zaibatsu* who were already deeply involved in the industries that satisfied military demand. In October 1937, they restricted the South Manchurian Railway Company, which had been the principal development agency, to transportation, and transferred industrial development to the Manchukuo Industries Development Company; one of the military's favored new groups, Nissan, held half of the capital, and the Manchukuo government the other half. The new *zaibatsu* tended to be led by "new men" more sympathetic to the aims of the military, such as the head of Nissan, Yoshisuke Ayukawa. These entrepreneurs were "largely from a technological background and psychologically in tune with the army economic planners, since they were production rather than finance oriented and had a technologist's interest in the manipulation of raw materials."[45]

Japan's Colonial Empire: Protected Refuge or Source of Competition?

Japanese foreign economic policy in the 1930s was shaped by its colonial empire, which was contiguous to Japan and carved out in a threatening international environment—an important feature that would shape its economic development. Its core remained Taiwan, Korea, and finally Manchuria; its basis in strategic concerns was particularly clear-cut in northeast Asia.[46]

[44] Nakamura (fn. 31), 252.

[45] Tiedemann (fn. 35), 289; also see Peattie (fn. 41), 215-16. On Ayukawa and Nissan, see David Halberstam, *The Reckoning* (New York: William Morrow, 1986), 134-36.

[46] Mark Peattie, "Introduction," in Ramon H. Myers and Mark R. Peattie, eds., *The Japanese Colonial Empire, 1895-1945* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1984), 15-18; on the importance of contiguity, see Bruce Cummings, "The Legacy of Japanese Colonialism in Korea," *ibid.*, 482.

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The economic effects of empire were shaped by Japan's status as a relatively poor, late-industrializing society (though a highly successful one), which differentiated Japan from older imperial powers such as Britain and France. As Kublin has observed, "the tremendous stakes and her limited resources permitted Japan, a relatively backward and undeveloped country, only the barest margin for political, military, and economic error."[47] The empire had to pay, but Japan differed from other colonial powers in the way in which the empire was made to pay: not by penny-pinching financial orthodoxy, but by development. Colonies were regarded as investments. Samuel Ho notes that, among the colonial powers, "the Japanese were unusually development-oriented . . . both the colonial governments and Japanese capitalists reinvested in their colonies a substantial share of the surplus that they controlled."[48] Japan directed colonial development in its own interests, managing to capture most of the surplus produced and to shape the colonial economies into a pattern of complementarity with its own. Distortion resulted, but it existed within a relatively dynamic economic relationship. The colonies did not languish under imperial neglect; if anything, Japan paid excessive attention to these imperial assets.[49]

The economic role of the colonies was first of all that of a granary, relieving the balance-of-payments pressures of rice imports by creating imperial self-sufficiency in critical foodstuffs. Taiwan and Korea thus became "agricultural appendages of Japan."[50] This primitive colonial pact was shattered under the pressures of the 1930s, when Japan tightened economic integration within the empire, not simply by constructing a trade and currency bloc, but through forced industrialization in Korea and Manchuria. Japan was perhaps the only colonial power "to have located modern heavy industry in its colonies: steel, chemicals, hydroelectric facilities in Korea and Manchuria, and automobile production for a time in the latter."[51]

Heavy state involvement in colonial development could have produced stagnation caused by protection of less dynamic metropolitan sectors through a trading bloc or hostility to economic development in the colonies that threatened metropolitan economic interests. Japan escaped those costs of empire and the stagnation of a traditional colonial pact when it redefined development and complementarity in a way that permitted in-

[47] Hyman Kublin, "The Evolution of Japanese Colonialism," *Comparative Studies in Society and History* 2 (October 1959), 82, 77-78.

[48] Samuel Pao-San Ho, "Colonialism and Development: Korea, Taiwan, and Kwantung," in Myers and Peattie (fn. 46), 385.

[49] Kublin (fn. 47), 80.

[50] Ho (fn. 48), 348-50.

[51] Bruce Cumings, "The Northeast Asian Political Economy," *International Organization* 38 (Winter 1984), 12-13.

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dustrialization on the periphery. External ambition and the need to develop Japan's military-industrial base played a role in this shift, but so did the peculiar position of Japan as a late industrializer: both the military and the needs of colonial development promoted the "sunrise" sectors of the 1930s. The heavy and capital-goods industries developing in the 1930s found expanding markets in the empire; the traditional export industries, particularly textiles and raw silk, were oriented toward markets in Europe and the United States. Because it was new, Japan's empire also did not contain many vested interests that could obstruct rapid development: colonists were not an effective political force against the state.[52]

The empire thus became a source of competition and experimentation within the Japanese economy, not a refuge of declining sectors and ossified interests. Cheap imports of food from Taiwan and Korea accelerated the decline of Japan's agricultural sector, which, virtually alone among domestic economic sectors, did not recover during the 1930s.[53] Despite agitation by the Imperial Agricultural Society, the state, concerned with industrial wages and possible discontent in the colonies, refused to restrict colonial exports of food, choosing merely to stabilize prices and to slow agricultural production in the colonies.[54]

The potential for exit to the colonies and the beginnings of industrialization within the empire also upset efforts to cartelize Japanese industry in the 1930s: some cartel agreements extended only to Japan proper; aggressive firms could transfer production to the colonies and thus escape restrictions on production. In the case of steel, conflict between Japanese and Manchurian producers disrupted efforts to organize the steel sector.[55] And, as has been mentioned, Manchuria in the 1930s served as a magnet, not only for the new *zaibatsu*, but also for those military men and bureaucrats who were toying with state planning. Rather than favoring powerful domestic interests that might have hindered economic advance in both Japan and the empire, the Japanese government chose industrial development on the periphery. Japan's empire, in short, was not a backwater of the Japanese economy, but its frontier.

Japan in the 1930s: The Benefits and Burdens of Aggressive Upward Mobility

A closer look at Japan's economy in the 1930s serves to revise the conventional image of an economy that moved rapidly toward autarchy, state

[52] Lewis H. Gann, "Western and Japanese Colonialism: Some Preliminary Comparisons," in Myers and Peattie (fn. 46), 498.

[53] Patrick (fn. 29), 215.

[54] Schumpeter (fn. 34), 144-47; Ho (fn. 48), 363-64.

[55] Schumpeter (fn. 34), 713, 774.

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control, and a militarized economic structure. Japan's foreign policy ambitions and the economic changes instituted to further these ambitions were far less important in the first half of the decade than in the later years; the turning point was the war against China in 1937. The fiscal stimulus instituted under Takahashi did include an increase in military spending (but was not limited to it); the devaluation of the yen, and the export boom and import substitution that it stimulated, were equally or more important. The structural effects of military spending were also limited at first: the shift in Japan's industrial structure before 1937 owed more to overall economic growth than to the specific effects of military expansion. Finally, while economic integration of the Japanese empire was tightened in the 1930s, it served the purposes of a distorted and accelerated industrialization in northeast Asia, imposed at the cost of certain domestic Japanese interests. Empire, in this case, was a prod to changes in Japan's industrial structure that were already underway.

Even after the move to a war footing, as some sectors were built up from nothing, much of the planned expansion of heavy industry foundered on the demands of the war in China. Expansion that did take place came about at the expense of private consumption and the consumer-goods industries. State direction of the economy toward military goals accelerated after 1936 as import constraints tightened, but Japan was never a smoothly running totalitarian machine, even after the outbreak of the Pacific War: business resistance and autonomy remained high, and the state harbored feuding factions. Imperial integration did not produce autarchy: the empire failed to provide Japan with adequate supplies of strategic products—metals and petroleum in particular—and the need for imports from outside the yen bloc was both a persistent barrier to military plans for investment and a spur to military expansion in the search for greater autonomy.[56]

All of the foregoing suggests that the *weight* of Japan's external strategy has been overstated in conventional accounts as an explanation of the country's economic performance in the 1930s. Of equal interest, however, are the *signs* of the fiscal, structural, and protectionist effects produced by external ambition (see Figure 1). Although the balance was mixed, it appears that Japan did enjoy positive benefits from its external strategy, and that the course of military expansion was not entirely a burden on the economy. The Takahashi strategy of 1932-1936 had the anticipated results and, in a deeply depressed economy, the new course worked brilliantly. A different mix of military and social expenditures might have

[56] On the lack of self-sufficiency in the empire, see Peattie (fn. 46), 35.

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produced more benefits for the Japanese population, but the economy's recovery in a bleak international context was striking.

Although military spending did not dominate public spending before the middle of the 1930s, military pressure for more resources did have another positive effect: *policy innovation*. Japan's break with orthodoxy under Takahashi was due in part to military demands; later in the decade, Finance Minister Ikeda devised additional means to accommodate increased military spending while minimizing controls.[57] The later impetus to state direction of the economy—which had mixed results—came directly from reform bureaucrats and military officers. This was not the first time that military demands had brought about institutional innovation: the Bank of England was founded in part to finance British naval expansion; France's lack of a similar institution proved to be a major inhibition on naval competition with Britain in the 18th century.[58]

Countering these positive fiscal effects was the equally classic end of the experiment in 1936-37: investment and war demands collided in a balance-of-payments crisis and produced an economy of growing controls. The country did not escape the negative fiscal effects of its ambition: for institutional reasons, military spending proved to be uncontrollable. Japan's experience during the 1930s (and earlier) raises the difficult question of whether military claims on resources can reach a stable equilibrium, or whether increased expenditures lead to increased institutional power in a cycle that points toward fiscal excess.

The structural effects of military spending reinforced changes in the Japanese economy that had begun well before the 1930s. The convergence of military demands and the evolution of the Japanese economy toward more capital- and technology-intensive industries resulted from the peculiarities of Japan's position in the international economy and the bases of military power in the interwar years.

Astute observers at the time saw that this symbiosis was more than a spin-off effect—that Japan was not creating an industrial structure suited for war and nothing else: there was "no real distinction between peace and war industries."[59] The role of state intervention—apart from growing military procurement—has probably been exaggerated: direct intervention was late and imperfect; the grandiose plans of the mid-1930s perished on the plains of North China. Nevertheless, military preferences during this period were oriented toward technological change and the new industries. And, given the industrial organization of Japan, those

[57] Peter Gourevitch discusses the configurations that produced other "breaks with orthodoxy" in the 1930s in "Breaking with Orthodoxy: The Politics of Economic Policy Responses to the Depression of the 1930s," *International Organization* 38 (Winter 1984), 95-130.

[58] McNeill (fn. 13), 180.

[59] Schumpeter (fn. 34), 328.

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preferences favored new entrepreneurs and new industrial combines over the old *zaibatsu*, fostering competition rather than stifling it.

The Japanese case demonstrates a variant of Alexander Gerschenkron's arguments concerning the importance of international position—late industrialization, "catching up" rather than being on top—for reaping the structural benefits of military expansion. In nations that see themselves as catching up in military technology and capability, the space for conservative military preferences is lessened. One would hardly find in the Japan of the 1930s the classic attitude of the dominant power expressed by the Royal Navy in 1828: "Their Lordships feel it is their bounden duty to discourage to the utmost of their ability the employment of steam vessels, as they consider that the introduction of steam is calculated to strike a fatal blow at the naval supremacy of the Empire."[60]

Similarly, *not* being on top influenced Japan's attitude toward its colonial empire and minimized the negative imperial effects on its economy: its cost-benefit calculations were more careful since its margin of maneuver was smaller. The empire, like all else, had to contribute directly—not just as a status symbol—to Japan's economic development and its leaders' goal of "a rich country and a strong army."

As an upwardly mobile, relatively poor power within the international hierarchy, Japan had always been more careful than most to weigh economic costs and benefits in its external advance. During the 1930s, however, such reckonings were increasingly pushed aside by many among the military and their allies within the bureaucracy. Hosoya has observed that values such as "expansionism, national prestige, and 'national mission' increasingly took precedence over economic values of foreign policy decision-making."[61] A reassertion of pre-industrial values (Schumpeter's explanation) could be advanced for this shift, but it could also be argued that Japan became a "premature" hegemonic power: its leaders perceived a wider margin of economic maneuver. Such incipient attitudes were confirmed when the Pacific War brought its stunning initial successes, and the Japanese elite telescoped decades of development to attain the smug outlook of a dominant power. After years of frenetic concern with building military potential, Japan enjoyed one year of hegemonic complacency. Then, after the setback at Guadalcanal in November 1942, its leaders began their first "really energetic attempt to raise over-all production sights."[62] But it was too late: the swift descent through blockades and bombing to economic ruin took less than three years.

[60] Cited in McNeill (fn. 13), 226.

[61] Chihiro Hosoya, "Retrogression in Japan's Foreign Policy Decision-Making Process," in Morley (fn. 28), 88.

[62] Cohen (fn. 36), 55.

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Japan's economic development in the 1930s, and the importance of its situation in the international military and economic systems for determining the economic effects of an ambitious external strategy, can be compared to other countries characterized by such a strategy, by the prominent role of the military in the economy, or by both. The cases of Germany in the 1930s, of contemporary developing countries, and of the superpowers in the post-1945 international system permit a further inquiry into whether, and under what conditions, the effects observed in the Japanese case will be found.

Economic Dynamism and External Strategy: Comparisons and Qualifications

Hitler's Germany: Rearmament and Economic Recovery

The economics of rearmament in National Socialist Germany has inspired considerable scholarly controversy, in contrast to the relative lack of attention paid to prewar Japan. In large measure, such scrutiny of the German case was motivated by the belief that German rearmament offered evidence of Hitler's military plans; the debate over the latter was not concerned with the connection between the rearmament program and Germany's overall economic performance in the 1930s. In more recent examinations of the German economic record, however, the superficial similarities between Japan and Germany in the conventional accounts have given way to even more striking contrasts that suggest a partial explanation of Japan's superior economic record.

Germany's economic performance was hardly as stellar as Japan's during the 1930s, nor was its break with past policies as great. National Socialist economic policies increased public spending (in line with preceding governments); the novelty was that it was now financed through short-term bills or longer-term loans, which many viewed as dangerously unorthodox. Military spending, however, was not a significantly large budgetary element during the initial, and most marked, years of recovery before 1936. As in Japan, after 1936, "rearmament did assume a much greater significance, with a high level of expenditure, a general restructuring of the economy for waging war and the deliberate restraining of consumer expenditure."[63]

One contrast with Japan lay in the external dimension of Germany's new course. Unlike Japan, Germany did not pursue an export-oriented

[63] R. J. Overy, *The Nazi Economic Recovery, 1932-1938* (London: Macmillan, 1982), 47. On Nazi economic policies and their relationship to rearmament, see esp. chaps. 1 and 4.

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recovery. The Nazi elite, and particularly Finance Minister Hjalmar Schacht, remained constrained by orthodox beliefs and by Germany's international economic position: the Deutschmark was overvalued to restrain inflation and to assist in repaying German debt (which prevented a radical break from the international economic order). In the early 1930s, Germany, unlike Japan, was too important an exporting power and too central to the world economy to hope for a devaluation that would not be countered by its trading partners.[64] The combination of an overvalued exchange rate and an economic recovery led to a familiar pattern: extension of controls over foreign transactions to ensure that foreign exchange would be conserved for "essential" purposes—rearmament among them.[65]

The policies pursued by Germany, then, were distinct from those chosen by Japan under Takahashi: Schacht's conservatism was reinforced by Germany's perceived international economic constraints. As in Japan, however, the fiscal impact of external strategy was relatively minor before 1936. When war preparations assumed first priority after 1936, however, Germany faced the same severe trade-offs in an economy at full employment; a further shift of resources toward the armaments sector reduced economic performance.[66]

In part, this overall reduction in economic performance resulted from the structural effects of military expansion, which appear to have been less positive in Germany than in Japan. Far more research is required on government-business relations in both Japan and Germany during this period; it appears, however, that certain aspects of these relations contributed to the relatively poor performance of the German economy and its arms sector before World War II. Although the shift toward new sectors of the economy—aircraft, chemicals, automobiles—was apparent in Germany, military spending also favored heavy industrial sectors which, unlike their counterparts in Japan, were already well established in Germany, and were hardly the most dynamic in the economy.[67] A plausible argument can be made that technical progress would have been greater had export and consumer industries been favored instead of being increasingly penalized by the demands of rearmament.

The inefficiency introduced by political intervention was equal in sig-

[64] *Ibid.*, 22-25.

[64] *Ibid.*, 51-52; William Carr, *Arms, Autarky and Aggression* (London: Edward Arnold, 1972), 39, 51-56.

[66] Overy (fn. 63), chap. 6.

[67] T. W. Mason, "Some Origins of the Second World War," in Esmonde M. Robertson, ed., *The Origins of the Second World War* (London: Macmillan, 1971), 120-21; Overy (fn. 63), 54-55.

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nificance to the pattern of industrial sectors favored by rearmament. The tenuous state of government-business relations and a chaotic lack of coordination and planning paralleled those in Japan during the same period. All observers agree that the state itself was too disorganized to coordinate the rearmament efforts and that the military paid little attention to the economic implications of their programs.[68] Two features of National Socialist rearmament stood in sharp contrast to Japan's. One was the extension of state ownership and control in the armaments sector; inefficiencies in that sector (such as cost-plus contracts and tight control of the arms firms by the military) resulted in lowering the performance of private firms working for the military as well: "those commercial firms brought into war-work also became infected by the incompetence and inflexibility of the system."[69] The second feature was the additional layer of interference and corruption introduced by the Nazi Party itself, which had no analogue in prewar Japan.

For Germany, the protectionist effects of its expansionist policies can only be estimated since, unlike Japan, Germany began to construct a New Order in Europe only with the outbreak of war. Asymmetric economic relations with the Balkans had been strengthened in the 1930s (a process described by Albert Hirschman) but the importance of the Balkans as a trading partner was never great; in contrast to Japan's pattern of colonial development and industrialization, Germany sought to acquire raw materials and to freeze dependent relations. An even more overt exploitation was characteristic of German policies in occupied Europe: a pattern of plunder to avoid domestic conflict over wartime economic burdens.[70]

Despite the parallels that have been drawn between the economic records of Germany and Japan during the 1930s, the economic effects of Germany's expansionist strategy seem to have been more negative, for reasons of both the international situation and domestic politics. Germany's position in the international economy inhibited policy innovation and the choice of instruments such as devaluation. Because it was already a major industrial power, the structural effects of rearmament tended to favor established sectors, and there is little evidence that German rearmament favored new or more dynamic firms, as Japan's military did. The party regime added an inefficient and aggrandizing political layer to an increasingly overstretched economy.

[68] Mason (fn. 67), 123; Burton H. Klein, *Germany's Economic Preparations for War* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1959), 79; Overy (fn. 63), 63; Wilhelm Deist, *The Wehrmacht and German Rearmament* (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1981), 91-96.

[69] R. J. Overy, "Hitler's War and the German Economy: A Reinterpretation," *Economic History Review*, 2nd series, 35 (February 1982), 287.

[70] Klein (fn. 68), 60-61; Overy (fn. 63), 30.

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The Newly Industrializing Countries and the Japanese Model

One implication of independence for developing countries in the decades since 1945 has been the need to provide for their own defense. The potential competition between military expenditures and development goals has drawn attention and controversy. Much of both has centered around the findings of Emile Benoit, whose study of a large sample of developing countries between 1950 and 1965 revealed—to his own surprise—that "countries with a heavy defense burden generally had the most rapid rate of growth, and those with the lowest defense burdens tended to show the lowest growth rates." Benoit suggested some positive contributions of defense expenditures to economic growth—relaxation of restrictive fiscal and monetary policies (one of the fiscal effects noted above), development of infrastructure, support for research and development (with structural spin-off effects), and development of human capital—while admitting that evidence for these benefits "is imprecise, anecdotal, and difficult to evaluate."[71]

Benoit's study stimulated an outpouring of aggregate studies that have added more heat than light to the question of defense burdens and economic performance.[72] Most of Benoit's critics seem determined from the outset to disprove any positive relationship between defense spending and growth. They have chosen different samples from different historical periods, making comparison difficult; the quality of the data employed has been questioned.[73] They usually found very weak negative relationships, which is not surprising in view of the large samples analyzed. In certain cases, the data for a particular country are in direct contradiction with each other.[74]

One can conclude from these studies that the relationship between military spending and economic growth appears stronger when country

[71] Benoit, "Growth and Defense . . ." (fn. 11), 271, 276-77; for an earlier statement of Benoit's research, see *Defense and Economic Growth* (fn. 11).

[72] David Lim, "Another Look at Growth and Defense in Less Developed Countries," *Economic Development and Cultural Change [E.D. & C.C.]* 31 (January 1983), 377-84; Nicole Ball, "Defense and Development: A Critique of the Benoit Study," *E.D. & C.C.* 31 (April 1983), 507-24; Riccardo Faini, Patricia Annez, and Lance Taylor, "Defense Spending, Economic Structure, and Growth: Evidence Among Countries and Over Time," *E.D. & C.C.* 32 (April 1984), 487-98; Saadet Deger and Ron Smith, "Military Expenditure and Growth in Less Developed Countries," *Journal of Conflict Resolution* 27 (June 1983), 335-53; Gavin Kennedy, *The Military in the Third World* (London: Duckworth, 1974), chap. 10; Saadet Deger, *Military Expenditure in Third World Countries: The Economic Effects* (London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1986).

[73] Frank Blackaby, "Introduction," in Nicole Ball and Milton Leitenberg, eds., *The Structure of the Defense Industry: An International Survey* (London: Croom Helm, 1983), 16.

[74] See, for example, the findings on India by Faini et al. (fn. 72), 496, and Deger and Smith (fn. 72), 175; or those on military spending by military regimes by Benoit (fn. 11, 1978), 273, and Kennedy (fn. 72), 163.

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samples are broken down by region and level of development, and that aggregate studies tell us little about the processes by which military spending affects economic performance. The term "developing countries" conceals wide variations in economic structure (industrial base) and composition of military expenditure; one would therefore expect different countries to experience different relations between economic growth and military expenditure.

One significant cluster, defined by level of industrialization, resembles the Japanese case described above. Most of the newly industrializing countries, which shared high economic performance during the 1960s and 1970s, also possess substantial defense industries. Trebilcock has noted the close relationship between the international transfer of military technology, the founding of defense industries, and the progress of industrialization among the "NICs" of Europe before World War I.[75] Military expenditures created additional demand for capital goods industries during a period when expenditure trade-offs were less severe: military spending was not an alternative to other forms of public spending in this era, nor did military research and development drain expertise from the private sector.

Certain similarities with interwar Japan are apparent in the few existing national studies of defense industries in contemporary NICs. While positive fiscal effects of military spending are reduced in a post-Keynesian era in which the state's role in the economy is extensive, structural effects of military spending remain significant. As early as the 1930s, the military in Brazil pressed for the development of the steel and petroleum industries.[76] In Taiwan and South Korea, intense security concerns, exacerbated by American policy in the 1970s, stimulated the development of more capital- and technology-intensive industrial sectors.[77] Moreover, the positive impact of defense spending on human capital formation seems to have been more significant than in earlier periods.[78]

Equally important, however, is the relationship of the incipient defense industry to overall economic strategy. The balance-of-payments effects of military expenditures, which could be negative under conditions of technological dependency, are offset in many NICs by export-oriented defense industries: Brazil, South Korea, Taiwan, and Singapore are all sub-

[75] Clive Trebilcock, "British Armaments and European Industrialization, 1890-1914," *Economic History Review*, 2nd series, 26 (May 1973), 254-72.

[76] John D. Wirth, *The Politics of Brazilian Development, 1930-1954* (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 1970), chaps. 4 and 5.

[77] Janne E. Nolan, *Military Industry in Taiwan and South Korea* (London: Macmillan, 1986), 112-13.

[78] *Ibid.*, 121.

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stantial arms exporters.[79] The need to compete in an international arms market—even though influenced by state policies—undoubtedly reduces the negative structural effects of military spending on the defense industry. In countries that have developed a defense industry within an overall posture of import substitution, the technological and other benefits of military spending seem to have been reduced: India and Argentina are cases in point.

The growth of arms industries and exports in the newly industrializing countries—from Israel to South Korea to Brazil—offers some confirmation of the structural effects of military spending found in interwar Japan: economic benefits will be greatest in those countries whose current industrial structure lags somewhat behind current military technology. "Catching up" would probably produce the maximum benefits, so long as the gap is not too large (which would limit the spinoff effects). Intermediate powers in the international hierarchy are also likely to escape other negative economic effects, since they, like Japan, may make more careful cost-benefit calculations. (These conclusions may not fully apply in an era of foreign borrowing and large-scale military aid.) The contrast between interwar Japan and Nazi Germany as well as the experience of the contemporary NICs suggest that it is countries in the middle of the international division of labor that are likely to reap beneficial economic effects from external ambition.

External Ambition, Economic Decline, and System Stability

The foregoing conclusions confirm Gilpin's formulations on hegemonic decline: there is no inevitability to the connection between economic stagnation and an ambitious foreign policy, but the connection is likely to be much closer in hegemonic or dominant powers than in powers that view themselves as upwardly mobile. In a mature industrialized economy, the opportunity costs of military spending are likely to be higher and the fiscal effects negative. Particularly in a post-Keynesian era, the need for military demands to increase total effective demand is reduced. Competing socially valuable demands on public spending will be higher than in developing countries. Valuable alternative investment by the private sector is likely to be crowded out by military expenditures.

Hegemonic powers—those at the top of both the economic and the power hierarchy—have neither the economic nor the military incentives (except in wartime) that produce beneficial structural effects in powers

[79] On the relationship between arms production and strategies of import substitution and export orientation, see Herbert Wulf in Ball and Leitenberg (fn. 73), chap. 10.

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that are catching up within the international system. Nor do they suffer the tight external constraints of many upwardly mobile countries, constraints that necessitate careful attention to cost-benefit calculations and economic effects of external ambition. The signs of the feedback effects sketched earlier are therefore more likely to be negative in the case of dominant powers.

Quantitative studies of the relations between military spending and economic performance in industrialized countries have been less sophisticated than those analyzing developing countries. Simple associations between higher growth and lower military expenditures wash out if more countries (France in particular) are added. Although military expenditures seem to have a negative association with investment, the part played by military spending in explaining lower economic performance among the industrialized countries after 1973 seems small, since military spending increased at a slower rate than in previous decades.[80] As in the case of developing countries, more detailed examination of the processes by which military spending affects economic outcomes is necessary. In the case of the superpowers, those effects may have long-run implications for the international configuration of power.

The economic consequences of the Reagan administration's military build-up are likely to contrast sharply with those that flowed from the militarization of Japan's economy in the 1930s. The elements in the contemporary U.S. defense build-up represent a reverse image of that of Japan fifty years ago; America's different place in the international system is a major explanation of the probable negative effects. The early Reagan budgets did represent a variant of military Keynesianism, but the economic outcomes have been determined by the central rather than peripheral role of the United States in the world's financial and monetary systems. While Japan's reflation and rearmament were coupled with sharp devaluation, the deficits produced by the American tax cuts and defense build-up resulted in a stronger dollar. Until military demands grew beyond its full-employment resources, Japan squared the circle through classic multiplier effects that induced a high rate of growth. The Reagan administration managed the feat through foreign borrowing—an avenue closed to Japan in the 1930s. The sources of the fiscal stalemate that developed in the United States are different from those in Japan: conflicting demands between military build-up and a middle-class welfare state on the one hand, and between big business and the military on the other. In the event that the contribution of foreign savings declines, however, in-

[80] On investigations of these relationships, see DeGrasse (fn. 7), and Smith (fn. 9), 61-76; criticisms of these arguments are offered by Blackaby (fn. 73), 8, 15-16.

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vestment in the U.S. is likely to suffer in the contest between guns and butter; authoritarian Japan was able to force a different trade-off.

Structurally, the results of devoting increased resources to defense remain controversial in the United States. Military spending contributed to Japan's economic expansion in prewar advanced sectors. What Robert Reich has called Reagan's disguised industrial policy has accelerated the decline of America's basic industry and agriculture (much like that of Japan's agriculture in the 1930s); whether it will produce new, export-oriented industries (and equivalent employment) is questionable. The structural effects of investment in the Strategic Defense Initiative (S.D.I.) and its technologies symbolize the difficulty of predicting economic costs and benefits of even a major military program.[81] Critics and skeptics point to two probable negative structural effects. First, given the pattern of S.D.I. expenditures so far, benefits are likely to flow to established defense contractors rather than to smaller, innovative firms.[82] Second, critics view the potential spin-off effects (like those of most recent defense expenditures on research and development) as low, and the opportunity costs for civilian research and development (public and private) as high. They argue that expenditures made in such a centralized manner, for specific system needs rather than basic research, are less likely to provide technologies that are transferable to commercial applications.[83] Supporters of the S.D.I. argue that if research and development funds were removed from the program, they would not be used for other research and development programs, and that beneficial gains in infrastructure, personnel, and commercial applications are likely.[84]

Finally, in connection with fiscal and structural consequences, one can begin to see protectionist effects in regional trade arrangements such as the Caribbean Basin Initiative and the free-trade agreement with Israel. Those initiatives, driven by foreign policy goals, are a vivid illustration of the client economies that the United States believes offer safe possibilities for economic integration; in the meantime, the demands grow for raising protectionist barriers against more dynamic foreign producers.

[81] See the analysis of the costs of alternative strategic defense systems and their fiscal impact by Barry M. Blechman and Victor A. Utgoff, *Fiscal and Economic Implications of Strategic Defenses* (Washington, DC: Westview Press/Foreign Policy Institute, 1986).

[82] William D. Hartung et al., *The Strategic Defense Initiative: Costs, Contractors & Consequences* (New York: Council on Economic Priorities, 1985), 24.

[83] Robert B. Reich, "High Technology, Defense and International Trade," in John Tirman, *The Militarization of High Technology* (Cambridge, MA: Ballinger, 1984), 33-43; Hartung (fn. 82), 6-10, 107-11; Harvey Brooks, "The Strategic Defense Initiative as Science Policy," *International Security* 11 (Fall 1986), 182-84.

[84] Gerold Yonas, "Research and the Strategic Defense Initiative," *International Security* 11 (Fall 1986), 185-89.

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While the negative economic consequences that follow from military expansion by a dominant power fit well with Gilpin's assumptions, the effects of military competition on the challenger in the system, the Soviet Union, are of even greater significance for the evolution of the international order. The Soviet Union is the first socialist rival of a dominant power since the Industrial Revolution. Although the evidence is hardly conclusive, Moscow's international ambitions seem to have had clearly negative effects on its economic performance in recent decades. The principal fiscal effect of its military program has been a repeated choice for consumption and military spending over investment.[85] The structural effects of its military ambitions on Soviet economic growth also seem negative. On balance, although some observers have argued that increased military spending strengthens the most efficient sector of the Soviet economy and spawns technological spin-offs for civilian sectors, most specialists maintain that transfer of technology is limited, not only between the defense and the civilian sectors of the economy, but even within the defense sector.[86] This pattern of limited spin-offs has been reinforced by the priority that the defense industry enjoys within the economy and the secrecy in which it has been shrouded.[87] The beneficial economic effects of military expansion that may have characterized the planned economy of the 1930s seems to have disappeared:

> In the 1930s the planning system served both industrial and military policy equally well. But now a contradiction has emerged between the two, for while the system hinders progress in civilian industry, it allows the state to protect the defence sector and ensure that it is more successful in pursuing technological progress.[88]

The U.S.S.R. remains the only power with a formal imperial sphere, one directly linked to its external strategy. The protectionist effects on Soviet economic performance of its ties to Eastern Europe may have become negative: a heavily subsidized and inefficient regional economy confronts political unrest at a time when Soviet resources are stretched by renewed military competition with the United States.[89]

[85] See Rush (fn. 12).

[86] For the positive view of structural effects, see John W. Kiser, "How the Arms Race Really Helps Moscow," *Foreign Policy* 60 (Fall 1985), 40-51.

[87] David Holloway, *The Soviet Union and the Arms Race* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1983), 146; Mikhail Agursky, *The Soviet Military-Industrial Complex* (Jerusalem Papers on Peace Problems 31, Jerusalem: The Magnes Press, Hebrew University, 1980), 9-16, 25.

[88] Holloway (fn. 87), 171.

[89] The economic costs and benefits of the Soviet sphere are the subject of considerable controversy. On the question of whether and why the U.S.S.R. subsidizes Eastern Europe, see Michael Marrese, "CMEA: Effective but Cumbersome Political Economy," *International Organization* 40 (Spring 1986), 287-327; Josef C. Brada, "Soviet Subsidization of Eastern Eu-

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The negative feedback effects of military competition on the economies of the United States and the Soviet Union in recent decades suggest an often overlooked reason for the relative stability within the international system since 1945. Robert Gilpin, Kenneth Waltz, and others argue that the clear bipolarity of the present system has played a principal role in lowering the risk of hegemonic war; others give credit to nuclear weapons.[90] Although power configuration and military technology both figure in explaining the restrained competition between the United States and the Soviet Union, the economic effects described—peculiar to the post-1945 system—provide a supplementary explanation. Before 1914 and again in the 1930s, external ambition and economic dynamism were linked: peculiar forms of late-industrializing capitalism in Germany and Japan provided the principal destabilizing force in the international system. Today, the dominant power as well as the challenger face the erosion of their economic edge; the other major industrial powers—Germany and Japan—no longer pursue external ambitions through military means. Thus, the ambitious pay an economic price that restrains their contest, while more dynamic economies (in contrast to the 1930s or the 1890s) are not ambitious. Until the elite of another ascendant power (China?) discovers the means to reinforce its military ambitions with economic success, the stability that has characterized the present system for more than four decades is likely to persist.

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rope: The Primacy of Economics over Politics?" *Journal of Comparative Economics* 9 (March 1985), 80-92; Valerie Bunce, "The Empire Strikes Back: The Evolution of the Eastern Bloc from a Soviet Asset to a Soviet Liability," *International Organization* (Winter 1985), 13-28.

[90] For a review, see John Lewis Gaddis, "The Long Peace: Elements of Stability in the Postwar International System," *International Security* 10 (Spring 1986), 99-142.

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THE UNITED STATES, THE SOVIET UNION, AND THE POLITICS OF OPPOSITES

By MIROSLAV NINCIC

PROGRESS in coming to intellectual grips with the forces driving U.S.-Soviet relations has been slow. Historians, and a number of political scientists, have provided excellent interpretative chronologies of the onset of the cold war and of the vicissitudes of detente,[1] and a body of capable work has been produced on strategic competition and arms control,[2] as well as on matters of crisis prevention and management.[3] Nevertheless, there has not been much systematic work on the structure of the overall relationship between the United States and the Soviet Union, or on the forces behind the rhythms and cycles that these relations display. Too often, inquiry into what drives the rivalry is relegated to a set of questions to which the answer seems to be so obvious as never to require explication. It is apparent, however, that the policies of the superpowers toward each other are shaped by the interplay of domestic and international circumstances, and that the former are probably no less important than the latter. This premise has been repeatedly confirmed with respect to the arms race[4] and may well be true of Soviet-American relations more generally.

[1] See, for example, John Lewis Gaddis, *Strategies of Containment: A Critical Appraisal of Postwar American National Security Policy* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1982); Louis J. Halle, *The Cold War as History* (New York: Harper & Row, 1967); Walter LaFeber, *America, Russia, and the Cold War: 1945-1975* (New York: John Wiley & Sons, 1976); and Bernard A. Weisberger, *Cold War, Cold Peace: The United States and Russia since 1945* (Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1984).

[2] The literature is vast. Representative items include Thomas R. Cusack and Michael D. Ward, "Military Spending in the United States, Soviet Union, and People's Republic of China," *Journal of Conflict Resolution* 25 (September 1981), 429-70; Stephen J. Majeski and David L. Jones, "Arms Race Modeling: Causality, Analysis and Model Specification," *Journal of Conflict Resolution* 25 (June 1981), 259-83; Michael Nacht, *The Age of Vulnerability* (Washington, DC: Brookings Institution, 1985); Miroslav Nincic, *The Arms Race* (New York: Praeger, 1982); and William K. Domke, Richard C. Eichenberg, and Catherine M. Kelleher, "The Illusion of Choice: Defense and Welfare in Advanced Industrial Democracies: 1948-1978," *American Political Science Review* 77 (March 1983), 19-35.

[3] See, for example, Arthur M. Cox, *Russian Roulette: The Superpower Game* (New York: Times Books, 1982); Alexander L. George, *Managing US-Soviet Rivalry: Problems of Crisis Prevention* (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1983); and William R. Uri, *Beyond the Hotline: How We Can Prevent the Crisis that Might Bring on a Nuclear War* (Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1985).

[4] See, for example, Cusack and Ward (fn. 2); Nincic (fn. 2); and Miroslav Nincic, "Fluc-

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By examining the nature and impact of public preferences regarding U.S. Soviet policy, this article will treat a specific aspect of the policy's domestic context. Historically, official attitudes toward the Kremlin have interacted with public opinion in a variety of ways. At times, the government's policy has been manipulative, seeking to mold national opinion in a manner consistent with its preferences and programs. At other times, policy has been reactive, as an administration has let actual or anticipated public attitudes toward the U.S.S.R. shape its own attitudes and behavior.

President Truman's tough anti-Soviet rhetoric of 1947 and his emphasis on the communist danger were largely guided by the need to mobilize the nation around his major foreign policy and national security initiatives—most prominently the Truman Doctrine and an increasing reliance on nuclear weaponry as tools of external policy. In 1950, one State Department memorandum observed that it seemed "necessary" for the administration to oversimplify Soviet intentions in order to ensure congressional and popular support for its defense program[5]—a defense program that was largely rooted in the apocalyptic views contained in the famous NSC-68 secret memorandum. Similarly, some of the vehemence in President Reagan's early denunciations of the Soviet Union flowed from a desire to rouse the country's anxiety and distrust toward the Soviets, which had softened in the years of detente.

Although official attitudes on East-West matters are sometimes intended to mold public opinion, it is a matter of pragmatic politics, and especially electoral considerations, that these attitudes must also be responsive to existing national moods. As John Lewis Gaddis has convincingly argued, major shifts in U.S. containment strategies have been influenced at least as much by domestic electoral concerns as by the Kremlin's actions.[6] By the 1952 electoral campaign, the nation displayed signs of frustration with the costs and ineffectiveness of containment, and the Republican Party, guided largely by John Foster Dulles, reacted by urging a policy of "rollback" designed to reverse Soviet gains in Eastern Europe (rather than merely to contain Moscow's power). Despite its declared policy of "massive retaliation" with nuclear weapons in response to a Soviet foray outside of its sphere of influence, the Eisenhower administration's natural prudence and fiscal conservatism led it to be content with a combination of flamboyant rhetoric and considerable caution regarding the

tuations in Soviet Defense Spending," *Journal of Conflict Resolution* 27 (December 1983), 648-60. But see also Charles Ostrom and Robin F. Marra, "US Defense Spending and the Soviet Estimate," *American Political Science Review* 80 (September 1986), 819-42.

[5] Quoted in Ernest R. May, "The Cold War," in Joseph S. Nye Jr., ed., *The Making of America's Soviet Policy* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1984), 226.

[6] Gaddis (fn. 1).

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actual use of force. Some years later, John F. Kennedy's strong statements on missile gaps, and his call for a major defense build-up, seemed to stem from his perception of where the greatest electoral advantage lay. During Richard Nixon's quest for the Presidency, his conciliatory stance on U.S.-Soviet issues was also probably dictated by electoral concerns and a recognition of public weariness with confrontation and large defense budgets. Ronald Reagan's election in 1980 (and the campaign platforms of his principal opponents) reflected the fact that American public opinion was no longer in sympathy with the idea of detente, and that more votes were to be gained by hardline than by conciliatory policies.

Public attitudes have encouraged major shifts in Washington's Soviet policies even outside the specific context of electoral politics—simply in the normal play of influence between the public and the government. Although President Truman did seek to heighten public hostility toward the Soviet Union in order to gain support for his national security program, it appears that his initial decision to move away from cooperation was taken in response to increasing public irritation with Moscow's postwar behavior. Schlesinger points out that "[it was] the mass of ordinary people who first became angry over Soviet actions and then turned the Truman administration around."[7] Similarly, President Carter's increasing assertiveness toward the Kremlin at the end of his incumbency had much to do with the average American's growing anger with the U.S.S.R. in the late seventies. To some extent, then, public feelings have provided an independent drive behind U.S.-Soviet relations.

As George F. Kennan has observed,

> The motivations for American policy toward the Soviet Union from the start have been primarily subjective, not objective in origin. They have presented for the most part not reactions to the nature of an external phenomenon (the Soviet regime) but rather the reflections of emotional and political impulses making themselves felt on the American scene.[8]

Adam B. Ulam concurs, remarking that, with regard to the Soviet Union, "powerful gusts of popular emotion rather than factual data about the international situation determined the main lines of American foreign policy."[9]

Though the public may have made its influence felt at crucial junctures, the limits to the role it can expect to play are defined by its overall

[7] Arthur Schlesinger Jr., "The Cold War Revisited," *New York Review of Books*, October 25, 1979, p. 17.
[8] Kennan, *The Nuclear Delusion: Soviet-American Relations in the Atomic Age* (New York: Pantheon Books, 1983), 229.
[9] Ulam, *Dangerous Relations* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1983), 7.

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apathy and patchy knowledge regarding the substance of foreign policy issues, including those involving the Soviet Union. For example, despite the centrality of NATO to America's security arrangements, in 1964 only 58 percent of those surveyed knew that the United States was a member of NATO, while 38 percent thought that the U.S.S.R. was a member.[10] In 1985, 28 percent of the public believed that the United States and the Soviet Union had fought as enemies during World War II, and 44 percent did not know that the two had been allies at the time.[11]

Two Models of Opinion Formation

Because the public's levels of knowledge and understanding are quite low, its input into foreign policy cannot proceed from an informed assessment of needs and possibilities. Thus, if we assume that public opinion does bring itself to the attention of the makers of foreign policy, we must understand how it is formed and how it is expressed. Two possibilities suggest themselves.

Some observers assume that such opinion operates in the form of occasional bursts of emotion, interspersed with long stretches of apathy. This may be termed the *impulsive model* of attitude formation; it implies that the overall foreign policy mood of the nation, based on emotional whim rather than coherent thought and adequate information (Ulam's "gusts of popular emotion"), is likely to be volatile and unpredictable. This image is held by George Kennan who, referring to the American public, has observed that it is

> similar to one of those prehistoric monsters with a body as long as this room and the brain the size of a pin: he lies there in his primeval mud and pays little attention to his environment: he is slow to wrath—in fact, you practically have to whack his tail off to make him aware that his interests are being disturbed; but once he grasps this, he lays about him with such blind determination that he not only destroys his adversary but largely wrecks his native habitat.[12]

The prediction to be drawn from this assessment is that public moods will swing wildly, and often erratically, between extremes of indifference or complaisance on the one hand, and belligerence on the other. Such an expectation is consistent with the thinking of certain other political sci-

[10] Lloyd A. Free and Hadley Cantril, *The Political Beliefs of Americans* (New York: Simon & Schuster, 1968), 60.

[11] Adam Clymer, "Polling Americans," *New York Times Magazine*, November 10, 1985, p. 48.

[12] Kennan, *American Diplomacy, 1900-1950* (New York: New American World Library, 1959), 59.

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entists. In his study of mass belief systems, Philip Converse observed that the mass public (as opposed to elites) exhibits very little constraint among its various opinions, which are not mutually linked and anchored by a contextual grasp.[13] Accordingly, these opinions tend to be quite unstable. James Rosenau, in a pioneering study of public opinion on foreign policy, maintained that the "mass public" (the vast majority of Americans) knows very little about its nation's external affairs and does not care to know much more: its response to international events is "less one of intellect and more one of emotion, less one of opinion and more one of mood." And, while the dominant mood "is, of course, indifference and passivity," it sometimes "swings from one extreme to another."[14] Converse generally referred to the opinions of individuals; Rosenau appeared to have in mind both the attitudes of individuals within the mass public and of the aggregate itself.

This image of the American public as moody and lurching between attitudinal extremes may or may not apply to other areas of foreign affairs, but it does not adequately describe feelings toward the Soviet Union.

The American people never could have been described as overly trusting or complaisant with regard to the Soviet challenge. As Figure 1 illustrates, opinions of the Soviet Union have fluctuated within a band ranging from cool to frigid; the portion of the public expressing a favorable opinion of the U.S.S.R. has always been less than half.[15] In addition, overall opinion cannot be described as particularly volatile. Rather, it has tended to track the general state of relations between the two countries: improving progressively during the fifties and sixties, registering new highs during the period of detente, deteriorating during the collapse of relations in the early eighties, and stabilizing thereafter.

Americans have always endorsed the need for military preparedness. For example, 80 percent of the respondents who were asked to list the major factors in U.S. greatness in 1976 mentioned military strength.[16] Normally, some 20 percent of the public wants larger defense budgets; but in 1980, when Soviet-American relations had deteriorated and when

[13] Converse, "The Nature of Belief Systems in Mass Publics," in David Apter, ed., *Ideology and Discontent* (New York: Free Press, 1964), 206-61.

[14] Rosenau, *Public Opinion and Foreign Policy* (New York: Random House, 1961), chap. 4.

[15] In Gallup and N.O.R.C. surveys, respondents were asked to rank their approval of the U.S.S.R. on a ten-point scale, with +1 to +5 indicating some level of approval and −1 to −5 indicating some level of disapproval. The Gallup data are for 1953, 1954, 1956, 1966, 1967, 1973, 1976, 1978, 1979, 1980, 1981, 1982, and 1983. N.O.R.C. data are for 1972, 1974, 1975, 1977, 1985, and 1986.

[16] Roper Public Opinion Center, "Factors in America's Greatness," *Current Opinion* 6 (January 1976), 2.

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

FIGURE 1
U.S. PUBLIC APPROVAL OF THE SOVIET UNION

U.S. defense outlays had declined as a percentage of national income during the late seventies, 60 percent of respondents desired more military spending. After the dramatic increase in defense outlays under the Reagan administration in the early eighties, this figure declined to its traditional level of 20 percent.[17] The U.S. public has thus not been indifferent to the Soviet challenge, but it has not expressed rabid belligerence toward the U.S.S.R.

William Schneider reports that one-half of the public tends to agree with the view that "we should take a strong position with the Soviets now so they won't go any further, but at the same time we should try to reestablish good relations with them." By contrast, only about one-quarter of the respondents agree with each of the two more extreme positions that "we should do nothing that is likely to provoke an American-Soviet conflict, but instead should negotiate and reason out our differences," and that "it is clear the Soviets can't be trusted and we will have to rely on increased military strength to counter them."[18]

Despite the dramatic deterioration in superpower relations during the early years of the Reagan administration, and even though public approval of the Soviet Union had fallen to 21 percent, most Americans were

[17] Bruce M. Russett and Harvey Starr, *World Politics: The Menu for Choice*, 2d ed. (San Francisco: Freeman, 1985), chap. 10.

[18] Schneider, "Rambo and Reality: Having It Both Ways," in Kenneth A. Oye, Robert J. Lieber, and Donald Rothchild, eds., *Eagle Resurgent? The Reagan Era in American Foreign Policy* (Boston: Little, Brown, 1987), 49.

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not really swept up in the wave of hostility. A majority of those questioned wanted arms control talks, cultural and educational exchanges, and even joint efforts to solve energy problems.[19] In 1984, when relations were still icy, 90 percent of the public endorsed nuclear arms control negotiations, and over 80 percent wanted to expand academic and cultural exchanges with the Soviet Union.[20]

It is apparent that, despite proven support for a strong defense and overall distrust of the U.S.S.R., the U.S. public is not comfortable with unbridled hostility and saber-rattling—not at all Kennan's prehistoric monster wildly lashing out when jarred by events. If we assume that it has a somewhat more systematic approach to evaluating policy toward the U.S.S.R., two considerations must be kept in mind. On the one hand, Americans appear to have a reasonable standard of what desirable foreign policy should be; in all likelihood, they do measure governmental behavior against this standard. On the other hand, because of low levels of information and weak analytical tools for judging the conduct of foreign affairs, rather simple rules of evaluation must be thought to operate.

From what we have seen, it appears that the two values to which the public most consistently adheres regarding Soviet policy are those of strength and of peace. The first is reflected in support for adequate military power and in the conviction that the United States cannot deal with the Kremlin from a position of weakness or docility. The second is expressed in a desire for negotiated agreements between the superpowers and a dislike of pugnacious "high noon" postures and excessive militarism. Consequently, U.S. presidents have been led to promise both toughness toward the Soviet Union and efforts to avoid dangerous confrontation.[21] Beyond certain levels, however, these two values become increasingly incompatible, and choices must be made. We may suppose that, desiring both, the public will tend to reward behavior enhancing that value (either peace or strength) which appears currently most slighted in U.S. foreign policy.[22] We may also assume that the public evaluates both the symbolic and the tangible side of foreign policy—its tone and rhetoric as well as the concrete activities it produces.

Specifically, we hypothesize that, when current policies seem overly

[19] John E. Reilly, *American Public Opinion and US Foreign Policy* (Chicago: Chicago Council on Foreign Relations, 1983), 15.

[20] *The Harris Survey*, May 28, 1984, p. 3.

[21] Alexander L. George and Robert O. Keohane, "The Concept of National Interests," in Alexander L. George, ed., *Presidential Decision Making in Foreign Policy* (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1980), 225.

[22] This, of course, is based on the usual assumption that the marginal utility of a value increases the less one has of it.

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tilted toward military means and a confrontational tone, the public will prefer evidence of conciliatory behavior; when current policies seem excessively soft and accommodating toward the Soviets, evidence of resolute toughness will be preferred. This may be called the *politics of opposites* model of public opinion. While the impulsive model implies that public attitudes will amplify swings in U.S. policy toward the Soviet Union, the politics of opposites assumes that public influence is more likely to have a moderating role.



FIGURE 2
ATTITUDES PREDICTED BY THE POLITICS OF OPPOSITES

We can test the validity of the model with reference to recent history. If concern shifts toward the value that seems to be slighted by the U.S. government's Soviet policy, the public may be expected to approve of cooperative initiatives by hawkish administrations while frowning on similar behavior by administrations thought to be dovish toward the U.S.S.R. Of the nation's two most recent administrations, Ronald Reagan's has been unabashedly hawkish while Jimmy Carter's, except perhaps for its final phase, has been considered quite dovish. Ultimately, neither approach met with the public's wholehearted approval. In 1980, 60 percent of the respondents in a Gallup survey thought that President Carter was "not tough enough" in his dealing with the Soviet Union.[23] In 1983, on

[23] *The Gallup Poll: Public Opinion 1980* (Wilmington, DE: Scholarly Resources Inc., 1981), 52.

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the other hand, 56 percent of the public, when asked about President Reagan's approach, agreed with the statement that "while it's good to have someone as president who is firm with the Soviets, I worry that he might get us into another war." An identical percentage concurred with the view that "he doesn't seem to realize that negotiations to make peace are more important than building up the armed might of the U.S."[24]

Although this information provides some preliminary support for the hypothesis, it would be more revealing to examine whether fluctuations in public support for Reagan's and Carter's Soviet policies were actually correlated with their respective dovishness and hawkishness—i.e., whether the public preferred conciliatory moves by President Reagan and wanted tougher initiatives from President Carter. To avoid an overly mechanical approach, and to get a direct sense of how public feelings and foreign policy have interacted, we will begin by reviewing the major phases of Reagan's and Carter's Soviet policy and the shifts in public approval that they evoked.

Ronald Reagan, the U.S. Public, and the Soviet Union

Figure 3 displays the public's evaluation of Reagan's Soviet policy between 1981 and 1986, the policy of a president who is generally considered the most fervently anti-Communist and the most thoroughly distrustful of the Russians of any chief executive in the nation's recent history.[25]

Over the entire period, the portion of the public approving of the way President Reagan handled relations with the Soviet Union ranged from a low of 40 percent (October 1982) to a high of 65 percent (January 1986). Though this reflects a generally favorable evaluation, approval ratings have moved both up and down. The pattern of responses demonstrates that, with very few exceptions, Americans thought better of their president's policies when they moved away from confrontation than when they were pugnaciously hostile. Over the period of five and a-half years, and on the basis of the public opinion data at our disposal, we can distinguish thirteen shifts in approval ratings (A-M); all but two of these were in the direction anticipated by the hypothesis.

During the first period (A) the administration was busy sounding the tocsin on Soviet involvement with terrorism (an allegation later denied by

[24] *The Harris Survey*, May 9, 1983.

[25] The wording of the question was: "Tell me whether you approve or disapprove of the way President Reagan is handling this problem: relations with the Soviet Union." The figures are reported in *Gallup Report* No. 251 (Princeton, NJ: The Gallup Poll, 1986), 20.

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

FIGURE 3
PUBLIC APPROVAL OF PRESIDENT REAGAN'S SOVIET POLICY
1981-1986

the C.I.A.); declaring a new era of U.S. attitudes toward the Kremlin—an era of toughness where treaties would be no substitute for military strength; and describing the Soviets as an "evil force" bent on destroying the United States. During these months, public misgivings about Reagan's policy appeared to grow as approval dropped ten points (from 58 percent to 48 percent). This was followed (B) by a mild softening of rhetoric and a few, admittedly minor, conciliatory gestures.[26] Approval climbed back to 53 percent in late fall. In January 1982, however, relations took another turn for the worse. Martial law had been declared in Poland on December 13, 1981, and the administration proclaimed that arms talks would henceforth be linked to an improvement in the Polish situation. A meeting between Haig and Gromyko in Geneva on January 26 led to nothing but bitter recrimination.[27] Relations moved from cold to frigid, and approval dropped to 41 percent in March (C).

Though public support for the President's Soviet policies increased during the next few months (D), new dimensions of East-West tension emerged between mid-summer and mid-fall (E).[28] Relations were as icy

[26] In late September, for example, the President dispatched a letter to Secretary Brezhnev seeking a "framework of mutual respect"; this was followed, the next day, by a "frank" talk between Haig and Gromyko setting a date for arms talks in Geneva.

[27] Furthermore, the Soviet offer, in mid-March, to forgo further deployment of its nuclear weapons in the European U.S.S.R. if the United States installed no more medium-range missiles in Western Europe, was dismissed by President Reagan as "pure propaganda."

[28] The administration embarked on an all-out effort to stop its allies from providing the

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as they have ever been during the Reagan administration, and a meeting between Shultz and Gromyko in September failed to produce a thaw. Between June and October 1982, public approval of policy toward Moscow slid from 49 percent to a low of 40%.

Nearly a year of ambiguous foreign policy signals followed (F). On the one hand, the President took his rhetoric to new extremes with a speech, delivered to a group of evangelicals in March 1983, denouncing the U.S.S.R. as an "evil empire" that acts as the "focus of evil in the modern world."[29] At the same time, however, there was a flurry of arms control initiatives and other marginally constructive moves. Grain sales to the Soviets were once again liberalized, the administration ended its ban on furnishing gas pipeline equipment, and the I.N.F. and START talks in Geneva showed a fair amount of activity. Public approval of the President's Soviet policy remained low during this period, but declined no further.

A short-lived upswing in public approval followed (G). On September 1, the Soviet Union shot down a Korean Air Lines passenger plane, killing all 269 people on board. Amid widespread public indignation, the administration condemned this action, but the tone of the response was measured. Reagan described the downing as an "act of barbarism" and announced the curtailment of cultural, scientific, and diplomatic exchanges. Still, these sanctions were comparatively gentle, and the President explained the restrained response by observing that "it would be easy to think in terms of vengeance, but that is not a proper answer." Rather, he stressed that "we must not give up our effort to bring [the Soviet Union] into the world community of nations," and "we cannot, we must not, give up our effort to reduce the arsenals of destructive weapons threatening the world."[30] By most standards, this was a mild response. In any case, the tragedy was not allowed to stand in the way of a number of constructive initiatives,[31] and approval ratings climbed five points during

U.S.S.R. with pipeline equipment (causing considerable friction within the Alliance). In addition, Alexander Haig declared that trends in Soviet missile deployment belied conciliatory overtures, while the Soviets' proposal to cut their strategic weapons forces, if Washington would agree to shelve its medium-range missile plans, was dismissed as unacceptable. On July 19, Reagan announced an end to the U.S.-U.K.-U.S.S.R. negotiations on a Comprehensive Test Ban for nuclear weapons; two weeks later, each superpower expelled one of the other's leading journalists.

[29] He also undertook a renewed drive for MX deployment, launched his fateful "Star Wars" program, and accused "foreign" (read Soviet) agents of instigating the freeze movement within the United States.

[30] "Reagan Denouncing Soviet, Bars Series of Negotiations; Demand It Pay for Jet Losses," *New York Times*, September 16, 1983, p. 14.

[31] On September 26, 1983, Reagan announced a new set of positions on medium-range nuclear forces; soon after, he put forward a strategic arms proposal based on the build-down concept.

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this period—from 41 percent in August to 46 percent in November—after which a brief reversal (H) was registered. When the Soviets walked out of the Geneva arms talks in protest against initial deployments of U.S. medium-range missiles in Europe, the level of mutual recrimination rose once again. The percentage of the public endorsing the President's Soviet policy slipped slightly, to 43 percent.

The next phase (I) lasted throughout 1984 and witnessed steadily increasing public approval of Reagan's Soviet policy. This was also a time of generally responsible and statesmanlike dealings with Moscow.[32] The year was somewhat marred by the Soviets' refusal to participate in the 1984 Olympic Games in Los Angeles, but a number of steps set relations on a healthier course. In July, the two sides initialed an agreement to modernize the Hot Line, and Washington lifted its ban on Soviet fishing in American waters. On September 9, Secretary Shultz offered talks on restricting space-based weapons. Later that month, the Secretary of State met with Soviet Foreign Minister Gromyko, who, somewhat unexpectedly, was invited to the White House as well. On October 16, Soviet Party chief Chernenko expressed optimism regarding relations between the two sides. During this period, public approval consistently hovered above the 50 percent mark. On November 22, a new round of arms control meetings was announced and, in December, administration officials hinted that the U.S. might forsake advanced antimissile defenses in exchange for Soviet reductions in offensive arms. By January 1985, public approval of Reagan's policies reached 54 percent.

The new year began with mixed, but ultimately discouraging, indications on Soviet-American relations and slipping approval ratings (J).[33] In May, however, things were again in a constructive phase (K), and the tone got progressively warmer.[34] By fall, rumors of an impending first summit meeting between the President and the Soviet leader were confirmed and, on November 19, Reagan and Gorbachev met in Geneva. An aura of cordiality and optimism surrounded their talks; public approval of the President's Soviet policy soared to an all-time high of 65 percent.

The early part of 1986 (L) brought a warm exchange of televised New

[32] On January 16, 1983, the President softened his criticism of the U.S.S.R. and appealed for nuclear arms negotiations and a dialogue between the two countries. Although several days later Reagan submitted a report to Congress alleging Soviet violations of arms control obligations, he again called for improved relations in his State of the Union address on January 24.

[33] While there were useful bilateral contacts in Geneva, the talks did not seem to be leading anywhere; the President reiterated, with considerable fanfare, his charge that the Soviets had violated a number of arms treaty provisions.

[34] A trade agreement was signed, and President Reagan vowed to abide by the unratified SALT II Agreement.

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Year greetings between the two leaders, but the tone of relations cooled rapidly in the face of Reagan's commitment to the Strategic Defense Initiative and the obstacle it placed on the path of a second Reagan-Gorbachev summit.[35] As a new chill fell on relations, approval dropped to 57 percent in April. By June, the President made a constructive speech on the future of relations between the two superpowers; predictably, public approval once again moved upward during the last of the periods covered here (M).

Most of the observed periods confirm the notion that conciliatory moves by President Reagan were rewarded with increasing public approval of his Soviet policy, while bellicose initiatives provoked the opposite reaction. There was one major exception: during the spring and early summer of 1982 (D), a period of vitriolic anti-Soviet rhetoric, the public expressed growing approval. Another period (F) was marked by mixed indications of U.S. policy toward Moscow and a fairly flat, though gently rising, level of public approval. Because of the ambiguity, and for purposes of the following statistical analysis, this period will be treated as a disconfirmation of the hypothesis. Despite the one exception and the one ambiguous case, the evidence appears strong that, given Reagan's anti-Soviet credentials and tendency to rely on tough talk and military strength, the public's dominant concern was that relations might be allowed to deteriorate beyond safe levels. Consequently, nonconfrontational initiatives were considered especially necessary and welcome. During the Carter administration, public response had been very different.

Approval of Carter's Soviet Policy

Unlike his successor, President Carter was generally regarded as a conciliatory president on East-West matters. He had came to office on a pro-detente platform, arguing against an "inordinate fear of communism." Although he did display occasional periods of firm rhetoric and increasing sympathy for expanding military budgets, he was not, nor was he ever perceived to be, one of the more hawkish presidents of the United States. We have less information on the public's responses to his Soviet policy than we have on Reagan's; what we do have allows us to identify four distinct periods.[36] The data indicate that approval for Carter's policies vis-

[35] In addition, in an unusually provocative move, two U.S. warships sailed into Soviet waters in the Black Sea in March.

[36] Gallup seems to have started surveying public approval of presidential Soviet policies at the beginning of the Reagan Presidency. Data for Jimmy Carter's approval ratings are from various issues of the *Harris Survey*. Respondents were asked whether or not they approved of "Carter's handling relations with Russia."

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

FIGURE 4
PUBLIC APPROVAL OF PRESIDENT CARTER'S SOVIET POLICY
1977-1979

à-vis the U.S.S.R. fluctuated between 28 and 43 percent; in contrast to the Reagan period, support increased when Carter became more assertive, and tended to decline when he was conciliatory.

Our scores begin in June 1977, six months after Carter's inauguration. In the first phase (A), the President's attitude toward the Soviet Union was one of benign optimism that detente could be saved; it included several initiatives to maintain the momentum of cooperation carried over from the early seventies. SALT and Comprehensive Test Ban talks started in Geneva, and there was even serious mention (to the dismay of many of the President's supporters) of bringing Moscow into the Middle East peace process. Despite the President's insistence on needling the Soviets on their human rights record and his willingness to warn the Kremlin against foreign military involvements, he eschewed inflammatory rhetoric, believing that most problems could be resolved in a nonconfrontational manner. The public, however, was less convinced of the merits of a conciliatory approach. By June 1978, approval of Carter's Soviet policy slipped to 28 percent (the lowest point during his administration).

At approximately this time, the President's approach began to change. The new attitude was presaged by a speech delivered at Annapolis on June 7, in which he warned the Soviets that they must choose between cooperation and confrontation. The speech was more assertive and criti-

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cal of Soviet conduct than any that Carter had previously delivered.[37] In a new display of toughness, the President also decided to tighten controls on transfers of oil technology to the Soviets. As his stance became more confrontational, public approval of his Soviet policy experienced a significant upswing (B). Toward the end of the year, 43 percent of Americans thought Carter was doing a good job of handling the U.S.S.R.—up 15 points from the June level.

The third period (C), though marked by the President's growing disillusionment with Moscow, nevertheless saw him pushing hard for acceptance of the SALT II treaty, negotiations for which were entering their final phase. He went so far as to indicate that he wanted the United States to abide by the treaty provisions even if the Senate refused to ratify it. This must have been viewed as too much of a concession toward detente and to the Kremlin, and the public judgment of his policy took another nosedive, dropping to 31 percent by March of 1979. The length and data of the fourth period (D) are restricted because most questions referred to President Carter's handling of the hostage crisis rather than to the U.S.S.R. That period witnessed the conclusion of this phase of the strategic arms talks; in mid-June, President Carter and Secretary Brezhnev met in Vienna to sign the SALT II Agreement. The public rewarded this achievement with a somewhat higher approval score. Nevertheless, the difference between Carter's 37 percent at the time of Vienna and Reagan's 65 percent when he met Gorbachev in Geneva is significant.

The Politics of Opposites and America's Soviet Policy

Although the data are not suited to structural equation techniques, other statistical tools will provide an intuitively meaningful test of the hypotheses flowing from the politics of opposites model of opinion formation. Part A of Table 1 shows the number of increases ($\Delta+$) and decreases ($\Delta-$) in public approval of presidential Soviet policies on occasions when these policies were consistent with their perceived stance toward the Soviet Union (confrontational for Reagan, conciliatory for Carter) or opposite to that which this stance might have led one to expect; part B displays the probabilities associated with these numbers.

From these figures we can draw statements, cast in terms of conditional probabilities (p), that shed light on the model. We have assumed that, if the President is perceived as too much of either a dove or a hawk,

[37] Following the trials of dissidents Aleksandr Ginzburg and Anatoli Scharantsky, Carter announced a review of existing exchange programs. As part of the same overall policy, he also cancelled a sale of Sperry-Univac computer equipment to Russia.

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TABLE 1
PUBLIC ATTITUDES TOWARD THE PRESIDENT'S SOVIET POLICY*

Relation of Policy to President's General Stance	*Movement in Public Approval*		*Total*
	A. NUMBER OF INSTANCES		
	Δ+	Δ−	
Consonant	2	8	10
Opposite	6	1	7
Total	8	9	17
	B. PROBABILITY		
	Δ+	Δ−	
Consonant	0.12	0.47	0.59
Opposite	0.35	0.06	0.41
Total	0.47	0.53	1.00

* This table includes the following periods from Figures 3 and 4:

Consonant Δ+ : D, F (Reagan)
Consonant Δ− : A, C, E, H, J, L (Reagan)
A, C (Carter)
Opposite Δ+ : B, G, I, K, M (Reagan)
B (Carter)
Opposite Δ− : D (Carter)

the public will register increased approval of behavior contrary to the perceived stance or decreased approval of policies consistent with it. Let us begin with the assumption that approval will surge when policies are opposite to general predisposition. The conditional probability is:

$$p(\Delta+|\text{opposite}) = 0.35/0.41 = 0.85.$$

In other words, the data suggest that there is an 85 percent chance that approval will increase if the President acts in a way contrary to that which his general stance toward the Soviets would have led the public to expect; there is only a 15 percent chance that the public will disapprove of such contrary behavior. By extension, the odds that an increase rather than a decrease will occur in the presence of opposite presidential behavior are:

$$\overline{\Omega}_1 = p(\Delta+|\text{opposite})/p(\Delta-|\text{opposite}) = 5.7.$$

Thus, if the President acts contrary to expected stance, the public is 5.7 times more likely to respond with increased rather than decreased ap-

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proval of presidential Soviet policies: a strong endorsement of the hypothesis. How do these probabilities present themselves in the case of behavior that is consistent with public expectation? We can repeat the exercise as follows:

$$p(\Delta - | \text{consistent}) = 0.47/0.59 = 0.80.$$

Accordingly,

$$\overline{\Omega}_2 = p(\Delta - | \text{consistent})/p(\Delta + | \text{consistent}) = 4.0.$$

In other words, if a president's policy is consistent with his overall attitude toward the Soviet Union, the odds are 4 to 1 that public approval will decline rather than rise.

Possible Alternative Explanations

Though the evidence is certainly suggestive, we should address a rival hypothesis. As a competing explanation for the findings, one might argue that the different responses to Reagan's and Carter's Soviet policies were caused by the public's different feelings toward the Soviet Union rather than by presidential dovishness or hawkishness. Though intuitively compelling, the hypothesis does not seem to fit the evidence. Over the period covered by our data on the Carter and Reagan years, an average of 22 percent of the public expressed some level of approval regarding the U.S.S.R. During each of the four periods charted in the Carter administration, the public's opinion of the Soviets was above this average; yet during three of these periods, the President was either punished for an overly conciliatory policy (A,C) or rewarded for adopting a harder line toward Moscow (B). Similarly, during the Reagan years we examined, every survey but one (D) registered a lower than average public evaluation of the U.S.S.R.; yet, in all but one of the periods covered (the exception again is D), the public preferred nonconfrontational behavior. It would seem that the politics of opposites eclipsed overall feelings toward the Soviet Union in determining the public's policy evaluations.

Another competing hypothesis should also be addressed—one that leads to similar conclusions via a different, though less plausible, path. We have assumed that the politics of opposites is a product of the public's tendency to seek a balance between the objectives of peace and strength. Another mechanism, producing similar results, would start with the President's attempt to maximize his domestic support rather than with the public's desire to optimize its values. Here we would assume that the President's existing supporters are unlikely to shift their endorsement no

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matter what turn his Soviet policy might take, but that a significant number of people would support him only if he adopted an opposite behavior vis-à-vis the Kremlin. His movement away from what his supporters expect in terms of Soviet policy would thus be designed to capture that extra sliver of support, and the higher public approval scores would indicate that the stratagem worked. The notion cannot be rejected out of hand, but it does rest on a set of suppositions that are, on the whole, unconvincing. It assumes that established supporters will not defect despite the shift in Soviet policy, while newly courted supporters are supposedly willing to endorse the President because of his Soviet policy, no matter how they might otherwise feel about him. Even if we allow that the President seeks to maximize support, not for his overall performance but merely for his Soviet policy, we are still forced to believe that his old support will not defect despite his shift of policy, while new support will nevertheless be attracted. In both cases, the more likely result is that gains would be approximately matched by losses—a net wash from the perspective of the President.

Because the assumptions behind this explanation are rather implausible, the original hypothesis seems to be more valid as an explanation for the results of the study: the public (consisting of some overall supporters of the President and some nonsupporters) shifts its preference between tough and conciliatory policies depending on which seems generally more neglected—a tendency we have labeled the politics of opposites. It is worth stressing, however, that both mechanisms would produce the same results.

Policy Implications

The fact that, other things being equal, the public will tend to prefer assertiveness in dovish presidents while seeking a more conciliatory stance in hawkish chief executives has two major implications for the way the United States may interact with the Soviet Union.

The first is that there are limits on how far policies will be allowed to deviate, in either a conciliatory or a confrontational direction, from a moderate foreign policy that combines peace and strength. If a President is seen to depart too far from either of these two values, the public will demand that the neglected value be given greater prominence in national policy. The public's attitude is of course affected, and often amplified, by the guidance of the media, the preferences of interest groups, and the influence of the political leadership itself. Still, its malleability is limited and, in democratic politics, it is the final arbiter of political incumbency. Thus, we can assume that U.S. public opinion will normally limit the

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range of feasible policy toward the U.S.S.R. by making extremes politically costly. Contrary to what is sometimes assumed, therefore, the public may act as a moderating influence on the administration's Soviet policy.

The second (and related) implication is that the politics of opposites allows presidents to preempt the opposition by adopting, once in office, policies contrary to those that earlier rhetoric or action would have led the nation to expect. If an apparently dovish president wishes to become more assertive toward the Soviets, he may do so—not only with impunity, but even with the prospect of increased public support. The inverse is true as well. This tendency thus provides leaders with considerable flexibility to move in the opposite policy direction—though only reasonably pragmatic presidents would choose to benefit from this liberty.

A Possible Extension of the Model

A phenomenon that is in some ways parallel may also operate. Public evaluation of an administration's Soviet policy may clash with the mandate that a political leader may have inferred from the public's ideological inclination. Though we will not provide a comprehensive test of this hypothesis, and though it is no more than an interesting possibility, certain suggestions and statistical indications are worth considering.

To illustrate: a pronounced conservative mood in the country may not only increase the likelihood that the elected political leadership will be of a similar cast, but also give leaders of all ideological orientations the feeling that they must respond to this mood with appropriate policies. In the case of relations with the Soviet Union, this mood would presumably be interpreted as a mandate for a hard-line policy. At the same time, the electorate, perceiving a confrontational political bent in the administration, may reward predominantly conciliatory policies. Thus, the leaders' interpretation of their mandate may collide with the actual pattern of political rewards.

The core beliefs that define political ideology in the United States are usually associated with domestic policy, and, even more so, with issues of morality and lifestyle; but foreign policy beliefs to some extent also flow from overall ideological identification. For example, most Americans who characterize themselves conservatives also generally take more hawkish positions on external affairs than those who consider themselves liberals. The former tend to believe more strongly that too little is spent on defense, have a deeper conviction that communism is the worst form of government, and harbor a more pronounced coldness toward the Soviet Union.[38] The suggestion that a predominantly conservative public

[38] John Robinson, "The Ups and Downs and Ins and Outs of Ideology," *Public Opinion* 7 (February/March, 1984), 12-15.

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will exhibit a greater dislike for the Soviet Union is particularly significant for our hypothesis—sufficiently so to warrant independent confirmation here.

The question of their attitude toward the U.S.S.R., expressed in terms of a five-point approval scale, has frequently been asked of the American public by both the Gallup Organization and N.O.R.C.[39] These surveys provide 21 separate data points, each representing the percentage of respondents who expressed some level of approval of the Soviet Union. On 13 occasions since 1968, the Harris Survey has reported the proportion of respondents identifying themselves as either conservative or liberal.[40] It is therefore possible to establish how closely political ideology predicted feelings about the Soviet Union during the 13 years when data were available for both variables.

Soviet behavior is also likely to have affected public approval ratings. From the American perspective, the most alarming sort of activity is probably the direct external use of Soviet military force, which has occurred four times since the onset of the cold war: Hungary in 1956, Czechoslovakia in 1968, Afghanistan in 1979, and the destruction of the Korean civilian airliner in 1983. The latter two incidents are covered by our data.

The following regression equation incorporates the two hypothesized influences on public attitudes toward the Soviet Union:

$$approv\% = k - \beta_1[cons\%] - \beta_2[armed] + u$$

where *approv%* = the percentage of respondents expressing some level of approval of the Soviet Union; *cons%* = the percentage of respondents identifying themselves as political conservatives; and *armed* = a variable denoting whether or not one of the four instances of use of military force occurred during the twelve months preceding the survey that produced the corresponding value of *approv%*. The estimation of this equation, by the method of ordinary least squares, yielded the following results:

TABLE 2
COEFFICIENT ESTIMATES AND RELATED STATISTICS

Coefficient	*Standard Error*	*t value*
$\hat{\beta}_1 = -1.43$	0.68	2.11
$\hat{\beta}_2 = -16.96$	6.10	2.78
$\hat{k} = 78.800$		

$R^2 = 0.60$; Durbin-Watson 1.58; N = 13

[39] See fn. 15.

[40] The question of ideological identification was asked by the Harris pollsters in 1968, and on 12 subsequent occasions.

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Both coefficients are in the predicted directions, and both are more than twice their standard errors. As the value of the Durbin-Watson statistic indicates (DW = 1.58), first-order serial correlation does not appear to be a problem. For $\hat{\beta}_1$ the 90 percent confidence interval (the interval of numbers within which the true coefficient lies by a 90-percent probability) is bounded by the values −0.02 and −2.66. This allows us to predict, both in terms of a specific estimate and of a range of values, the decreases in public approval of the Soviet Union associated with a growth (of 1 percent, 3 percent, 5 percent, 10 percent) in the number of American conservatives. (See Table 3.)

TABLE 3
CONSERVATISM AND APPROVAL OF THE SOVIET UNION

Growth in Conservatism	*Predicted Drop in Approval of U.S.S.R.*	*Bounds of Prediction (based on 90% confidence interval)*
1%	1.43%	−0.2% to − 2.66%
3%	4.29%	−0.6% to − 7.98%
5%	7.15%	−1.0% to −13.30%
10%	14.30%	−2.0% to −26.60%

For example, if the number of conservatives were to increase by three percent, there is an assumed 90-percent probability that public approval of the Soviet Union would fall by between .6 percent and roughly 8 percent; our best estimate would be a decline of 4.3 percent.

There is consequently a significant relationship between ideological inclinations and attitudes toward the U.S.S.R. If national leaders take the dominant ideological mood as a cue on how to behave toward Moscow (for example, to the extent of adopting a pronounced hard-line stance in a conservative national climate), the politics of opposites might come into play. Thus, a President who is elected by a large conservative vote, and possibly any President who senses a predominantly conservative national mood, may interpret this as a mandate for toughness vis-à-vis the Soviet Union—and the public may initially have intended it as such. But if the President, acting accordingly, conveys the image of a confrontational leader, the public may come to approve of behavior that is contrary to the perceived mandate while opposing activities that are consistent with it.

THE CASE OF A MODERATE PRESIDENT

The mechanism of the politics of opposites assumes that the President is considered somewhat extreme—i.e., too much of either a hawk or a dove on matters regarding the Soviet Union. But none of Carter's and Reagan's predecessors would have qualified, in the public's mind, as

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either excessively confrontational or conciliatory toward the U.S.S.R. This is not astonishing for at least two reasons. First, the postwar bipartisan consensus on East-West matters provided a rather clear set of guidelines along which presidents could direct their external behavior, making it less likely that they would veer away from mainstream preferences. This consensus had collapsed by the late sixties, and the substance of public preferences became less simple. Second, the shifting fortunes of detente in the early seventies furnished an unusually volatile set of standards for any leader trying to gauge the hawkishness or dovishness of his own Soviet policy. Thus, the politics of opposites would not have had an obvious application to administrations that preceded President Carter's, and a different set of rules must have guided the public's reaction to U.S. Soviet policy. In an article devoted to the politics of opposites, we cannot explore the situation of a President who is generally considered moderate, but will offer a few tentative suggestions.

For the years preceding the mid-seventies, the data on public approval of presidential Soviet policy are scant, but they do cover the Presidency of Gerald Ford adequately. In one way, his Presidency was well-suited for our examination, in another way it was not. Ford was not a statesman whom most people would unambiguously have qualified as either a hawk or a dove. His congressional record was generally pro-defense and anti-communist; yet he did not disapprove of Nixon's detente policies and, upon stepping into the White House, made no strong pronouncements regarding the Soviet Union and East-West relations. A president without a clear foreign policy stance provides us with an example of what happens when the politics of opposites has no foundation upon which to operate. On the negative side, the two and a-half years of the Ford administration were too brief for an adequate range of policy initiatives and public reactions to have manifested themselves. Consequently, our data on the Ford Presidency can provide no more than very preliminary suggestions.

Upon assuming the Presidency, Ford experienced the initial surge of public support that is usually given to a new Chief Executive. Shortly after he stepped into office in August 1974, 59 percent of the public approved of his Soviet policy; but this support decreased rapidly and, by March 1975, only 39 percent endorsed his handling of the Soviet Union.[41] The period during which this decline occurred was one marked by an indecisive, but on balance supportive, attitude toward detente. Although a White House official characterized relations as in "pretty good shape," no major new initiatives were undertaken during these months, and the Vladivostok Accord signed in November satisfied neither the partisans of

[41] *The Harris Survey*, May 1, 1975, and November 3, 1975.

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arms control nor its conservative critics. In January 1975, the U.S.-Soviet trade agreement was annulled by the Kremlin in response to congressional efforts to link it to increased emigration of Soviet Jews; yet the President assured the nation, somewhat implausibly, that relations would be unaffected. Nothing characterized Gerald Ford's Soviet policy during this time as much as its apparent lack of direction.

By the middle of 1975, public opinion exhibited a modest rally around Ford's policy, reaching levels of support that remained at the low 40 percent mark throughout the summer,[42] possibly because of two events that occurred during this period. In May, the United States staged the successful armed rescue of the *Mayaguez*, the U.S. vessel captured by Cambodian naval units. The operation was not directed against the Soviet Union, but it nevertheless had an East-West flavor about it. In late July, the President traveled to Helsinki for the concluding stages of the Conference on European Security and Cooperation; he witnessed the signing of its Final Act, frequently viewed as an endorsement of Europe's political division. Although the separate effects of these two activities are not easily disentangled, both showed a measure of decisiveness that had not previously been apparent. By fall and winter of 1975, however, support dropped back down to 34 percent.[43] This period was again one of hesitant policy, with no dramatic moves in any direction—a period of very halting movement toward arms control combined with an effort not to provide the increasingly visible opponents of detente with an issue that could be used against the administration.

The foregoing chronology tentatively suggests that, where the politics of opposites has no foundation upon which to operate, the public will reward the President for *any* display of decisive (though not necessarily extreme) initiative, whether of a conciliatory or confrontational sort. The evidence regarding the Ford Presidency is far too sketchy to confirm the proposition, but it offers information that allows us, at a minimum, to propose the hypothesis. Subsequent studies may wish to incorporate this suggestion into a more complete model of the relationship between public opinion and U.S. Soviet policy.

Conclusions on the Politics of Opposites

The implications of the politics of opposites are, on the whole, welcome. The mechanism allows leaders some degree of flexibility, but

[42] In May, 42% approved of his handling of relations with Moscow (*The Harris Survey*, May 27, 1975). In August and September, the figures were, respectively, 43% and 42% (*The Harris Survey*, September 25, 1975).

[43] *The Harris Survey*, February 23, 1976.

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within a band of fairly moderate policy. While discouraging extremism, it helps to avoid swings in policy even greater than those that we have actually witnessed. At the same time, a President whose interpretation of the public's initial mandate is overly rigid may experience an unexpected pattern of national disaffection with the policy he thought the public expected.

Finally, the politics of opposites seems to be applicable to areas other than the one we have examined. It is, for example, reflected in the feelings of many Europeans toward the presence of U.S. nuclear weapons in Europe. Their tendency to vacillate between a fear of insufficient U.S. commitment to the nuclear defense of Western Europe and a fear that the United States may be willing to tolerate nuclear war on European soil has been unmistakable, especially with regard to the issue of theater nuclear forces. Public opinion always seems to stress the concern that is least emphasized in current (American) policy. Macroeconomic issues provide another example of the politics of opposites. The fact that there is usually a trade-off between unemployment and inflation has been recognized for some time, and is embodied in the Phillips curve of economic theory. In the view of the public, that of the two values (employment or price stability) which is most neglected in current economic policy is usually the one that elicits the greatest concern. Thus, although the concept should not be made to carry an overly heavy burden, its explanatory potential is probably not limited to U.S. policy toward the Soviet Union.

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Research Note

ECONOMIC AND POLITICAL EXPLANATIONS OF HUMAN RIGHTS VIOLATIONS

By NEIL J. MITCHELL and JAMES M. McCORMICK*

GOVERNMENTS organize police forces and armies to protect their citizens, build schools and hospitals to educate and care for them, and provide financial assistance for the old and unemployed. But governments also kill, torture, and imprison their citizens. This dark side of government knows no geographic, economic, ideological, or political boundary. In the Middle East, for example, Iraq has morbidly placed a "welcome" doormat at the entrance to its torture chamber—a place where prisoners are burned with cigarettes and electric hot plates, where electric shocks are administered to them, and where they are hanged from the ceiling. In Central America, the government of Guatemala tolerates the torture and killing of three church workers who were assisting refugees. In Africa, the Cameroons allows eight prisoners to die of malnutrition; South Africa, through its policy of apartheid, systematically violates the rights of its nonwhite citizens. In Asia, Burmese army units operating in Karen state use local civilians as minesweepers. In Eastern Europe, the Soviet Union confines dissenters to psychiatric hospitals. In Western Europe, the residents of Northern Ireland are subjected to trials that fail to conform to international standards, and civilians are shot by the security forces.[1] The list goes on.

Unfortunately, this type of governmental behavior is—even in the late 20th century—a dismal characteristic of contemporary politics. Most of the world's countries hold some "prisoners of conscience" or detain po-

* The order of the authors' names was randomly selected to reflect equal contributions to the research effort. An earlier version of this research was presented at the 1987 Annual Meeting of the American Political Science Association. We would like to thank Professors Hank Jenkins-Smith and Philip Roeder of the University of New Mexico and Professor Ken Koehler of Iowa State University for their helpful comments and suggestions on this research. Thanks are also due to the Faculty Leave Program at Iowa State for supporting a portion of this research.

[1] These illustrations are taken from *Amnesty International Report 1985*, describing human rights conditions in 1984.

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litical prisoners without a fair trial. There is, however, a substantial variation between nations in the degree of these human rights violations. While some treat their citizens ruthlessly, others—though by no means innocent in their conduct—treat them better. Despite the fact that variations in the level of human rights violations across the world have been recognized, relatively little empirical research has been done to account for these differences.

Instead, most of the empirical research in this area has tended to concentrate on the influence of a country's human rights record on U.S. foreign policy, primarily on decisions concerning American aid. Undoubtedly stimulated by new congressional statutes and the Carter administration's emphasis on human rights, a number of studies emerged in the late 1970s and early 1980s on the relationship (or lack of it) between human rights and American assistance. This trend has continued into the mid-1980s, probably fueled in part by the Reagan administration's apparent reversal of this emphasis. Beyond these analyses—and a considerable dialogue on what exactly constitutes human rights—little work has proceeded to the next important step: the characteristics of countries that are most likely to violate human rights.

In our research, we intend to undertake just such an analysis. Specifically, two principal tasks guide our work. First, we seek to develop a new measure with which to compare human rights conditions on a much wider basis than has been done previously and to specify more fully the degree of human rights violations throughout the world. Second, we develop and test several alternate hypotheses that might account for this variation in global human rights conditions. By eliminating, or specifying, popular explanations of human rights violations, we can begin to understand the conditions that precipitate those violations.

Explaining Human Rights Violations

Although human rights issues are of immediate public concern and great political importance, the theoretical contribution of political science to explaining these violations has been modest at best. In view of the centrality of the state in affecting the rights of its citizens, this theoretical weakness is particularly surprising. After all, the liberal tradition has held, since Hobbes, that life under government is preferable to life without it. Thus, while government may be "evil," human beings on their own are worse. In Thomas Paine's words:

> Society is produced by our wants, and government by our wickedness. . . . Society in every state is a blessing, but government even in its best state is

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> but a necessary evil. . . . Government, like dress, is the badge of lost innocence. . . .[2]

The question of what kinds of governments will be most evil would appear to be a natural priority for research; what we have instead are efforts to understand repression in the Soviet Union or in the southern cone of Latin America. Only a few efforts have been made to theorize on a global level about the kinds of governments that are likely to engage in human rights violations.

Where, then, do we look for some theoretical guidance? Our point of departure, some writing on democracy and political instability, does not always address human rights violations directly; it does, however, carry important implications for the relative propensity of states to violate the rights of their citizens. Moreover, it allows us to develop several plausible economic and political hypotheses about states and human rights violations that can be tested empirically.

Economic Conditions and Human Rights Violations

Economic modernization, it is sometimes argued, leads to political stability and, in turn, to increased respect for human rights. The poorest countries, with substantial social and political tensions created by economic scarcity, would be most unstable and thus most apt to use repression in order to maintain control. Robert McNamara has succinctly summarized this view: "There can . . . be no question but that there is an irrefutable relationship between violence and economic backwardness."[3] The implication of McNamara's analysis is that the poorer the country, the greater the probability of human rights violations as the government seeks to maintain some semblance of order. Empirically, then, a first proposition for testing would be a simple one: an inverse relationship would exist between the wealth of a society and its human rights violations.

Samuel Huntington, in his classic investigation of political stability in *Political Order in Changing Societies*, has sought to refute this "simple poverty thesis." Although human rights violations are not the focus of his work, he does suggest some likely correlates: he argues that it is not the poorest countries that will be the most unstable "because people who are really poor are too poor for politics and too poor for protest."[4]

> Evidence, nonetheless, did exist to suggest that causes of violence in such nations lay with the modernization process rather than with the backward-

[2] Thomas Paine, *Common Sense* (Harmondsworth, England: Penguin Books, 1976), 65.
[3] Quoted in Samuel Huntington, *Political Order in Changing Societies* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1968), 41.
[4] *Ibid.*, 52.

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> ness itself. Wealthier nations tend to be more stable than those less wealthy, but the poorest nations, those at the bottom of the international economic ladder, tend to be less prone to violence and instability than those countries just above them.[5]

As social and economic change broadens, political participation increases, and the demands on government are greater. According to Huntington, traditional sources of political authority are thus challenged, and new political institutions (particularly political parties) are necessary to moderate and channel the demands of the newly mobilized citizenry. If such institutions are not developed, instability and disorder will result. Such a situation is ripe for political repression. The inference from Huntington's analysis, unlike that from McNamara's, is that the "modernizing" states would be most susceptible to a high level of human rights violations. Put differently, a curvilinear relationship should exist between the relative wealth of a nation and human rights violations: the very poor and the very rich countries would be less likely to have substantial levels of human rights violations, while those who are in the process of modernization would be more likely to exhibit such a pattern.

A third economic explanation is largely Marxist in orientation and has less to do with poverty *per se* and more with the external economic relationships of a country. Noam Chomsky and Edward S. Herman, for example, argue that "the balance of terror [in human rights violations] appears to have shifted to the West and its clients, with the United States setting the pace as sponsor and supplier."[6] This shift is systematically linked to the economic interests of the United States and other advanced capitalist countries, and to their efforts to maintain favorable conditions for investment in the third world. Such efforts include the containment of reform (e.g., the formation of trade unions) and the prevention of revolution. Consequently, there is an increase in human rights violations by countries that are more involved with external capitalist interests. In other words, the greater the economic association with the United States or other advanced capitalist countries, the greater the degree of human rights violations.

Political Conditions and Human Rights Violations

While poverty, levels of development, and dependence represent the principal economic conditions that may be associated with human rights violations, political culture and regime type seem to be the principal political conditions. The dominant attitudes and beliefs of a society are con-

[5] *Ibid.*, 41.

[6] Chomsky and Herman, *The Political Economy of Human Rights: The Washington Connection and Third World Fascism* (Boston: South End Press, 1979), 8.

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sidered to be of great importance in the choice of methods of political control and the relative propensity of governments to violate human rights. A key question, for example, is: To what extent does the political culture tolerate political repression as a means of maintaining order?

One important factor that is thought to have shaped political culture for most states in the world is the colonial experience. Since most are relatively new (over 90 newly independent states have been created since 1945), the political culture derived from the colonial experience may be a useful starting point for understanding variations in respect for human rights. British colonial rule, for instance, is commonly thought to be strongly associated with the postcolonial development of democracy. The British legacy may be a relatively greater respect for human rights. By contrast, other colonial experiences (Spanish, for instance) are generally assumed to have introduced a greater degree of hierarchy and authoritarianism. The legacy here may well involve higher levels of human rights violations.[7]

The thesis based upon political culture may be affected by the length of colonial rule and, alternatively, by the "newness" of the state. For example, 18th-century British colonies such as India are thought to have a better record in terms of democracy than 19th-century British colonies such as those in Africa.[8] Presumably, "democratic" culture—insofar as any colonizing culture can be democratic—is more or less influential depending on the time it has had to permeate the colonized society. It is also possible that politics in countries that achieved independence relatively recently, regardless of colonial rule, may be more unsettled than in those that have had a considerable time to unify their states. Because ethnic and religious divisions may be more important than the sense of belonging to one nation, human rights violations may be particularly pronounced in the newest states as they attempt to "build" a new nation.

Other political explanations of differences in human rights focus on the kind of political regime in power. One variant is offered by former U.S. Ambassador to the United Nations, Jeane Kirkpatrick, who employs

[7] See Samuel Huntington, "Will More Countries Become Democratic?" *Political Science Quarterly* 99 (Summer 1984), 193-218. Wiarda and Kline contrast the British and Iberian influences as follows:

> The Spanish and Portuguese colonies were founded on a set of institutions that were absolutist, authoritarian, hierarchical, Catholic, feudal or semifeudal, two-class, corporatist, patrimonialist, orthodox, and scholastic to their core. By contrast, the British colonies . . . derived from a set of institutions and practices that were fundamentally different. . . ."

Howard J. Wiarda and Harvey F. Kline, eds., *Latin American Politics and Development* (Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1979), 21-22.

[8] Huntington (fn. 7), 206.

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the distinction between totalitarian and authoritarian regimes as her organizing theme.[9] Rhoda Howard and Jack Donnelly focus on another variant, the differences between liberal and "communitarian" regimes.[10] With each variant, predictions are made about the magnitude of human rights violations in the kinds of societies examined.

Kirkpatrick maintains that, of all forms of government engaged in repression, left-wing, totalitarian regimes are the greatest offenders against human rights. These regimes render the individual virtually defenseless in relation to the state and offer little prospect of evolutionary or revolutionary change. Authoritarian regimes, though hardly innocent of human rights violations, are based upon traditional social patterns with less complete control; in time, they are thus subject to evolutionary change. Because governmental control in authoritarian regimes is less complete and more subject to change than in totalitarian regimes, human rights violations in the former are likely to be less extensive than in the latter. Kirkpatrick summarizes her position and its implication for American foreign policy as follows:

> Only intellectual fashion and the tyranny of Right/Left thinking prevent intelligent men of good will from perceiving the facts that traditional authoritarian governments are less repressive than revolutionary autocracies, that they are more susceptible of liberalization, and that they are more compatible with U.S. interests.[11]

Since the "susceptibility of liberalization" argument requires data over time, it will not be investigated here. We shall focus, instead, on the assertion that totalitarian regimes are most repressive. To our knowledge, this regime explanation for human rights violations has not been systematically tested.

Howard and Donnelly cast a wider net than Kirkpatrick by grouping regimes into two general categories: liberal or communitarian. They maintain that only governments that operate within the liberal tradition are likely to observe their citizens' human rights: "We contend that internationally recognized human rights require a liberal regime."[12] Their contention is based on the premise that only "liberal" regimes have the

[9] Kirkpatrick, "Dictatorships and Double Standards," *Commentary* 68 (November 1979), 34-45.

[10] Howard and Donnelly, "Human Dignity, Human Rights, and Political Regimes," *American Political Science Review* 80 (September 1986), 801-18.

[11] Kirkpatrick (fn. 9), 44. We should note that the use of regime type in an analysis of human rights violations risks tautology because concern for human rights is an element of regime definition. In our research, however, classifications of regime types are independent of our data on human rights.

[12] Howard and Donnelly (fn. 10), 802.

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requisite "substantive conception of human dignity" to make the observance of internationally recognized human rights possible. "Communitarian" societies, by contrast, in which the community or the state has priority over the individual, will not be receptive to the observance of human rights. Howard and Donnelly do not extend their argument to the identification of regimes that are to be considered liberal; our database, however, permits a rough comparison, suggested by their work, of presumed liberal states—that is, first-world nations—with the rest of the world.

The various theoretical positions can be summarized in a number of questions for research:

—Are the worst violators the poorest nations?
—Are the worst violators economically associated with capitalist countries?
—Are the worst violators tied to a particular colonial background?
—Are the worst violators the newest nations?
—Are the worst violators regimes of a certain political type?

Before pursuing these questions, we need to address the difficulties involved both in collecting adequate data on human rights violations and in the problem of developing comparative measures.

Defining and Measuring Human Rights Violations

In evaluating human rights violations in any society, we immediately encounter several questions: What are human rights? How do you monitor nonadherence to human rights across a great number of countries? How do you measure these violations in a way suitable for comparative purposes?

The initial problem, of course, involves the definition of human rights (and hence, their violation). We do not wish to get involved in the philosophical debate on the nature, origins, or existence of human rights.[13] Our concern here is with governments' propensities for torture, killing, and arbitrarily imprisoning their citizens. We simply follow contemporary convention by identifying these activities as violations of human rights. In addition to philosophical traditions that have given rise to this convention, there is now a legal basis—the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (1948). This United Nations resolution, in addition to condemning torture, killing, and imprisonment, enumerates various eco-

[13] See the discussion in David Carleton and Michael Stohl, "The Foreign Policy of Human Rights: Rhetoric and Reality from Jimmy Carter to Ronald Reagan," *Human Rights Quarterly* 7 (May 1985), 205-29. Our discussion of the methodology draws upon their imaginative research and follows their lead.

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nomic and social rights. Although these latter rights are clearly very important, they represent a distinct category and are beyond the scope of the present research.

Acts of the U.S. Congress have added to the legal basis of this convention with their focus on aspects of human rights that have to do with "the integrity of the person." For example, section 116 of the International Development and Food Assistance Act of 1975 and section 502B of the International Security Assistance and Arms Export Control Act of 1976 both emphasize "the integrity of the person." Section 116 states that

> no assistance may be provided under this part to the government of any country which engages in a consistent pattern of gross violations of internationally recognized human rights, including torture or cruel, inhuman, or degrading treatment or punishment, prolonged detention without charges, or other flagrant denial of the right of life, liberty, and the security of the person. . . .[14]

Section 502B repeats only a portion of this passage: "No security assistance may be provided to any country the government of which engages in a consistent pattern of gross violations of internationally recognized human rights."[15] In essence, then, while we acknowledge that we are examining only part of human rights across national societies, we are evaluating a crucial segment of them.

How, then, do we measure whether states respect "the integrity of the person" within their societies? The primary problem, as in all human rights analyses, is simply the inadequacy of information on such violations, since governments are understandably reluctant to publicize their use of arbitrary imprisonment, torture, or killing. Second, even in the case of sources that monitor human rights conditions on a regular basis, questions about comprehensiveness and political fairness inevitably arise. Of three standard sources of such human rights monitoring—Amnesty International, Freedom House, and the U.S. State Department—only *Amnesty International Report* can make a reasonable claim to being politically uncommitted. Freedom House does not focus solely on "the integrity of the person" and has been described as a "partisan group within the domestic context of American politics." The U.S. State Department can hardly claim to be a disinterested investigator.[16] Further, *Amnesty Inter-*

[14] See the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961 as amended, in *Legislation on Foreign Relations Through 1985*, Committee on Foreign Relations (Washington, DC: G.P.O., 1986), 86, for a more recent statement of this section, in which the phrase "causing the disappearance of persons by the abduction and clandestine detention of those persons" has been added after the passage on "prolonged detention without charges."

[15] *Ibid.*, 125.

[16] See Harry M. Scoble and Laurie S. Wiseberg, "Problems of Comparative Research on

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national Report concentrates specifically on human rights conceptualized as concerned with "the integrity of the person"; it does not introduce what is sometimes called respect for civil and political liberties.

Our analysis is based on the latest available human rights survey (at the time) by Amnesty International (*Amnesty International Report 1985*); we developed a two-dimensional scale of human rights violations for each of the countries included in the 1985 *Report*. A detailed description of how the scale was constructed will show how it differs from earlier efforts and how it will be used in our subsequent analyses.

First, one of the authors surveyed the *Report* to identify the categories of human rights violations recorded in order to develop a coding format that is comparable across all nations. The coding categories ranged from the holding of "prisoners of conscience" (those imprisoned for their beliefs, color, religion, and so forth, and who are nonviolent) and other political prisoners detained without a trial conforming to internationally recognized standards, to disappearances, executions, and the torture of prisoners. The format thus developed allowed the coders to evaluate the presence or absence of these dimensions in 1984, the intensity of the different activities (that is, the number of violations), and the presence or absence of these activities in earlier years. Coding space was also available for any investigation or conviction of officials who were accused or suspected of human rights violations in that year. (*Amnesty International Report* sometimes includes information on efforts to handle human rights violations.) Each of the authors then read and coded all 123 countries listed in the *Report*.

The next task was to construct a summary measure for comparing countries. A two-dimensional measure of human rights violations was developed—one dimension based upon the degree of arbitrary imprisonment, the other based upon the systematic use of killings and torture of prisoners. The conceptual justification for this dichotomy was based upon the view that, although arbitrary imprisonment was certainly reprehensible, resort to torture and killing was a distinct, and qualitatively worse, activity. Previous measures had tended to incorporate different levels of imprisonment and killings into a single dimension; we believe, however, that that approach inadequately captures the substantive difference. Furthermore, we noted that, empirically, states were quite distinct on these measures. While the preponderance of states had political prisoners, there is a considerable gulf between states with political prisoners

Human Rights," in Ved R. Nanda, James R. Scarritt, and George W. Sheppard, Jr., *Global Human Rights: Public Policies, Comparative Measures, and NGO Strategies* (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1981), 162-64, for a discussion of the Freedom House and State Department reports.

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and those that use torture and killing. These differences should be noted in any evaluation. Finally, in order to provide greater sensitivity to these dimensions, a five-point ordinal scale was developed for each. A country could be scored as (0) never having such violations, (1) rarely, (2) sometimes, (3) often, or (4) very often.

With the coding information collected and the scale dimensions with their subcategories developed, each author separately proceeded to classify each country on the imprisonment and torture dimensions. We then compared our rank orderings, discussed differences that arose, and came to a joint resolution.[17] The result was a summary measure along each dimension for all of the countries included in the *Amnesty International Report*. In a few cases—for example, North Korea and Albania—Amnesty International reported particular difficulties in obtaining information. Our strategy was to assume the worst and score those cases in the "very often" categories on both dimensions.

In a further effort to verify our rankings, we compared them with an earlier attempt at crossnational human rights measurement. We put our 1984 combined political prisoner and torture rankings beside those in Carleton and Stohl's analysis for 1983,[18] and found that they differed only slightly. Fifty-four percent (25 of 46 comparisons) had similar rank or-

[17] The rank-ordering of a country into one of the five categories for the two scales was difficult. While identifying the most and least serious offenders on either dimension was a relatively straightforward procedure, the task was considerably more challenging for the majority of countries in our study. In order to produce meaningful measures for analysis, the scaling of each country involved an iterative process of categorization. First, using the information on each country from our coding sheet, both of us separately rank-ordered all countries on both scales. Next, we compared our rankings, did an initial intercoder reliability check, and tried to make explicit the calculations that we went through to arrive at a particular rank order for a country. To resolve our differences, we agreed upon the following quantitative distinctions: "rarely" referred to countries in which one to ten cases of political prisoners or incidents of torture or killing were reported by Amnesty International; "sometimes" referred to countries with 20 to 90 cases; "often" to 100 or above, and "very often" to 1000 or more. Because our coding sheet has more than one entry to capture information on political prisoners and their treatment, we also agreed that if a given country had a number of entries on these dimensions, the numerical threshold required for an assigned scale would be lower. Finally, we made adjustments in our rank-ordering for several countries to reflect these decisions. Namibia, while given its own country entry in the *Report*, was not included in our analysis because of the general lack of other data.

Although these procedural efforts cannot ultimately remove the necessarily qualitative judgment for the two scales, we are generally quite confident that our effort helped us to construct a meaningful and empirically useful measure.

Finally, in a decision that may well be controversial, we departed from Amnesty International's definition by not counting judicial executions or capital punishment on our torture-and-killing scale. For the sake of consistency, we also excluded judicial amputations—as found, for example, in some Moslem countries—from our analysis.

[18] The comparison between our aggregate human-rights scale score (the sum of the ranks on the political prisoner and torture scales) for 1984 and Carleton and Stohl's rank-ordering of countries for 1983 is based upon their assessment from Amnesty International for that year (fn. 13, 227-28). The range of our scale scores was 0 to 8; it was 1 to 5 for Carleton and Stohl. In all, comparable information between the two datasets was available for 46 countries.

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derings even though different scale categories were used. In comparing 1983 and 1984, some of the differences were to be expected. For instance, the 1984 human rights score for Argentina improved after it changed from a military to a civilian regime in late 1983. By contrast, Nigeria's record worsened, perhaps as a result of the military coup of December 31, 1983. We also scored India and Chile higher in terms of violations; the rankings correspond in India to Indira Gandhi's assassination and the events surrounding it, and in Chile to Pinochet's crackdown on growing antigovernment unrest. Even where the comparisons did not match, the differences in most cases were not greater than one category in rank. In short, our political prisoner/torture scale is comparable to another measure of human rights violations.

Findings

Table 1 shows that, although virtually all countries of the world held some political prisoners in 1984, countries vary widely. Part A of the table shows the aggregate level of human rights violations (the political prisoner scale and the torture scale combined). There is a relatively even distribution of countries across the nine categories. Fourteen countries score 0 or 1 on this summary measure, 28 countries score 7 or 8, and the rest are fairly evenly distributed across the other values. The aggregate measure, of course, assumes equality between the two dimensions. Without minimizing the significance of either, it can reasonably be asserted that the torture-and-killing dimension is generally the harsher method of political control; this is the argument that encourages the separate analysis of each dimension. When we separate the aggregate scale into the two components, we begin to see considerable variations in human rights violations.

Part B of Table 1 shows the number of countries for each of the five points on our political-prisoner scale. While only 8 states did not hold any political prisoners in 1984, over half (65) of the states in our analysis held citizens as political prisoners "often" or "very often" in that year. Between these two extremes, 49 states "rarely" or "sometimes" used detention of political prisoners as an instrument of policy.

Some of the states with the greatest number of political prisoners are readily recognizable from recent popular accounts: Ethiopia, South Africa, Kampuchea, Iran, and Sri Lanka, for example. The countries with the best records are not wholly unexpected either: the United States, Switzerland, Ireland, Japan, and Finland, for instance. These results demonstrate, however, that the bulk of the states of the world still practice this kind of human rights violation.

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TABLE 1
HUMAN RIGHTS VIOLATIONS RANKED ALONG THREE DIMENSIONS (1984)

Scale Values		*Number of Countries*	*%*
		A. AGGREGATE SCALE	
No Violations	0	6	4.9
	1	8	6.6
	2	13	10.7
	3	13	10.7
	4	19	15.6
	5	19	15.6
	6	16	13.1
	7	18	14.8
Most Violations	8	10	8.2
Total		122	100.2*
		B. POLITICAL PRISONERS TAKEN	
Never		8	6.6
Rarely		9	7.4
Sometimes		40	32.8
Often		39	32.0
Very Often		26	21.3
Total		122	100.1*
		C. USE OF TORTURE	
Never		29	23.8
Rarely		15	12.3
Sometimes		32	26.2
Often		27	22.1
Very Often		19	15.6
Total		122	100.0

* Percentage does not total to 100 due to rounding.

Part C of Table 1 shows that, although still substantial, governmental use of torture and killing is somewhat less pervasive than is the holding of political prisoners. To be sure, 44 states never or rarely employed such harsh treatment, but 46 states (or 38 percent of our dataset) frequently tortured their citizens. Once again, many countries in this category are no surprise: El Salvador, Guatemala, Indonesia, Iran, Iraq, Kenya, Uganda, for example.

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We should emphasize again that the two dimensions are related. The Spearman rank-order correlation is significant and relatively large (.62), but it is not perfect—indicating, as do the frequencies, that holding prisoners, and torturing and killing them, are distinct activities in a substantial number of countries.

Economic Conditions as Explanations

Economic conditions can help us understand and begin to account for variations in human rights violations, but their impact is less potent than might be expected. Table 2 contains cross-tabular breakdowns of countries on three levels of per capita income (under $500 per year, $501 to $3000, and over $3000).[19] For the political prisoner analysis, McNamara's "simple poverty thesis" seems to have more support than Huntington's curvilinear explanation. That is, the wealthier the country, the less likely it is to hold a large number of political prisoners.

Yet even this assertion should not be pushed too far, for at least two reasons. First, the relationship is modest at best. Although the cross-tabulation implies support, and the tau_c coefficient for this relationship is significant and in the right direction, it is relatively small ($-.19$). Second, close examination of the tabular results suggests that only in countries that never or rarely hold political prisoners do we approach a linear relationship with the level of economic development (and direct support for the McNamara thesis). When we look at countries that hold political prisoners sometimes or often, the pattern changes. The differences on the political prisoner dimension between the countries in the two lowest income categories are small, but the difference between these two categories and the highest income category is substantial. In effect, there is a threshold effect in the relationship between relative wealth and the holding of political prisoners.

On the torture dimension, the simple poverty thesis receives some support as well. Once again, those countries that have a relatively low per capita income are more likely to have higher levels of torture. But caution is in order to an even greater degree than in the case of the political prisoner scale. While the tau_c coefficient for this relationship is somewhat stronger ($-.21$) than for the political prisoner analysis, the tabular results plainly show the threshold effect. Only 3 of the high-income countries

[19] For the purposes of the statistical analyses, we collapsed categories one and two on both the political prisoner and torture scales. The income data are from *World Development Report, 1986* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1986). Where there were reporting gaps, which was most often the case with second-world countries, we used *The World Almanac and Book of Facts, 1986* (New York: Newspaper Enterprise Association, Inc., 1985). In the case of Brunei, we used *The CIA Factbook* (Washington, DC: C.I.A., 1986).

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TABLE 2
HUMAN RIGHTS VIOLATIONS BY LEVEL OF ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT (1984)

	Per Capita Income		
	$0-$500	*$501-$3000*	*>$3000*
A. POLITICAL PRISONERS TAKEN			
Rarely or Never	2.4%	11.3%	35.7%
Sometimes	41.5	26.4	32.1
Often	34.1	35.8	21.4
Very Often	22.0	26.4	10.7
Total	100.0	99.9*	99.9*
	(N=41)	(N=53)	(N=28)
Chi Square = 18.70, $p<.005$			
B. USE OF TORTURE			
Rarely or Never	29.3%	28.3%	60.7%
Sometimes	29.3	22.6	28.6
Often	22.0	30.2	7.1
Very Often	19.5	18.9	3.6
Total	100.1*	100.0	100.0
	(N=41)	(N=53)	(N=28)
Chi Square = 14.36, $p<.03$			

* Percentage does not total to 100 due to rounding.

(those above $3000 per capita per year) have torture records in the "often" or "very often" categories, while 25 have torture records that place them in the "rarely" or "sometimes" rankings. The low- and middle-income countries in our dataset do not have that great a gap between those with relatively good records ("rarely" or "sometimes") and those with bad records ("often" and "very often"). Thus, in this case too, only countries with very high incomes do well on this dimension of human rights.[20]

[20] Although our human rights measures are not per capita measures, there is a small positive association between the size of population and the frequency of violations on both human rights measures: the larger the population, the larger the potential pool of victims, and the larger the reports of violations. Nevertheless, when we controlled for size of population (small, medium, or large) using an analysis of variance technique and a hierarchical log linear technique (controls that we use throughout these analyses) the association between income and human rights violations remained. See Marija J. Norusis, *SPSS^x Advanced Statistics Guide* (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1985), 195-254, 297-325. The population estimates for 1984 are from *The World Almanac* (fn. 19). For Albania, Gambia, U.S.S.R., and Zaire, population estimates were available only for 1983.

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Our third economic hypothesis—capitalist involvement—is more difficult to test; it requires some discussion of how best to measure economic involvement with the United States and capitalist countries generally. As the hypothesis is essentially directed at third-world nations, first- and second-world countries were excluded from our analysis. We decided to operationalize capitalist involvement in two ways: first, by measuring the amount of trade between capitalist and third-world countries; and second, by measuring the total investment tie between capitalist and other countries. The first measure involves the 1984 volume of trade flows (exports plus imports) between an individual country and capitalist countries (defined as "industrial countries" by the International Monetary Fund [I.M.F.]).[21] The second measure involves the private-sector net flows plus public-sector export credits and investments to the individual country from capitalist countries for 1984.[22] Although it is now conventional to operationalize the trade measure as a function of trade's relative weight in a domestic economy, and thus as a ratio of GNP, we have used the absolute amounts of trade and investment. Our hypothesis is that the greater the economic involvement with the capitalist countries, the greater the human rights violations, rather than the greater the relative weight of capitalist economic involvement in the domestic economy, the greater the human rights violations. Irrespective of the size of a country's GNP, it is assumed that two plants or factories will be twice as likely to prompt efforts to unionize as would one plant, and twice as likely to prompt government countermeasures as well. We are therefore not theoretically interested in the ratio measure itself.[23]

[21] The I.M.F. lists the following as "industrial countries": United States, Canada, Australia, Japan, New Zealand, Austria, Belgium, Luxembourg, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Iceland, Italy, Netherlands, Norway, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, United Kingdom. I.M.F., *Direction of Trade Statistics Yearbook 1986* (Washington, DC: International Monetary Fund, 1986). The classification of nations into first-, and second-, and third-world nations was based upon Gary K. Bertsch, Robert P. Clark, and David M. Wood, *Comparing Political Systems: Power and Policy in Three Worlds* (New York: Wiley, 1986), xiii-xv, and their categorization of 170 nations for 1983. The first-world nations excluded from our dataset for this analysis were: Canada, Greece, Ireland, Israel, Italy, Japan, Spain, Switzerland, United Kingdom, and the United States. The second-world nations excluded were: Albania, Bulgaria, People's Republic of China, Cuba, Czechoslovakia, East Germany, Hungary, Kampuchea, North Korea, Laos, Poland, Romania, Soviet Union, Vietnam, and Yugoslavia. The rest of the nations in our dataset were classified as third-world countries for this analysis, including five nations (Barbados, Cyprus, Djibouti, Grenada, and the Seychelles) that were classified as "mixed systems, status uncertain, or otherwise unclassified" by Bertsch et al. Because of missing data for some nations, the total number of nations in the trade and investment analyses was 90 and 85, respectively.

[22] The investment measure is the sum of "Total Other Official Flows plus Private Sector Net" from the member countries of the OECD's Development Assistance Committee (which corresponds to the I.M.F.'s list of industrial countries except Luxembourg, Iceland, and Spain). OECD, *Geographical Distribution of Financial Flows to Developing Countries* (Paris: OECD, 1986).

[23] See Glenn Firebaugh and Jack P. Gibbs, "User's Guide to Ratio Variables," *American*

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TABLE 3
HUMAN RIGHTS VIOLATIONS
BY TRADE WITH AND INVESTMENT BY CAPITALIST COUNTRIES (1984)

	Trade			*Investment*			
	Low	*Medium*	*High*	*Negative*	*Low*	*Medium*	*High*
A. POLITICAL PRISONERS TAKEN							
Rarely or Never	17.2%	6.3%	3.4%	11.5%	13.6%	10.0%	5.9%
Sometimes	44.8	40.6	31.0	50.0	45.5	20.0	29.4
Often	31.0	28.1	37.9	26.9	27.3	30.0	52.9
Very Often	6.9	25.0	27.6	11.5	13.6	40.0	11.8
Total	99.9*	100.0	99.9*	99.9*	100.0	100.0	100.0
	(N = 29)	(N = 32)	(N = 29)	(N = 26)	(N = 22)	(N = 20)	(N = 17)
Chi Square = 8.44 (not significant)				Chi Square = 12.83 (not significant)			
B. USE OF TORTURE							
Rarely or Never	48.3%	18.8%	27.6%	30.8%	40.9%	15.0%	29.4%
Sometimes	24.1	31.3	17.2	34.6	22.7	25.0	23.5
Often	20.7	25.0	31.0	7.7	27.3	40.0	29.4
Very Often	6.9	25.0	24.1	26.9	9.1	20.0	17.6
Total	100.0	100.1*	99.9*	100.0	100.0	100.0	99.9*
	(N = 29)	(N = 32)	(N = 29)	(N = 26)	(N = 22)	(N = 20)	(N = 17)
Chi Square = 9.53 (not significant)				Chi Square = 10.42 (not significant)			

* Percentage does not total to 100 due to rounding.

Countries in the high trade category are, as expected, more likely to be in the "often" and "very often" imprisonment categories. Table 3 shows a total of 65 percent in these categories, as compared to 38 percent in low trade countries. The chi square is not significant, but the tau_c coefficient (.24) is; it indicates an association between imprisonment and trade in the direction expected. Using the direct measure of investment, the high investment category again has the largest share of countries that imprison citizens often or very often; the low is 38 percent in the negative investment category, in which the investment flow is reversed and away from the country. Investment is significantly associated with imprisonment (the tau_b coefficient is .18). When we control for size of population, however, any significant associations between trade and imprisonment and investment and imprisonment disappear.

Sociological Review 50 (October 1985), 713-22, and Eric Uslaner, "The Pitfalls of Per Capita," *American Journal of Political Science* 20 (February 1976), 125-33, for a methodological discussion of the use of ratio variables.

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Those countries that use torture often or very often tend to fall in the medium and high trade categories; the low trade category has the largest share of countries that make infrequent or no use of torture. These observations are supported by a significant tau_c coefficient (.22). The medium and high investment categories also contain most of the countries that use torture often or very often. But the tau_b coefficient for the relationship between investment and torture is not significant, and the trade/torture association disappears when population is held constant. So, while a substantial number of countries that have very bad human rights records are economically heavily involved with advanced capitalist countries, a third factor—population—appears to account for some of the observed association.

Political Conditions as Explanations

The political culture hypothesis seems to provide some useful insight into human rights violations. The classic assertion that British colonial experience is associated with the development of democracy and, by extension, with greater respect for human rights, finds some support in our data.[24] As Table 4 shows, countries that were British colonies are less likely to imprison political dissidents than countries that had other colonial experiences. (The tau_c of .25 is statistically significant.) About 58 percent of the countries that were British colonies are classified as "rarely" or "sometimes" holding political prisoners. By contrast, 55 percent of the countries with other colonial experiences fall into the "often" or "very often" categories.

When we control for both population and income, however, using an analysis of variance and a log linear technique, the association between former British colonies and lower levels of imprisonment is no longer statistically significant. A closer examination of the data suggests that the original relationship between these two variables was largely attributable to some small former British colonies with medium (and, to some extent, high) per capita incomes and good human rights records, as compared to similar states with other colonial experiences and poor human rights records. Put differently, and generally consistent with our earlier results, low- and high-income countries—with or without British colonial experience—do not have significantly different human rights records. Some caution is still warranted in intepreting these results, however, because of the limited cases in our data cells when these controls are built in.

[24] The information on colonial powers is from Waldemar A. Nielsen, *The Great Powers and Africa* (New York: Praeger, 1969), inside front cover; *The World Almanac* (fn. 19); and Arthur S. Banks, ed., *Political Handbook of the World, 1986* (Binghamton, NY: CSA Publications, 1986).

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Colonial background is even less important in differentiating nations on the torture scale, although the results are in the predicted direction. While most countries with any colonial experience are classified as torturing "rarely" or "sometimes," those with a British colonial background are less likely to be in the "often" or "very often" category than those with a non-British colonial background. The statistical analysis indicates that the propensity to torture or kill is not significantly associated with a British colonial experience. When we control for population and income through log linear techniques, we find that both factors significantly specified any possible relationship between torture and British or other colonial background. Close inspection revealed that, again, any relationship that does exist is based on medium-income former British colonies that have considerably better records on the torture dimensions than do medium-income countries with other colonial experiences.

Taking our colonial analysis one step further, we found few differences in human rights performance, both on our political prisoner scale and on our torture scale, between the 21 countries in our dataset that had been British colonies for less than a hundred years and the 19 countries that had been British colonies for more than a hundred years. Thus, the sheer fact of British colonization seems to have somewhat more impact on human rights performance than length of colonization.[25]

A second way to examine political conditions and human rights violations is to look at the relationship between the length of a state's independence and the treatment of its citizens. Are older nations more respectful of human rights than newer ones? To answer this question, we divided the states in our dataset into two categories: those that had gained independence before 1944, and those that had gained independence after that year. On our two dimensions of human rights violations, we found virtually no difference between these two classifications. The newness of the state appears to be unrelated to the observance of human rights.

Yet another way to inquire into the relationship between human rights violations and the political environment is to test the hypothesis advanced by Jeane Kirkpatrick. According to her thesis (and using her vocabulary), totalitarian regimes—operationalized here as second-world, Marxist nations—are more repressive in the treatment of their citizens than are authoritarian regimes—operationalized here as military regimes and traditional monarchies; the former are also less susceptible to change.[26] In

[25] Data for years of independence are from Appendix B in Bruce Russett and Harvey Starr, *World Politics: The Menu for Choice* (San Francisco: W. H. Freeman, 1981 and 1985), original and 2d eds., 577-83 and 589-96.

[26] To identify authoritarian regimes, we used the regime typology presented in W. Phillips Shively, *Power and Choice* (New York: Random House, 1986), 248-49. From this typology, the

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TABLE 4
HUMAN RIGHTS VIOLATIONS BY COLONIAL EXPERIENCE
(1984)

	Colonial Experience	
	Former British Colony	*Other Colonial Background**
A. POLITICAL PRISONERS TAKEN		
Rarely or Never	25.0%	3.9%
Sometimes	32.5	41.2
Often	30.0	29.4
Very Often	12.5	25.5
Total	100.0	100.0
	(N = 40)	(N = 51)
Chi Square = 9.92, $p<.02$		
B. USE OF TORTURE		
Rarely or Never	42.5%	31.4%
Sometimes	25.0	23.5
Often	12.5	29.4
Very Often	20.0	15.7
Total	100.0	100.0
	(N = 40)	(N = 51)
Chi Square = 3.94 (not significant)		

* Spanish, Portuguese, French, Dutch, Belgian, or Italian.

one sense, Kirkpatrick's argument is confirmed by our data. All second-world nations fall into the "often" or "very often" political prisoner categories (see Table 5). The strong and statistically significant relationship ($tau_c = -.47$) between imprisonment and the second world survives our controlling for population differences and levels of income. On the torture dimension, however, we found no significant difference between the two types of regimes. Contrary to Kirkpatrick's argument, more author-

classification of "Military Government" and "Monarchy" formed the bulk of our authoritarian category. Like most such efforts, the regime typology from Shively has some questionable classifications. For example, Uruguay, South Korea, and Honduras were listed under "Democracy," with the qualification "heavy military involvement." We placed those countries in the authoritarian category. Finally, to identify totalitarian regimes, we used the classification of Marxist nations by Bertsch et al. (fn. 21).

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TABLE 5
HUMAN RIGHTS VIOLATIONS
BY TOTALITARIAN AND AUTHORITARIAN STATES (1984)

	Type of State	
	Totalitarian	*Authoritarian*
A. POLITICAL PRISONERS TAKEN		
Rarely or Never	0.0%	0.0%
Sometimes	0.0	41.9
Often	53.3	41.9
Very Often	46.7	16.1
Total	100.0	99.9*
	(N = 15)	(N = 31)
Chi Square = 10.19, $p<.01$		
B. USE OF TORTURE		
Rarely or Never	33.3%	19.4%
Sometimes	26.7	29.0
Often	26.7	32.3
Very Often	13.3	19.4
Total	100.0	100.1*
	(N = 15)	(N = 31)
Chi Square = 1.16 (not significant)		

* Percentage does not add to 100 due to rounding.

itarian regimes (52 percent) than totalitarian regimes (40 percent) are in the "often" or "very often" category on the torture dimension.

For second-world governments, imprisonment is the preferred method of political control. Thus, only if "repression" is restricted to imprisonment is there evidence that confirms Kirkpatrick's thesis. If repression is defined as torture and killing, then the results, though not statistically significant, are contrary to her expectation: authoritarian regimes show a greater inclination toward torturing and killing the opposition. And if repression is defined as both imprisonment *and* torturing and killing, our aggregate human rights measure, there is no statistically significant difference between the two types of regimes.[27]

[27] South Africa was also classified as a democracy in the Shively listing, and the following were termed countries "difficult to classify": Philippines, El Salvador, Haiti, Nepal, Chad, and Iran. When these seven countries are added to the authoritarian category, the number of

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A reformulated and weaker version of Howard and Donnelly's argument—that liberal regimes are more attentive to human rights than are communitarian regimes—is borne out by our analysis. Although Howard and Donnelly do not provide a usable operational definition of a liberal regime, we operationalized their thesis by comparing the degree of violations in first-world nations (advanced capitalist democracies) with that of the rest of the world. Whereas the first-world nations would do well on respecting "the integrity of the person," we assume that these other nations would all do equally poorly on this dimension of human rights.

In the course of our analysis, we found, not unexpectedly, that the "liberal" regimes have a superior human rights record on both the political prisoner and the torture dimensions. Almost all of the liberal states fall into either the "rarely" or "sometimes" categories on both dimensions; the lowest-scale category ("rarely") is the most prominent one. By contrast, the rest of the nations are spread across the scale, with over half in the "often" and "very often" ranks on the political prisoner dimension, and just under half in the same categories for the torture dimension.

Howard and Donnelly advance a precise and interesting proposition: that human rights observance *requires* liberalism while "communitarian regimes necessarily violate the full range of human rights."[28] It is supported by our analysis only if Barbados, Botswana, Mauritius, and Jamaica—which, along with Japan and the United States, are the only countries to score 0 on both of our measures of human rights violations—are considered to have liberal regimes. Several additional second- and third-world countries score 0 on the torture scale and thus cannot be said to violate "the full range of human rights."

Conclusion

Our analysis demonstrates, first, that human rights violations are indeed a common feature of contemporary governments. At the same time, however, substantial differences exist between governments in terms of the types and numbers of violations that occur. Moreover, these differences are sufficiently marked so that the division of the violations into two categories—imprisonment and torture—is an appropriate conceptualization, especially in terms of violations of "the integrity of the person." Further, these two categories may serve as important guideposts in

authoritarian regimes in the two high-torture dimensions increases from 52% to 61%, but this does not significantly change the results.

[28] Howard and Donnelly (fn. 10), 814.

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seeking to reduce such violations on a global scale. Arbitrary imprisonment seriously diminishes the integrity of any individual, but systematic torture deserves even more immediate normative attention and action.

Although we tested several plausible explanations that might account for variations in human rights violations throughout the world, our results indicate that none of them is complete. Support for various hypotheses was generally weak-to-modest and not always consistent, especially when various controls for the size of a nation's population and its level of income were introduced into the analysis. In that sense, this study has begun to specify, and possibly to eliminate, several explanations for differences in human rights compliance around the world, but it has not found a wholly satisfactory one. Further work will need to be undertaken to complete the picture that we have begun to outline.

Nonetheless, the major themes of our results are worth emphasizing. We generally found that the economic hypotheses were better supported than the political ones. For instance, countries that enjoyed higher levels of economic well-being had somewhat consistently—albeit modestly so—better human rights records than those that did not. Extensive ties with capitalist states did not in themselves detract from or contribute to the level of human rights violations in the nations of our dataset; the actual level of development—as measured by domestic income levels—seems to be a more important factor.

For the political explanations, the results are more mixed. While former British colonies are somewhat less likely to imprison their citizens than are countries with other colonial backgrounds, both were about equally likely to torture their citizens. The relative "newness" of a state turned out to be unrelated to both dimensions of human rights violations, and support was mixed for Kirkpatrick's thesis on authoritarian and totalitarian regimes. A weak version of Howard and Donnelly's thesis on liberal and communitarian regimes was generally borne out by our data, but their stronger version was not.

Where do we go from here? First, we need to introduce other political and social conditions within these nations that may help us sort out the relationships. Two factors immediately come to mind: the amount of warfare (both internal and foreign), and the magnitude of ethnic divisions within a state. Both of these factors can be expected to influence human rights violations; they should be incorporated into future analyses. Second, where possible, we need to move to greater precision in our data, and to more multivariate analyses of various alternate explanations. Our examination thus far has relied primarily on, at best, ordinal-level data with only a few limited controls. More sophisticated analyses are neces-

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sary, even though we are constrained by the limitations of our data (and of human rights data in general). Third, we should search for and examine additional explanations for human rights violations. By moving in all these directions, we may come closer to a position in which we can understand and work for change in human rights conditions.

Some of our "explanations" of human rights violations do not seem to have immediate policy implications. The level of development or a colonial heritage, for example, are conditions within which policy makers must operate rather than something they can do much about.[29] Our analysis does indicate variations in violations *within* as well as *between* different types of conditions, however: poor countries do not necessarily violate their citizens' human rights; among those that do, the extent varies. Thus, while some global redistribution of material well-being may be the obvious overall recommendation, government policy makers in poor countries do have alternatives when coping with the problem of political control. It may be possible for the international community, or even for individual nations, to raise the costs—perhaps through aid decisions—of violations of human rights.

We began this article with some examples of violations of human rights in particular countries. In the course of our analysis, and with the unavoidable abstractions that accompany statistical discussion and the necessary attention given to methodological issues, we lose some sensitivity toward the phenomenon that we are trying to understand. It is important to end by reminding ourselves of the real terror and suffering contained in our concepts and percentages.

[29] See Charles W. Anderson, "System and Strategy in Comparative Policy Analysis," in William B. Gwyn and George C. Edwards, eds., *Perspectives on Public Policy Making* (New Orleans: Tulane University Press, 1975), for a theoretical discussion of policy conditions.

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Review Articles

LESSONS FROM HISTORY, OR THE PERFIDY OF ENGLISH EXCEPTIONALISM AND THE SIGNIFICANCE OF HISTORICAL FRANCE

By ROBERT H. BATES*

T. H. Aston and C.H.E. Philpin, *The Brenner Debate: Agrarian Class Structure and Economic Development in Pre-Industrial Europe* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1987), 339 pp.
Steven L. Kaplan, *Bread, Politics, and Political Economy in the Age of Louis XVI*, 2 vols. (The Hague: Martin Nijhoff, 1976), 797 pp.
Steven L. Kaplan, *Provisioning Paris: Merchants and Millers in the Grain and Flour Trade During the Eighteenth Century* (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1984), 666 pp.
Hilton L. Root, *Peasants and King in Burgundy: Agrarian Foundations of French Absolutism* (Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California Press, 1987), 277 pp.
Charles Tilly, *The Contentious French: Four Centuries of Popular Struggle* (Cambridge, MA: The Belknap Press of Harvard University Press, 1986), 456 pp.

Introduction

THE field of development lacks a core body of deductive theory; it proceeds inductively instead. To account for development, scholars often draw lessons from history: they extrapolate from what is "known" to have happened in the past. As a consequence, the field belongs as much to historians as it does to social scientists.

In a field without theory, precedents assume the status of laws. In the development field, it is the historians who process the case materials from which law-like statements are drawn. Historians infer the lessons that become the new orthodoxies. Equally as important, they challenge old ones.

* I wish to acknowledge the impact of Philip Hoffman, Kathryn Norberg, Hilton Root, Robert Brenner, Douglas North, Roger Schofield, Eleanor Searle, Peter Lange, Michael Gillespie, John Aldrich, William Bianco, and Margaret Levi on my thinking. I hasten to add that none are responsible for the viewpoints in this article.

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For the development theorist, the implication is clear: keep a vigilant eye on the work of historians.

If specialists in the field were asked to appraise competing definitions of development, one of the most popular surely would be: development is the process by which town replaces country and industry replaces agriculture. Key works at theorizing in the development field focus on this transition.

In the contemporary literature, many scholars proceed cross-sectionally: the development field remains a branch of comparative politics, and scholars arrive at theories by contrasting behavior in present-day agrarian and industrial societies. But the grand theorists of development—Max Weber, Adam Smith, Karl Marx, and others—proceeded longitudinally. The theories they bequeathed the field evolved from studying how, in societies that had developed successfully, town had emerged from country, industry from agriculture, and mature capitalism from its agrarian antecedents.

This essay examines some recent works that focus on this transition. Recognizing that in this field history stands as parent to theory, we shall conduct a critical inquiry into several of the key lessons that have been drawn. We shall see that resistance to the market was not led by rural communities, but by the agents of capitalism; that peasants (particularly wealthy ones) often sought to champion private rights in property, whereas elites promoted collective ones; and that the historical shifting of the terms of trade against agriculture, which heralded the ascendancy of the commercial classes, has been deeply misunderstood.

Above all, I shall argue that, by focusing on the case of England, classical and Marxian theorists have based development studies on data that are profoundly misleading. Differing in critical respects both from its historical contemporaries and from the developing nations today, the English case supports invalid inferences. Rather, it is the French case from which the lessons of history should be drawn.

Communal Resistance to the Rise of Capitalism

Influential 19th-century theorists held that pre-industrial societies were founded on principles that contrasted with those of market-based societies: in the words of Toennies, *Gemeinschaft* as opposed to *Gesellschaft*, or, in the words of Durkheim, "mechanical" as opposed to "organic" solidarity.[1] Marx contrasted natural societies, where value was

[1] Ferdinand Toennies, *Community and Society*, trans. and ed. by Charles B. Loomis (East Lansing: Michigan State University Press, 1937); Emile Durkheim, *The Division of Labor in Society* (New York: Free Press, 1956).

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conferred by use, with market societies, where value was determined by exchange.[2] The distinction also figures in the work of such influential non-Marxian theorists as Polanyi and Parsons.[3]

Contemporary scholars remain convinced that the principles which underlie agrarian societies contrast with the principles which govern market-based societies. Some have used this "lesson of history" to create a theory of political violence. Wolf, Migdal, and Scott, for example, have located the origin of agrarian rebellion in efforts to resist the impact of the market.[4] The market, they hold, threatens the very foundations of rural community. It promotes self-interest and violates basic notions of human welfare in agrarian societies, such as the guarantee of subsistence. Thus, its spread is resisted by peasant communities.

These scholars maintain that, in part, the triumph of the market is assured by its possession of an active ally: the nation-state. In the contemporary period, for example, the spread of market forces has been promoted by imperialism. In the reigning orthodoxy of peasant studies, peasant rebellions thus become communalistic rebellions, representing forms of protest against the market. And while they are profoundly anti-capitalist, they are clothed in the rhetoric of nationalism, as they also entail resistance against foreign political domination.

In *The Contentious French*, Charles Tilly—a historian and sociologist who has made well-known contributions to the development field[5]—perpetuates important strands of the contemporary orthodoxy. But, by lovingly exploring a rich tableau of historical data, he opens the door to revisionists. For the lessons that he reaffirms appear to be contested by the facts that he uncovers.

Tilly's mission, he states, is to address the question, "How did the development of capitalism and the concentration of power in the national state affect the ways that ordinary people contended—or failed to contend—for their interests?" (p. 5). His answer is that the intrusion of capitalism and the nation-state led to protests in early modern France that represented the reassertion of community. This lesson, he argues, is most

[2] Karl Marx, *Capital* (New York: Clark A. Kerr, 1906), and esp. *Grundrisse* [Outlines] (Harmondsworth, England: Penguin Books, 1973).

[3] Karl Polanyi, *The Great Transformation* (Boston: Beacon Press, 1957); Talcott Parsons, *The Social System* (New York: Free Press, 1964).

[4] Eric R. Wolf, *Peasant Wars of the Twentieth Century* (New York: Harper Torchbooks, 1969); James C. Scott, *The Moral Economy of the Peasant: Peasant Rebellion and Subsistence in Southeast Asia* (New Haven and London: Yale University Press, 1973); Joel S. Migdal, *Peasants, Politics, and Revolution* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1974). For more recent works, see Eric R. Wolf, *Europe and the People Without History* (Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California Press, 1982), and James C. Scott, *Weapons of the Weak: Everyday Forms of Peasant Resistance* (New Haven and London: Yale University Press, 1985).

[5] See, for example, Charles Tilly, ed., *The Formation of National States in Western Europe* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1975).

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vividly conveyed by a characteristic form of political protest, the grain riot: "Blockage of grain expressed the demand of ordinary people that the needs of the community take priority over the requirements of the market" (pp. 21-22).

As Tilly's own work—and the work of others—has confirmed, political demands for subsistence were indeed characteristic of European society in the early modern period. Local communities faced with shortages of food and rising prices used political power to prevent the shipment of the grain that could meet their needs for subsistence.[6]

The key questions, however, are: Did these protests represent revolts against the market? Did they represent revolts against the market's putative ally, the state? In short, did they represent a revolt by precapitalist political communities?

For the conventional interpretation to hold, two things must be true. One is that those who entered the rural community to procure grain must have been agents of the market. The other is that the state officials who backed them must be champions of the market.

Tilly's data, and the data of others, show that it was often the levies of the armed forces that precipitated the grain riots; the military had little incentive to pay high prices for food (Tilly, 83ff.).[7] Other levies were made to provision Paris. Like Tilly, Robert Brenner ("Agrarian Class Structure and Economic Development in Pre-Industrial Europe," chap. 1, pp. 10-63, in Aston and Philpin) relates that the French monarchy frequently mounted wars against the regional nobility. Its power base usually rested narrowly on Paris. The bureaucracy, the armed forces, and the aristocracy also were concentrated in Paris. And the residents of Paris demanded cheap food.

Kaplan (1976) recounts that, in order to feed Paris, the government developed an elaborate bureaucracy for securing food from the countryside.[8] Its purpose was not only to feed Paris, but to do so at low prices—in other words, to counter market forces. It sought to purchase the grain at prices cheaper than those offered by consumers living in regional markets—or abroad.

[6] See, for example, the materials in Tilly (fn. 5); Louise A. Tilly, "The Food Riot as a Form of Political Conflict in France," *Journal of Interdisciplinary History* 2 (1971), 23-57, and J. Stevenson, "Food Riots in England, 1792-1818" in R. Quinault and J. Stevenson, eds., *Popular Protest and Public Order: Six Studies in British History* (London: George Allen & Unwin, 1974). Critical to the interpretation of these riots is Edward P. Thompson, "The Moral Economy of the English Crowd in the Eighteenth Century," *Past and Present* 52 (1971), 76-136, and George Rude, "La taxation populaire de mai 1775 à Paris et dans la region Parisienne" [The common taxation of May 1775 in Paris and in the Paris region], *Annales Historiques de la Revolution Française* 28 (1956), 139-79.

[7] See also the materials in Louise Tilly (fn. 6), and Stevenson (fn. 6).

[8] For the correlation between unrest and the price of food, see George Rude, *Paris and London in the Eighteenth Century* (London: Collins, 1970).

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The image that Tilly conveys is that of the state actively promoting the formation of markets and thereby provoking communal unrest in the agrarian hinterland. In keeping with the orthodox strain of contemporary peasant studies, he therefore interprets grain riots as a form of communal protest against the rise of capitalism, with the latter being championed by the market and the state. But the principal demanders of food were not agencies of the market; they were agencies of the state—the military or the bureaucracy who sought to override the operations of the market, rather than to promote them. They wanted food at cheaper prices than the unregulated market would provide.

The composition of the groups who resisted the export of grain constitutes a further challenge to the orthodox view. Tilly's language, and that of his colleagues in the field of peasant studies, suggests that it was agrarian communities who resisted the intrusion of the market and thus, implicitly, the rise of capitalism. But neither logic nor evidence bears out such an interpretation. Rather, both suggest that the enemies of the grain trade would be the creatures of capitalism—the nascent bourgeoisie and the proletariat—rather than the relics of the pre-capitalist past, the agrarian producers.[9]

Logic suggests that the consumers rather than the producers would resist the export of grain, for exports would lead to a rise in local prices. Although in times of drought or crop failure, the grain producers themselves became net consumers and then had reason to resist food exports, most often they were suppliers. If they could obtain higher prices by exporting grain from the local community, they would presumably favor grain exports.

It is relevant, therefore, that historians have found that food riots took place long after the end of subsistence crises in both England and France.[10] Moreover, these riots were led by consumers, not producers: members of the new urban populations that had grown up in the regional centers of England and France. Thus, Stevenson writes that food riots in England tended to take place in towns, communication centers, and ports. They usually occurred in areas of mining and quarrying; in areas where workers and builders were constructing canals, dykes, and roads;

[9] The picture is further complicated by the fact that members of the aristocracy who lived in Paris also owned land in the grain-growing areas. In their capacity as local elites, they often ruled *against* the right of grain "exports" to Paris and in favor of the paramountcy of local markets. The political interests of the aristocracy thus conflicted with their economic interests in shipping grain to high-priced markets; and their interests as producers, which were enhanced by high prices, conflicted with their interests as urban consumers, which were enhanced by low prices. These complexities should make the analyst suspicious of any simplistic rendering of the class interests of the aristocracy.

[10] For France, see Louise Tilly (fn. 6), 25. Stevenson too stresses that food riots occurred even after subsistence crises had ended in England (fn. 6, pp. 40ff.).

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and among the rural workers. Louise Tilly finds that in 18th-century Burgundy, "within the province, which was quickly tapped by the large military and urban consumers, smaller cities sought food and the countryside armed to prevent loss of vital supplies. 'There was open war with the peasants to get their grain,' wrote a canon of Beaune."[11]

Too often, the lesson that is drawn seems to indicate that rural, agrarian interests fight against the penetration of the market, particularly when the market threatens basic food supplies and creates crises of subsistence. Historically, there have indeed been political struggles over food supplies. But those who imperiled local subsistence most often were not agents of the market; rather, they were agents of interests that sought to override market forces. Often, those who resisted the export of food supplies were not the members of the agrarian community; the resistance tended to come from the local consumers rather than the producers of food.[12] And food riots continued even after subsistence crises subsided.

The agents of the new capitalism—the workers, artisans, burghers, as well as those who governed them—cloaked their demands for cheap food in the myth of the precapitalist community. Kaplan shows that agrarian interests—the producers of grain—trumpeted the virtues of "liberty and the market" and called for the end of irrational "feudal fetters" on the market's operations (Kaplan, 1976, I, pp. 114ff.). Clearly, key lessons of history must be unlearned.

Peasants as Communitarians

Another so-called lesson of history is that, with the transition from an agrarian to an industrial society, peasants tend to experience a loss in welfare. It is held that capitalism promotes the formation of private rights in property; and that, with the privatization of common rights, poor people lose their institutional defenses against the risks of the market. For this reason too, the rural poor are said to rebel and resist the rise of capitalism.

This interpretation has been put forward for peasant rebellions in France.[13] It has been applied to the study of rural violence in England,

[11] Louise Tilly (fn. 6), 52.

[12] As noted above, members of the agrarian community would on occasion be net purchasers of food, and therefore would resist higher prices for it. This was particularly true of cottagers and farm laborers, who at times of subsistence crises faced both a lowering of the wage rate and higher food prices; they would therefore be particularly motivated to resist the "exportation" of food. For a brilliant analysis, see Amartya Sen, *Poverty and Famines: An Essay on Entitlement and Deprivation* (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1981).

[13] Marc Bloch, *French Rural History*, trans. by Janet Sondheimer (Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California Press, 1970); Emmanuel Le Roy Ladurie, *Histoire de la France Rurale* [History of rural France], ed. by Georges Duby and Armand Wallon, 4 vols. (Paris: Seuil, 1976); Albert Soboul, "Problèmes paysannes de la communauté rurale (xviiie-xixe)"

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especially at the time of the Parliamentary enclosures.[14] And, as a "lesson of history," it has been applied to the study of peasant rebellions in the modern world.[15]

Again, Tilly perpetuates this orthodoxy. He argues that:

> The second common form of anti-capitalist action was . . . local resistance to landlords' consolidation of lands and of rights in the land (p. 23).
>
> Popular opposition did not aim specifically at the landed nobility. It aimed at the landlords of any order who chewed up the rural community's collective rights (p. 24).

But who actually promoted the preservation of collective rights? In some cases, to be sure, it was the peasants. But the more we learn, the more we come to realize that the defenders of common rights were often drawn from the ranks of others.

Some came from the elites who dominated village institutions and thereby captured the benefits of common property.[16] Important work by Philip Hoffman shows that, in Northern and Eastern France, herders constituted the primary opponents of private enclosure. Landlords, wealthy peasants, and local seigneurs usually owned these herds. They also tended to hold the right to stint on common lands, and to exercise it because they feared the loss of grazing privileges.[17] Kathryn Norberg argues in a study of a village in southwestern France:

> The commons . . . profited mainly the elite who jealously guarded its benefits. . . . they were the principal beneficiaries of most traditional practices, be they open fields or communal woods. No wonder then that they were among traditions' strongest defenders. . . . historians have mistaken the elite's views for those of the whole community.[18]

[Peasant problems of the rural community, 18th-19th century], in *Problèmes paysannes de la Revolution 1778-1848* (Paris: Maspero, 1975).

[14] J. L. and Barbara Hammond, *The Village Laborer 1760-1832* (New York: Harper Torchbooks, 1970); Edward P. Thompson, *The Making of the English Working Class* (New York: Vintage Books, 1962).

[15] See, for example, Scott (fn. 4, 1974).

[16] This line of historical interpretation was provided by Alfred Cobban in *The Social History of the French Revolution* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1968). In addition to the recent work of Norberg and Hoffman (fns. 17, 18, and 19), see Root's discussion in *Peasants and King*, pp. 16, 95-97, 125, 153ff, and 216-17.

[17] Philip T. Hoffman, "Institutions and Agriculture in Old-Regime France," paper prepared for the Caltech-All University of California Group in Economic History Conference on Pre-Industrial Developments in Peasant Economies (Huntington Library, Pasadena, CA), May 22-24, 1987.

[18] Kathryn Norberg, "The Struggle Over the Commons: Antiseigneurialism and Social Tension in the Peasant Community," pp. 26-27. The work of Hoffman (fn. 17) and Norberg (fns. 18 and 19) is to be featured in a special edition of the journal *Politics and Society*, edited by Margaret Levi and Robert H. Bates. Also see Samuel L. Popkin, *The Rational Peasant* (Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California Press, 1979), which makes a comparable argument based on data from contemporary Vietnam.

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In France, the local elites had an important ally: the central administrators. Under a law passed in 1439, the monarchy could tax the peasantry directly and without convoking the Estates General. Locked in combat with the nobility and distrustful of other elites, the king was afraid to negotiate for revenues with privileged orders. Instead, he sought to secure his tax base by preventing encroachments upon peasant property. This ability to tap the streams of income generated by the peasant communities played another critical role in the state's finances: it underwrote the monarch's capacity to repay—and thus to attract—foreign loans. This argument forms the central thesis of Hilton Root's *Peasants and King in Burgundy*. Root draws the important implication:

> Communal rights and properties and collective responsibility for tax collection were not spontaneous expressions of peasant culture. Both were measures imposed from above to ensure political dominance of the agrarian population and to facilitate resource extraction (pp. 232-33).

Perhaps we have gone too far. What, after all, do we know of the preferences of the peasants? Do we have any insight into what they themselves would have preferred? We do, at least to a modest degree. Norberg has gained access to the response of 431 peasant communities to a law passed after the French Revolution, which allowed peasants to divide common land into private holdings. She concludes that, when given the chance to break up the commons, peasant villages elected to do so.[19] In response to an investigation of the implementation of this law, the government learned that even prior to the new policy, 240 villages had decided to divide up the commons; 118 voted to partition; and only 46 had declined to do so.[20] Most of the villages that elected not to divide did so because their commons were too wet, too dry, or too hilly to cultivate. Norberg concludes, "If the commons had not been encroached upon, they were, most likely, virtually worthless and therefore not worth partitioning. Here lay, it appears, the main reason peasants chose to leave the commons as collective property."[21]

Too often, people in the development field seem to have drawn the lesson that local communities struggle against the privatization of interests brought on by capitalism, and do so in order to safeguard the interests of the poor. Instead, there is ample historical evidence to suggest that collective property is championed by elites and that it affords a way of privatiz-

[19] Kathryn Norberg, "Dividing up the Commons: The Political Economy of Eighteenth-Century French Agriculture," paper prepared for the Caltech-All University of California Conference (fn. 17).

[20] Twenty-seven had no knowledge of the law.

[21] Norberg (fn. 19), 7.

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ing the benefits to be extracted from agrarian society while spreading the costs widely among its members. It appears that champions of collective property possess private interests themselves, and use the corporate interests of the rural community to legitimate their claims.[22]

Peasant Farming as a Retardant to Development

Anyone who works in present-day developing areas knows that, despite overwhelming evidence to the contrary, significant elites and especially intellectuals remain convinced that peasant farming provides an inadequate foundation for development. In post-independence Africa, for example, the governments of Somalia, Ethiopia, Mozambique, Zambia, Tanzania, and Ghana have invested heavily in state farms; alternatively, through "villagization" or other means, they have sought to promote large-scale farming.[23] In the pre-independence period, the governments of Kenya and Rhodesia determined, as a matter of policy, not to rely on the output of peasant farmers. It was held that, in view of their commitment to subsistence, peasant farmers produced a highly variable level of marketable surplus, thus imposing risks upon consumers and the state.[24] Policy makers therefore chose to rely instead upon the large-scale farmers who, they believed, produced a more reliable flow of marketable output.

The superiority of the large-scale farmer is a lesson of history drawn chiefly, it would appear, from commentaries on the 18th-century rivalry between the superpowers of that era: England and France. Influential observers attributed England's military superiority in large part to her economic prosperity; her superior wealth, in turn, was thought to be due to the greater productivity of her agriculture; and the last was believed to be based on the greater technical and economic efficiency of England's large-scale farmers.[25] The retarded state of the French economy was as-

[22] Also see the discussion in Robert H. Bates, "Some Conventional Orthodoxies in the Study of Agrarian Change," *World Politics* 36 (January 1984), 234-54. This is not to deny that there were cases where the poor depended upon common rights, for pasture, for forest products, or for gleaning, and where they allied themselves with those who resisted the break-up of common lands. In general, however, it appears to have been the local elites who dominated the commons.

[23] See, for example, the discussion in Robert H. Bates, *Markets and States in Tropical Africa* (Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California Press, 1981).

[24] See the discussion and review of this debate in William O. Jones, *Marketing Stable Food Crops in Tropical Africa* (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1972). William Allan, *The African Husbandman* (New York: Barnes & Noble, 1965) remains the classic argument of this position.

[25] The intellectual background is brilliantly presented in Kaplan (1976). See also the thoughtful review in Michael Lipton, *Why Poor People Stay Poor: Urban Bias in World Development* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1977).

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cribed to France's lagging rural sector, where productivity remained low, technical progress insufficient, and farm size diminutive. England had seized the capitalist road to development; France remained backward, mired in peasant production.

This analysis was championed in a series of influential works by Arthur Young, published in the 18th century.[26] It was endorsed by the leading economists of the time,[27] and exercised a powerful influence upon policy makers—especially in France, where the government sought to reform its rural economy the better to finance its military ventures.[28] Karl Marx helped to inject this analysis into contemporary development studies. While condemning the stagnation of peasant production,[29] Marx attributed the initial surge toward industrialization to the rise of capitalist farming.[30]

This lesson of history—that peasant production is inefficient and incapable of generating an agricultural surplus adequate for the promotion of development—continues to influence the writings of contemporary historians. Among the works reviewed here, its power is perhaps most strikingly underscored by Brenner's compelling re-analysis of the decline of feudal society. The triumph of modern capitalism, he argues, was marked by the rise of commercial farming: large, capital-intensive farms, employing wage labor. States in which development was retarded were marked instead by the capacity of the bureaucracy and others to ally with an organized peasantry and to block the rise of commercially minded agrarian classes:

> In England we find the landlords consolidating holdings and leasing them out to large capitalist tenants who would in turn farm them on the basis of wage labor and agricultural improvement. But in France we find comparatively little consolidation. Even the land controlled directly by the landlords—that is by demesnes farmed out on terminable contract leases—was

[26] See Arthur Young, *Six Weeks Tour Through the Southern Counties of England and Wales* (London: W. Strahan, 1768); *A Six Months Tour Through the North of England*, 2nd ed. (London: W. Strahan, 1771); and *A Farmer's Tour Through the East of England* (London: W. Strahan, 1771).

[27] See Ronald L. Meek, *The Economics of Physiocracy* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1963).

[28] Kaplan's work, esp. 1976, provides valuable insights into the influence of economic technocrats upon policy making in 18th-century France. Also see Alexis de Tocqueville, *The Old Regime and the French Revolution*, trans. by Stuart Gilbert (New York: Anchor Books, 1955).

[29] See the materials gathered in Norire Ter-Akopyan, ed., *Marx, Engels: Pre-Capitalist Socio-economic Formations* (London: Lawrence & Wishart, 1979).

[30] Marx, *Capital* (fn. 2), part VIII. Subsequent Marxian theorists attributed the relative stagnation of Eastern and Central Europe to the prevalence of peasant agriculture; they located in large-scale farming the motor force for the rise of capitalism. A useful review is contained in David Mitrany, *Marx Against the Peasant* (New York: Collier Books, 1961). See also V. I. Lenin, *The Development of Capitalism in Russia* (Moscow: Progress Publishers, 1956).

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> generally let in small parcels and cultivated by small peasant tenants. At the same time, of course, fragmentation dominated the sector of peasant proprietorship. These different class structures determined substantially different results in terms of agricultural productivity and, indeed, wholly disparate overall patterns of economic development (Brenner in Aston and Philpin, 46).

Students of contemporary agriculture, particularly in Asia—Schultz, Hayami, Ruttan, Sen and others—have largely discredited this "lesson of history."[31] More important for this essay, the thesis is strongly disputed by contemporary historians of agricultural development in Europe. As phrased most dramatically by Goldstone, "There is a persistent belief . . . that much of the magic in English farming was due to its 'larger' farms, with their land lord/capitalist tenant/wage laborer, compared with the proliferation of tiny plots in France. This is, to be polite, poppycock."[32]

As the work of Robert C. Allen and others has shown, there was a steady growth of productivity on all British farms, be they enclosed or open-field, large or small, from the time of the middle ages through the 18th century;[33] because of the dominance of open-field farming throughout much of this period,[34] enclosed, large-scale farmers contributed relatively little to the differences in productivity that distinguished British from French agriculture.[35] According to Allen,

> Corn yields in the English midlands approximately doubled between the middle ages and the nineteenth century. Wheat, for instance, which had yielded about ten bushels per acre in the fifteenth century, provided about 20-22 bushels c. 1800. Compared to that increase, the difference between open and enclosed yields at the end of the eighteenth century was small, i.e. open field farmers (like enclosed farmers) had accomplished almost all of the advance.[36]

[31] Theodore W. Schultz, *Transforming Traditional Agriculture* (New Haven and London: Yale University Press, 1964); Yujiro Hayami and Vernon W. Ruttan, *Agricultural Development: An International Perspective* (Baltimore and London: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1971); Amartya K. Sen, "Size of Holding and Productivity," *The Economic Weekly* 16 (1964), 323-26.

[32] Jack Goldstone, "Regional Ecology and Agrarian Change in England and France, 1500-1700," paper presented at the Caltech-All University of California Conference (fn. 17), 24. A revised version of this paper is scheduled to appear in a special edition of *Politics and Society* (see fn. 18).

[33] Allen, "Enclosure and Productivity Growth, 1459-1850," typescript (Department of Economics, University of British Columbia, 1984). Allen's data remain controversial.

[34] For data on the rate of enclosure, see J. R. Wordie, "The Chronology of English Enclosure 1500-1914," *Economic History Review* 36 (November 1983), 483-505.

[35] For data on these differences, see Anthony Wrigley, "Urban Growth and Agricultural Change: England and the Continent in the Early Modern Period," *Journal of Interdisciplinary History* 15 (1985), 716-21.

[36] Robert C. Allen, "Enclosure, Farming Methods, and the Growth of Productivity in the South Midlands," Discussion Paper No. 86-44 (rev.) (Department of Economics, University of British Columbia, January 1987), 16. See also J. A. Yelling, *Common Field and Enclosure in*

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To what, then, is the greater English productivity to be attributed? Allen suggests biological improvements: seed selection and the use of improved plant species. Others suggest the growth of the market. In England, to a much greater degree than in France, a national market had formed. Some areas produced wool for export. Areas immediately adjacent to towns specialized in truck farming and the production of perishables.[37] Farms near the coast produced meat and grains, which they then shipped by water to urban centers. And those who worked the heavier soils of the interior shifted out of arable production into the production of livestock. Studies of subsistence crises also suggest the relatively greater integration of the English market; Appleby and others indicate that there was a far greater mobility of grain between regions of abundant harvests and those of dearth in England than there was in France, and thus a greater capacity to blunt the consequences of food shortages.[38]

Major investigations of present-day agriculture refute the position that peasant agriculture retards development. So do important reassessments of the historical data.

The Squeeze on Agriculture

Viewed in historical perspective, development is a process of structural change. It results from the movement of resources—land, labor, and capital—out of agriculture and into other sectors, such as industry, where these resources can be used more productively. In summary notation:

$$\frac{d\,GNP}{dt} > 0 \quad \Longrightarrow \quad \frac{d\,Ag./GNP}{dt} < 0,$$

where d stands for change, t for time, *GNP* for gross national product, and *Ag./GNP* for agriculture as a portion of the gross national product.

One way in which this shift of resources takes place is through productivity increases in agriculture. Technical change in agriculture leads to increased supplies of agricultural products; because the demand for

England 1450-1850 (Hamden, CT: Archon Books, 1977), and M. Turner, "Agricultural Productivity in England in the Eighteenth Century: Evidence from Crop Yields," *Economic History Review*, 2nd series, 35 (1982), 489-510.

[37] See Marjorie Mackintosh, "Economic Change in Southeast England, 1350-1600," paper presented at the Caltech-All University of California Conference (fn. 17).

[38] See Andrew Appleby, "Grain Prices and Subsistence Crises in England and France, 1590-1740," *Journal of Economic History* 39 (December 1979), 865-87; E. A. Wrigley and Roger Schofield, *The Population History of England 1541-1871* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1981); David Weir, "Markets and Mortality in France," 1600-1789," manuscript, n.p., n.d.; Joan Thirsk, ed., *Agrarian History of England and Wales* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1984).

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such products is inelastic, prices fall, and the resources of land, labor, and capital employed by marginal producers fail to earn revenues equivalent to their opportunity costs, and so seek productive employment elsewhere. Through the Mills-Marshall treadmill, dynamic transformations in agriculture lead to the structural transformation of the greater economy.[39]

Structural transformation can also be achieved by policy-induced shifts in relative prices. Here, another lesson of history is brought to bear: that industrialization was achieved by shifting the terms of trade against agriculture.[40]

Central to this inference is the history of the Corn Laws, and in particular their repeal. Classical economists, especially Ricardo, had attacked the Corn Laws and stressed the way in which they privileged the interests of the landed classes. Manufacturers and workers had combined in demanding their repeal; according to Marshall, "the Victory of the Anti-Corn Law League signalized the extension of the interests of industrial capitalists and of . . . their rule over England."[41] From the history of the Corn Laws, many therefore concluded that the shift from an agrarian to an industrial society could be achieved by altering the terms of trade between town and country.[42]

This way of promoting industrialization strongly appealed to ambitious elites. In the Soviet Union, for example, some, like Bukharin, favored offering positive incentives to farmers; their response in terms of increased supply would then induce the dynamic adjustments leading to the release of resources to industry. Others, like Preobrazhensky, distrusted the willingness and ability of peasants to respond to price incentives; citing the lessons from the history of industrialization in Britain, they felt that forceful state intervention to shift the terms of trade against

[39] See the excellent discussion in Alain de Janvry, *The Agrarian Question and Reformism in Latin America* (Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1981). The central issue of whether industrialization resulted from the transfer of resources from agriculture is addressed in François Crouzet, *Capital Formation in the Industrial Revolution* (London: Methuen, 1972), and Roderick Flood and Donald McClosky, eds., *The Economic History of Britain since 1700*, I (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1981).

[40] The history of these ideas is ably reviewed in Lipton (fn. 25). See also E. Preobrazhensky, *The New Economics*, trans. by Brian Pearce (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1966); Alexander Erlich, *The Soviet Industrialization Debates, 1924-1928* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1960).

[41] Leon S. Marshall, "The Emergence of the First Industrial City: Manchester 1780-1850," in Caroline F. Ware, ed., *The Cultural Approach to History* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1940), 158. A sophisticated treatment is provided by Timothy J. McKeown in "The Politics of Corn Law Repeal Reconsidered," paper presented at the Annual Meeting of the American Political Science Association, Chicago, September 3-6, 1987. In this paper, McKeown reanalyzes the famous Aydelotte data set. See William Aydelotte, "The Country Gentlemen and the Repeal of the Corn Laws," *English Historical Review* 82 (1967), 47-60.

[42] See in particular Ashok Mitra, *Terms of Trade and Class Relations: An Essay in Political Economy* (London: Frank Cass, 1977).

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agriculture represented the best policy. The advocates of political intervention won out; by shifting the structure of relative prices against rural producers, they taxed the rural sector in favor of industry.[43] This policy was subsequently followed by others.[44]

Although it is now widely recognized that turning the terms of trade against agriculture is far more likely to lead to stagnation than to growth, this lesson of history was used for decades to advocate and to justify the imposition of negative pricing policies on farmers.

Because reasoning from precedent will remain an important guide to policy in the development field, we are motivated to reassess the historical record. When we do so, we learn three *new* lessons. The first is that the repeal of the Corn Laws represented the repeal of a subsidy rather than the imposition of a tax; structural transformation had thus been achieved where agriculture was subsidized rather than squeezed. The second is that the development field has drawn historical lessons from a highly anomalous case; it therefore rests upon unfirm data. The third is the centrality of politics to the economics of development.

Lesson One

When re-assessing the historical precedents that proved to be misleading guides to policy, one quickly recognizes that the repeal of the Corn Laws did *not* represent the imposition of a tax on agriculture. The policy of the British government can be summarized as choosing that price for farm products which represents the

$$max\ (P_d, P_w)$$

where P_d is the price on the domestic market and P_w the price on the world market. Under the terms of the Corn Laws, when the world price was higher than the domestic price, farmers could export grain; when it was lower than the domestic price, imports were prohibited. The policy thus represented a high-price policy, which favored farmers at the expense of consumer interests.

It is ironic that, *rather than justifying the policy prescription of shifting the terms of trade against farming, the English case justifies the opposite*. The structural transformation of English agriculture took place in the context of policies that protected high agricultural prices.

[43] See Erlich (fn. 40), as well as Maurice Dobb, *Soviet Economic Development Since 1917* (New York: International Publishers, 1948).

[44] See the discussion in Theodore W. Schultz, ed., *Distortions of Agricultural Incentives* (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1978).

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Lesson Two

As Heckscher and others point out, England's commitment to policies favoring farmers made that nation unique in its time. A key element of "mercantilist policies," Heckscher suggests, was "provisioning": supplying cheap grain to urban centers. Other governments intervened to defend low domestic prices by banning the export of grain when world prices were higher than the domestic price, and by allowing the import of grain when domestic prices were high. They acted, in other words, to implement policies which selected the

$$min\ (P_d, P_w).^{45}$$

The policies everywhere else in Europe were exactly the opposite of those followed in England.

It is important to stress the level of English exceptionalism. Economists, Marxist and otherwise, have long taken the English case as prototypical of early industrialization. Many of the lessons inferred about the origins of successful capitalist development derive from this case. And yet, as we have seen, England proves to have been anomalous.

French policies toward agriculture were more characteristic of those of her historical contemporaries; they were also more typical of those that characterize the developing nations today. French agriculture was peasant-based; productivity was relatively low; the government adhered to a low-price policy; and it maintained a bureaucracy to secure cheap grain to feed its civil servants, its armed forces, and its capital city. The French case—not the English, with its large farms, subsidized rural sector, and relatively free internal trade—better approximates the world of the contemporary developing nations. Thus, it follows that too much theorizing about development has been based on the case of England, and too little on that of France.

Development specialists would do well to put aside their Marx, Smith, Ricardo, and Mill and instead consult the writings on France, such as those produced by Tilly, Brenner, Root, and Kaplan.

Lesson Three

The third lesson leads to a renewed respect for the centrality of politics to the economics of development.

England, like every other developing country, originally intervened in agricultural markets in an effort to defend consumer interests. Gras,

[45] Eli F. Heckscher, *Merchantilism*, II (London: George Allen & Unwin, 1931), 80ff.

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Ponko, Outhwaite, and others have examined the process by which the government sought to regulate the grain trade so as to preserve low prices.[46] The frequency of such interventions declined in the 17th century, however, and policy was reversed in 1688, with the adoption of the Corn Laws.[47] As Kaplan, Tilly, and others show, the government in France, by contrast, continued to intervene in grain markets in order to preserve lower, not higher, grain prices.

One reason for the disparate behavior of the two governments may have been the relative security of food supplies. The data suggest that, by the 17th century, food shortages were less frequent in England than in France; there were fewer subsistence crises. Just as government policy affected the performance of the agrarian economy, so the performance of the economy may have affected the incentives for governments to assure the supply of low-cost food.[48] There is a strong case to be made for the significance of this reciprocal causation.

The books reviewed in this essay also suggest, however, that there may have been important *political* reasons for the contrast in public policies. Root, Brenner, Tilly, and Kaplan argue that agricultural policy in France was driven in part by the need for revenues to finance foreign wars and in part by the need to achieve internal security. The English monarchy, too, needed money for its foreign wars; but, in the 17th century, the domestic threat to it came not so much from the capital city as from parliament.

Viewed from this vantage point, the date of the Corn Laws—the hallmark of English exceptionalism—is instructive. The laws were passed in 1688 as part of the terms negotiated between parliament and the king who had been chosen by parliament: William of Orange.[49] Parliament had overthrown the monarchy; it had ruled England for decades; and by turning to William and Mary, it had imported a new royal family. The landowners who dominated parliament sought the commitment of the monarch to policies that would raise the price of grain; the monarch

[46] N.S.B. Gras, *The Evolution of the English Corn Market* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1915); V. Ponko, "N.S.B. Gras and Elizabethan Corn Policy: A Re-examination of the Problem," *Economic History Review*, 2nd series, 17 (1964), 24-42; R. B. Outhwaite, "Dearth and Government Intervention in English Grain Markets, 1590-1700," *Economic History Review*, 2nd series, 34 (1981), 380-406, and "Food Crises in Early Modern England: Patterns of Public Response," in *Proceedings of the Seventeenth International History Conference*, ed. Michael Flinn (Edinburgh: The University Press, 1978).

[47] See the discussion in Adam Smith, *The Wealth of Nations* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1976), Book I, pp. 219ff.

[48] See, for example, Weir (fn. 38); the contributions in Robert I. Rotberg and Theodore K. Rabb, *Hunger and History* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1985); and Appleby (fn. 38).

[49] See Smith (fn. 47), Book I, pp. 219ff.

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sought higher taxes. The result was a political compromise. The king exchanged protection of the economic interests of grain producers for parliament's agreement to a land tax. The landed elites and the monarch adopted a program of agrarian protection and split the economic benefits between them.

Why, then, did not London rebel, as Paris did?[50] Brenner's new research shows that the governing elites in London differed significantly from those in Paris.[51] London was a port city, and its government was dominated not by civil servants and lawyers, but by merchants and traders. The elites of Paris were consumers of grain; those of London were traders. Unlike their Parisian counterparts, those who dominated the government of London could benefit from the exportation of grain; free trade in grain therefore was less of a threat to the powerful in the capital city.

Kaplan's study of the politics of agricultural policy in France demonstrates that the coastal cities joined the landed classes in demanding the liberalization of the grain trade. London was a coastal city. Had the capital of France been Marseille rather than Paris, the monarchy of France in the 18th century might well have shifted to market principles in the making of agricultural policy.

Conclusion

In this essay, we have examined five recent works that cast light upon the foundations of the development field. To a great extent, those foundations are based on lessons of history that have not been properly interpreted.

Several of the central theses about the transition from agrarianism rest on debatable grounds. For example, the nation-state did *not* champion the extension of competitive markets; rather, public officials sought to limit and regulate them. It was the workers and burghers—the new classes that emerged with capitalism—who used the language of community to resist the market; often, it was agricultural producers who preferred unfettered trade. Peasants often sought to break up commons; elites often sought to preserve them. Small-scale farmers accounted for much of the productivity gains in the period preceding the Industrial Revolution; peasant agriculture was not stagnant. Moreover, deep mis-

[50] As Rude has shown, the rebellions by the London mob correlated with the price of bread. See Rude (fn. 8).

[51] Robert Brenner, forthcoming.

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understandings surround the history of the terms of trade and the role they played in "the great transformation."

Among the most significant of the new lessons learned, however, is the intellectual tyranny of the English case—and the significance of that of France.

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JAPANESE FOREIGN ECONOMIC POLICY FORMATION:
Explaining the Reactive State

By KENT E. CALDER*

Takashi Inoguchi, *Kokusai Kankei no Seiji Keizai Gaku: Nihon no Yakuwari to Sentaku* [The political economy of international relations: Japan's role and choice]. Tokyo: Tokyo Daigaku Shuppan Kai, 1985, 253 pp.
Yōichi Funabashi, *Nichibei Keizai Masatsu* [Japan-U.S. economic conflict]. Tokyo: Iwanami Shinsho, 1987, 232 pp.
Atsushi Kusano, *Nichibei Orange Kōshō* [Japan-U.S. orange negotiations]. Tokyo: Nihon Keizai Shimbun Sha, 1983, 237 pp.
Thomas McCraw, ed., *America versus Japan*. Boston: Harvard Business School Press, 1986, 463 pp.
Kenneth B. Pyle, ed., *The Trade Crisis: How Will Japan Respond?* Seattle: Society for Japanese Studies, 1987, 251 pp.
Michèle Schmiegelow, ed., *Japan's Response to Crisis and Change in the World Economy*. New York: M. E. Sharpe, 1986, 309 pp.

As trade frictions between Japan and its Western economic partners have escalated, both Western and Japanese analysts, particularly at the popular level, have developed increasingly divergent and strongly held conceptions of what Japanese foreign economic policies currently are, and how they got to be that way. Some see Japanese policies as remarkably liberal in view of Japan's pervasive resource vulnerabilities; others regard these same policies as rapaciously mercantilist. Yet despite this broad divergence of views—as well as the rising importance of Japan's behavior—for the international system, for comparative political analysis, and for international relations theory, there has been remarkably little serious international dialogue about the character of the Japanese state in its complex relationship with the global economic system. Scholarly Western-language publications in the international relations field in particular have all too frequently given short shrift to or ignored Japanese

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interpretations of Japan's own policy processes, institutions, and objectives.

For an understanding of the complex mixture of strategy, hesitancy, and pragmatism that characterizes Japanese foreign economic policy behavior, particularly in the late 1980s, this essay employs the concept of the "reactive state." This concept denies neither the strategic intent of much Japanese policy making nor its successful implementation in many instances. It is also broadly consistent with arguments stressing the importance of international considerations, particularly the U.S.-Japan alliance, in influencing Japanese foreign economic behavior. The reactive state interpretation merely maintains that the impetus to policy change is typically supplied by outside pressure, and that reaction prevails over strategy in the relatively narrow range of cases where the two come into conflict. Thus, ambiguous foreign demands may serve, through deft strategic redefinition within Japan itself, as a stimulus for enhancing Japanese competitive capabilities; this occurred during the capital and import liberalization controversies of the late 1960s after Japan joined the OECD. But institutional difficulties in initiating pro-active policies handicap Japan in pursuing strategic interests in multilateral settings, a reality becoming more important to both Japan and the international economic system with the decline of American pre-eminence.

The essay begins by exploring the concept of the reactive state within the broader context of analysis in international political economy. It proceeds to an empirical investigation of postwar Japanese foreign economic policy behavior, with particular emphasis on the post-1971 period, and explains Japanese passivity in international affairs when activism would have been both possible and beneficial for Japan. This tension between reactive behavior and strategic imperatives became particularly pronounced during 1971-1973, after the stable trade, financial, and energy regimes within which Japan prospered during the 1950s and 1960s began to dissolve abruptly with the Nixon Shocks, flexible exchange rates, and the first oil shock.

Although the concept of the reactive state as presented here is a general notion, broadly applicable to nonhegemonic powers in highly interdependent international systems, it has particular relevance to contemporary Japan. The reactive aspects of Japanese foreign economic behavior are remarkably pronounced, considering the country's economic strength, the strategic inclinations of its technocracy, and the turbulence of the international economic system; the economic basis for a more proactive Japanese global role is gradually being established, however. The article concludes with an assessment of implications of Japan's character

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as a reactive state for the broader global political economy and for future research.

Japan as a Reactive State

The essential characteristics of the "reactive state" in this analysis are two-fold: (1) the state fails to undertake major independent foreign economic policy initiatives when it has the power and national incentives to do so; and (2) it responds to outside pressures for change, albeit erratically, unsystematically, and often incompletely. In a four-fold typology of nation-states in terms of these two characteristics, the reactive state can thus be distinguished from pro-active hegemonic and middle-range powers such as the United States, France, and many of the other large European powers during the 1950s and 1960s. It can also be distinguished from inflexible, autistic states incapable of responding to outside stimuli even under pressure. Contemporary Japan is sometimes accused of being such a state. Small, advanced European nations such as Austria and Norway, with foreign economic strategies that are highly responsive to developments in a broader global political economy whose parameters they do not attempt to shape, could be considered reactive states under the definition adopted here;[1] so could the newly industrializing nations of East Asia, such as South Korea, Taiwan, and Singapore, although their internal social and state structures are obviously very different from those of the small European democratic corporatist states.[2] Ample natural resource endowments, large internal markets, relatively centralized domestic policy-making structures, defense incentives for autarkic development, and a tradition of North-South confrontation have made the larger Latin American NICs (as well as India) somewhat more pro-active but less pragmatically flexible than their East Asian counterparts; Brazilian and Indian informatics policies during the late 1970s and the early 1980s are cases in point.[3]

From the perspective of international relations theory, Japan is an es-

[1] On the industrial adjustment and foreign economic strategies of the smaller European industrial states, see Peter J. Katzenstein, *Small States in World Markets: Industrial Policy in Europe* (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1985).

[2] On the foreign economic policies of the East Asian NICs, see Roy Hofheinz, Jr., and Kent E. Calder, *The Eastasia Edge* (New York: Basic Books, 1982), 171-91; David Yoffie, *Power and Protectionism: Strategies of the Newly Industrializing Countries* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1983); and Frederic C. Deyo, ed., *The Political Economy of the New Asian Industrialism* (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1987).

[3] On Brazilian informatics policies and the constraints they placed on U.S. multinationals, see Peter B. Evans, "State, Capital and the Transformation of Dependence: The Brazilian Computer Case," *World Development* 14 (July 1986), 791-808.

On the Indian case, see Joseph Grieco, "Between Dependency and Autonomy: India's Ex-

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pecially interesting reactive state because of its enormous economic size, its substantial population (more than France and West Germany combined),[4] and its pre-1945 history of pro-activism in the international system. In all these respects, it is more similar to the pro-active middle-range European economic powers (such as West Germany, Britain, and France) than to other reactive states (such as Austria and Norway), which are typically smaller in size and influence. Japan has, in addition, a far larger domestic market, and is less dependent on international trade than any of these states, including the major European powers. It has carefully controlled Western multinational corporations and banks in order to prevent them from compromising state authority; few other governments have done this successfully. Moreover, since 1985 Japan has been the largest creditor in the world; its capital outflows in 1986 were more than twice those of all OPEC nations combined at the height of their wealth.[5]

Despite its manifest economic and geostrategic resources and its demonstrated ability to operate strategically within its national boundaries, the Japanese state has been consistently more cautious in taking international initiatives than most major European governments. It has also typically been more deferential to pressure from the United States—and at times even from the European Community—than these middle-range powers. These differences raise fundamental issues regarding the relationship of national economic capabilities to foreign economic policy. The Japanese case also raises basic issues regarding the relationship of domestic structure to international economic behavior, particularly concerning domestic political constraints on pro-active foreign economic policy.

Considering the importance of the subject to the functioning of the global economic system and to theoretical analyses in international political economy, competent book-length empirical studies of Japanese foreign economic policy behavior are still remarkably scarce. Those that are available, such as the 1986 Harvard Business School's comparative study of business-government relations, *America versus Japan*, edited by Thomas K. McCraw (reviewed here), and the various collaborative projects of I. M. Destler, Hideo Sato, and Haruhiro Fukui,[6] focus predominantly on U.S.-Japan relations.

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perience with the International Computer Industry," *International Organization* 36 (Summer 1982), 609-32.

[4] In 1986, Japan's population was an estimated 121.5 million, compared with 61.1 million for West Germany, 57.2 million for Italy, 56.6 million for the United Kingdom, and 55.4 million for France. See Keizai Kōhō Center, *Japan 1988: An International Comparison* (Tokyo: Keizai Kōhō Center, 1987), 6.

[5] Japanese long-term capital outflows in 1986 totaled $132 billion; OPEC annual capital outflows in the mid-1970s averaged under $65 billion. See *Nomura Investment Review*, July 1987, p. 11; *New York Times*, August 31, 1986.

[6] I. M. Destler, Hideo Sato, and Haruhiro Fukui, *Managing an Alliance* (Washington, DC:

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Because of the explosive recent intensification of U.S.-Japan economic interdependence[7] and the far-reaching implications of that interdependence for the global political economy as a whole,[8] U.S.-Japan comparisons are of crucial importance for policy purposes. But in securing a deepened theoretical understanding of the reactive postwar Japanese state, U.S.-Japan analysis must be supplemented with comparisons between Japan and European states, comparisons between Japan before 1970 and the current newly industrializing countries (NICs), comparisons between recent Japanese behavior and that of earlier emergent economic superpowers, and comparisons between pre-World War II and post-World War II Japan itself. The important question is why Japanese foreign economic policy has been so much more reactive than that of other middle-range economic powers, even as Japan moves toward economic superpower status. In this respect, comparisons with the United States are especially useful when they are lagged to compare recent Japanese realities with American economic policy making between World Wars I and II, before the American global hegemonic role had been clearly established.[9]

During the 1950s and 1960s, both Japan and Western Europe were subordinate elements of the U.S.-dominated Western hegemonic system. Evidence from one of the few studies that has yet undertaken a systematic comparative analysis of Japan and Europe—Michèle Schmiegelow's edited volume under review here—affirms that the early post-World War II foreign economic policies of the middle-range European powers were significantly more pro-active, and on important occasions significantly *less* deferential to the United States, than those of Japan. In a fascinating comparative essay, Henrik Schmiegelow points out, for example, that several of the European nations, particularly France, pursued openly neomercantilist exchange-rate policies during the 1950s and the 1960s, involving pragmatic competitive devaluations broadly counter to the Bretton Woods structure of fixed exchange rates (p. 31). In sharp contrast to this practice, and to Japan's own mercantilist strategy of competitive devaluation during the 1930s, postwar Japan adhered rigidly to a fixed exchange rate of ¥360 to the dollar, consistently avoiding devaluations despite recurrent balance-of-payments deficits and a strong sense of

Brookings Institution, 1976); I. M. Destler and Hideo Sato, *The Textile Wrangle* (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1979); I. M. Destler and Hideo Sato, eds., *Coping with U.S.-Japan Economic Relations* (Lexington, MA: Lexington Books, 1982).

[7] See Kent E. Calder, "The Emerging Politics of the Trans-Pacific Economy," *World Policy Journal* 2 (Fall 1985), 593-623.

[8] See Robert Gilpin, *The Political Economy of International Relations* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1987), 328-40.

[9] On such prehegemonic American foreign economic policy making, see, for example, David A. Lake, "International Economic Structures and American Foreign Economic Policy, 1887-1934," *World Politics* 35 (July 1983), 517-43.

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external vulnerability. Only in 1969-1971, as Japan reached full employment and a structural balance-of-payments surplus was emerging, did Japanese exchange-rate policies benefit Japanese exports at clear cost to others because Japan persistently refused to consider realignment of a demonstrably undervalued yen. Throughout the period of formal dollar-gold convertibility up to August 1971, Japan refrained from active accumulation of gold reserves, which might have antagonized the United States. With regard to exchange-rate policy, Japan was significantly more deferential to the U.S. in its slowness to accumulate gold than the major middle-range European powers, particularly France.

Inoguchi's *Kokusai Kankei no Seiji Keizai Gaku* (The Political Economy of International Relations), is one of the few Japanese scholarly works that consider both Japan's role in the international economic system and its domestic politics bearing on foreign economic policy. Evidence from the volumes by Schmiegelow, Pyle, and McCraw, as well as from Inoguchi's work, suggests that the foreign economic policies of the reactive Japanese state remain less pro-active and confrontational than those of the major middle-range European powers, although the direct comparative data continue to be highly fragmentary. In the postwar period, Western Europe's economic ties to the United States were much closer than those of Japan. Europe has consistently had private-sector institutional structures that were relatively conducive to expanded imports and foreign investment; this pattern does not prevail in Japan, as Okimoto points out in his useful analysis of private-institutional barriers to rapid foreign economic penetration (Okimoto in Pyle, 85-116). But when confronted with explicit foreign political pressure—often the crucial catalyst for policy decisions by the reactive state—Japan has been more forthcoming with specific, formal policy changes than is generally realized. David Yoffie points out, for example, that in 1960 one-quarter of the Japanese government's special taxation measures for enterprises were devoted to promoting exports; by 1975, in the wake of widespread criticism of Japanese trade policies, all incentives had been shifted to favor domestic projects (Yoffie in McCraw, 47). Michèle Schmiegelow notes that Japan's average tariff levels for manufactures in the mid-1980s were lower than those of the United States and the European Community; indeed, Japan had reached West Germany's level of actual import liberalization as early as April 1971, even though West Germany had started from a substantially more liberal early postwar base (Schmiegelow, 5).

As Chalmers Johnson points out, Japan has eliminated virtually all the formal tariff and nontariff barriers to trade that were specifically criticized by its trading partners as being contrary to GATT rules (Johnson in Pyle, 75). To Schmiegelow, Japan's 1980 Foreign Exchange and For-

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eign Trade Control Law appears to be no less liberal than that of West Germany (Schmiegelow, 2); one might add that, since the Yen-Dollar Agreement of May 1984, Japanese foreign-exchange control policies have been significantly more liberal than those of West Germany. Schmiegelow also points out that since the mid-1960s, Japan has been unusually liberal, for a nation at its stage of development, in its treatment of capital outflows (p. 13). These measures did not emerge unilaterally; Yoffie maintains with only modest overstatement that Japan has been willing to alter its prevailing policies only under external pressures, such as those epitomized in the Nixon Shocks of 1971 (Yoffie in McCraw, 67).

Despite some self-interested nuances, Japanese foreign-aid policies also appear reactive to foreign pressure as well as broadly supportive of U.S. strategic purposes in the global political economy (Inoguchi, 201-4). Beginning with reparations policies in the 1950s (undertaken at the behest of the United States), Japan has played a key role in supporting Southeast Asian economies, thereby neutralizing the appeal of China in that region.[10] Since the 1970s, Japan has also provided increasing assistance to South Asian, Middle Eastern, and Latin American nations of strategic interest to the United States, complementing America's own security assistance (Inoguchi, 201-2).

Japanese behavior at major multilateral financial conferences of the past two decades has also been that of a reactive state. It has been passive, yet unusually cooperative with U.S. hegemonic demands, despite divergent Japanese interests and, particularly since 1985, despite Japan's substantial presence in the international monetary system. At the Smithsonian Conference of December 1971, for example, Japan accepted under pressure a nominal change of 16.88 percent in the parity value of the yen—the largest realignment imposed on any state, and the first revaluation of the yen since 1949. West Germany, by contrast, had unilaterally revalued in 1962, 1969, and in May 1971; consequently, its revaluation of the Deutschmark at the Smithsonian Conference was much smaller than Japan's. Similarly, Japan agreed at the Plaza Conference of September 1985, also under pressure, to cooperate actively in the effort of the Group of Five (G-5) major industrialized nations to drive down the dollar. The Nakasone administration only began its active intervention to stabilize exchange rates some months later, as the yen's surging strength started to threaten the domestic Japanese economy with a deep recession.

Japan's approach to macroeconomic coordination with other major in-

[10] On the details, see Akio Watanabe, "Sengo Shoki no Nichibei Kankei to Tōnan Azia" [Early postwar Japan-U.S. relations and Southeast Asia], in Chihiro Hosoda and Sadamu Ariga, eds., *Kokusai Kankyō no Henyō to Nichibei Kankei* [Change in the international environment and Japan-U.S. relations] (Tokyo: Tokyo Daigaku Shuppan Kai, 1987), 27-54.

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dustrialized nations is also that of the passive (but often pragmatically flexible) reactive state, far less disposed to either pro-activism or dogmatic rigidity than either West Germany or France. Although initially hesitant, Japan fell into harmony with the Carter administration's "locomotive strategy" following the Bonn Summit of 1978, in sharp contrast to the recalcitrant West Germans. Similarly, in response to U.S. pressures during 1986-1987, Japan began to reflate, beginning with off-budget credit programs;[11] West Germany refused to do so until after the global stock market crash of October 1987. Japan's reflation, however, occurred only after six years (1980-1986) during which conservative Japanese fiscal policies seriously exacerbated international trade frictions by intensifying Japanese current account surpluses and capital flows (Edward Lincoln in Schmiegelow, 154). Reflation came about not through autonomous Japanese decisions, but as a result of strong foreign pressure for fiscal expansion.

The Japanese state is clearly more systematic than most states in defining national industrial policy objectives, in redefining ambiguous foreign demands to suit domestic purposes, and in handling its relations with domestic and foreign firms within Japan. It can also be highly calculating in specific bilateral trade transactions (Yoffie in McCraw, 36-37). On the other hand, Japan is more hesitant in pursuing strategic trade and industrial interests in cases that require pro-active multilateral initiatives, especially in the face of clear foreign opposition.

Japanese policies toward telecommunications and data processing, for example, bear the hallmark of the diffident reactive state, in contrast to more rigid and statist continental European approaches. This has been true despite the long-term industrial significance of telematics to the Japanese economy. There were, to be sure, active mercantilist overtones to nascent Japanese software policies of the early 1980s, when draft legislation prepared by MITI in 1984 raised the possibility of compulsory licensing and relatively loose patent-law protection of software, as well as other provisions to which Japan's trading partners objected strongly. Following strong multilateral foreign pressure against Japan during 1985, however, these MITI proposals were retracted. In the case of value-added networks and other telecommunications activities made possible under the Telecommunications Business Law of 1985, initial Japanese proposals to restrict foreign involvement were also sharply modified under foreign

[11] The Fiscal Investment and Loans Program, for example, expanded by 6.2% in 1986, and by 22.2% in 1987. See Junichi Yonezawa, Takuo Noguchi, and Katsuhiro Kubota, *Zusetsu: Zaisei Tōyūshi* [The fiscal investment and loans program: A graphic description], 1987 ed. (Tokyo: Tōyō Keizai Shinpōsha, 1987), 254-55.

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pressure; the result was a considerably more liberal telecommunications and data-processing environment for foreign firms by the mid-1980s than prevailed in either France or West Germany.[12] In both of the latter countries, the telecommunications industry remained in public hands during the late 1980s, with only a gradual and grudging recognition of the role of market forces in stimulating innovation, and with much stronger and more rigid rejection of U.S. proposals for reform than was the case in Japan.

Reactive Japanese foreign policies have persisted throughout the 1980s, not only in the face of massive and rising Japanese economic capabilities, but also—as Kenneth Pyle notes in his edited volume under review—despite determined efforts by Prime Minister Yasuhiro Nakasone (1982-1987) to fashion a more decisive, pro-active international role for Japan (pp. 5-32). Pyle points out that, on the eve of assuming office in November 1982, Nakasone wrote that "the first necessity is a change in our thinking. Having 'caught up,' we must now expect others to try to catch up with us. We must seek out a new path for ourselves and open it up ourselves."[13] Throughout his long term as Prime Minister, Nakasone continued to stress the importance of an active international role for Japan; some tentative steps toward an expanded diplomatic role included his abortive efforts in 1983-1984 to mediate the Iran-Iraq war. In the economic arena, however, Nakasone's expressed intentions did not produce much actual change in policy. He did press strongly and successfully for Japanese concessions in the case of the Yen-Dollar Agreement of 1984. In this instance, intervention had few domestic political complications, since Nakasone's personal ties with the Ministry of Finance bureaucrats whom he was forced to override were relatively weak, and market forces had in any case created strong support for financial liberalization within Japan. But in several other cases, such as the U.S.-Japan telecommunications negotiations of 1984-85, domestic political vulnerability—particularly Nakasone's lack of a strong factional power base within the Liberal Democratic Party (LDP)—prevented him from intervening decisively to generate a clear, activist policy stance. Instead, he temporized and waited for foreign pressure to determine the outline of an appropriate Japanese response.[14]

Even the so-called Maekawa Report on structural transformation of

[12] See Kent E. Calder, *Dealing with Emerging Japanese Information Industries in the 1980s: The Cases of VAN and Software* (Center of International Studies, Princeton University, forthcoming 1988).

[13] Yasuhiro Nakasone, "Takumashii Bunka to Fukushi no Kuni o" [Toward a nation of welfare and vigorous culture], *Seiron*, January 1983, 26-37; quoted in Pyle, 16.

[14] Calder (fn. 12).

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the Japanese economy toward a more import-oriented profile, inspired by Nakasone, was brought forward in reactive fashion, appearing just prior to the 1986 Tokyo summit, when foreign pressures for decisive Japanese initiatives in trade policy were growing intense.[15] The report stresses quite clearly and boldly the importance of a fundamental change in national direction, away from the strong export orientation that had been traditional in Japan since the mid-19th century. It outlines a number of broad alternative national goals, such as expanding domestic demand, changes in fiscal and monetary policy, and increased imports of manufactured goods. But it provides few specifics on how such a transformation away from exports might be realized. There is only one statistic in the entire eleven-page report—the 3.6 percent figure representing Japan's trade surplus as a share of GNP in 1986. At an early stage, the advisory group that prepared the report apparently considered various prospective policy initiatives, such as setting a target date for Japan to bring its trade surplus to zero, or boosting government spending to stimulate the economy. But the final document included no quantified targets at all, reportedly due to various bureaucratic counterpressures.[16]

Why Japanese Foreign Economic Policy Tends to Be Reactive

In order to understand why states have reactive foreign economic policies, we must answer two parallel questions: why those policies are not pro-active, and why they are not simply rigid. Possible answers to both questions lie in one of three areas: considerations of state strategy, the character of the international system, and the internal structure of individual states that jointly make up the system. None of these possibilities are mutually exclusive as explanations for reactive state behavior; in the Japanese case, all were concurrent between the end of World War II and roughly the end of the 1960s. Japanese national strategy dictated avoiding broad international commitments or a pro-active global role, so as to devote maximum attention to economic growth; the pre-eminence of the United States—with whom Japan shared an interest in multilateral free trade and stable exchange-rate regimes—obviated the need for independent Japanese initiatives. Conversely, heavy dependence on the United States for capital, markets, and diplomatic support—rendered es-

[15] The report was informally named after the former governor of the Bank of Japan, Haruo Maekawa, the chairman of the advisory group. The formal name is Advisory Group on Economic Structural Adjustment for International Harmony; the committee was charged with recommending ways of "more fully internationalizing the Japanese economy."

[16] *Japan Times*, April 8, 1986.

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pecially acute by Japan's resource vulnerabilities, diplomatic isolation, and highly geared corporate strategies that mandated stable, steady cash flows—also made Japan unusually deferential to strongly expressed U.S. demands. Like some smaller U.S. allies, Japan could try to deflect or redirect those demands, but it could not totally forestall them.[17]

When the United States indicated a strong interest in concessions by Japan (as on the mutual security treaty, the Treaty of Commerce and Navigation, the Airline Treaty, and the Fisheries Treaty of the 1950s; and on adoption of I.M.F. Article 9 status and trade with the Soviet Union and China during the 1960s), Tokyo grudgingly but pragmatically accommodated U.S. concerns—indeed, more so than Americans usually recognize in hindsight. During the first two postwar decades, the United States simply did not press Japan very hard, due to the marginal attractiveness of the Japanese market, Washington's failure to foresee Japan's resurgent competitive potential, and the U.S. preoccupation with security considerations. The United States was obsessed with the need to retain Japanese diplomatic support against the Soviet Union and China; it also feared that severe pressure regarding economic issues would exacerbate Japan's seemingly fragile economic circumstances and lead either to political instability or to a counterproductive surge of anti-American sentiment within Japan.

While international systems explanations focusing on the U.S.-Japan relationship provide important insights into both Japanese passivity and Japanese responsiveness vis-à-vis the United States during the 1950s and 1960s, it is harder to explain the reactivity of Japanese foreign economic policy making since the Nixon Shocks of 1971—particularly since 1985. Japan has grown much larger in economic, technological, and even military terms than most of the other reactive states.

Unlike South Korea and most other reactive states, Japan has no net external debt; indeed, it is by far the world's largest creditor, with well over $200 billion in net external assets at the end of 1987. Compared to most reactive states or other middle-range powers, foreign investment in Japan is minimal relative to the overall scale of the national economy and has little domestic political influence; moreover, Japan has a much larger domestic market than the others. Supplying close to $100 billion annually in capital exports to cover the U.S. fiscal deficit, Japan has developed considerable leverage over the United States in their bilateral trans-Pacific relationship. Yet Japan has declined to use this international leverage

[17] See Robert O. Keohane, "The Big Influence of Small Allies," *Foreign Policy* No. 2 (Spring 1971), 161-82, on the methods smaller states use to influence the foreign policies of larger powers upon whom they are dependent.

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overtly in support of its interests, even to the extent of taking strong initiatives to secure exchange-rate stabilization that might limit multi-billion dollar portfolio losses for Japanese overseas investors.[18]

Domestic Constraints on International Initiatives

Despite the importance of the international environment and considerations of state strategy, particularly during the early postwar period, Japan's reactive behavior in the international political economy of the late 1980s cannot be explained without reference to Japanese domestic social and political structure. In contrast to the situation of the 1950s and 1960s, the international economic order of the 1980s clearly allows for and encourages Japanese activism, especially in view of the declining hegemonic capabilities of the United States, economic stagnation in Western Europe, and Japan's own broad-based economic, technological, and, increasingly, geostrategic leverage on the global scene.[19] Considerations of national strategy not only permit but mandate Japanese activism, particularly in international monetary affairs; with external financial assets upward of $200 billion, most of them dollar-denominated, Japan is sharply and adversely affected by the depreciation of the dollar and other major currencies against the yen, such as occurred steadily during the two years after the Plaza Accord of September 1985. With the international system allowing Japanese activism beyond the continuing strategic assistance to domestic firms within Japan, and conditions of national strategy seeming to dictate such activism, the reactive character of Japanese foreign economic policy in the late 1980s would clearly appear to have important roots in the Japanese domestic structure.

Japanese domestic political structure discourages pro-active foreign policy behavior in several respects. Perhaps most importantly, the fragmented character of state authority in Japan makes decisive action more difficult than in countries with strong chief executives, such as the United States or Fifth-Republic France. The problem of domestic coordination is compounded in Japan by the lack of both a functionally oriented ad-

[18] In fiscal 1986, for example, Japan's 24 insurance companies incurred a ¥2.2 trillion (over $15 billion) foreign exchange loss on their ¥10 trillion in foreign securities holdings, 50% of which were in U.S. Treasury offerings. Results for 1987 were reportedly comparable. See *Japan Times*, January 5, 1988.

[19] By 1988, Japan had, at prevailing exchange rates, by various definitions either the third-largest or the seventh-largest defense budget in the world, with rising defense technology capabilities and a central role in funding both U.S. defense budgets and economic assistance programs supportive of U.S. basing rights in states such as the Philippines. The Japanese defense budget for fiscal 1988 by Japanese definition was ¥3.67 trillion (around $30.4 billion at December 1987 exchange rates). By the NATO definition, including military pensions that Japan treats as welfare spending, Japan's defense budget was around $45 billion—significantly larger than the 1987 totals for France ($34.5 billion), West Germany ($34.2 billion), and Britain ($31.8 billion). See *The Economist*, January 23, 1988, pp. 27-28.

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ministrative corps and authoritative codification of ministerial responsibilities to dampen bureaucratic disputes over jurisdiction. Japan has, as Karel van Wolferen puts it, "a hierarchy, or complex of overlapping hierarchies, without a top,"[20] the intermittent attempts of figures such as former Prime Minister Nakasone to play transcendent leadership roles notwithstanding.

To be sure, Japan has powerful national ministries such as MITI and the Ministry of Finance, which lend an aspect of decisiveness to policy on narrow technical issues within their clear individual areas of technical expertise and established professional concern (*nawabari*), such as technical standards for the consumer electronics industry or the establishment of research cartels in integrated circuits.[21] But on broad, complex questions of global economic management, or on issues created by emerging technology or economic transformation where bureaucratic responsibilities have yet to be defined, ministerial jurisdiction is often unclear, and internal conflict over how to proceed is often strong. In such cases, of which multilateral financial and telecommunications issues in the 1980s are typical, Japanese policies can hardly avoid being reactive.

Fragmentation of decision-making authority, leading to reactive policy making, is not a new characteristic of Japanese diplomacy. Bureaucratic divisions and lack of a strong central executive led to indecisive and reactive policy making at the Washington and London Naval Conferences of the interwar period,[22] although decisive military actions were also typical of that era. Cleavages within the machinery of state also seriously undermined Japanese diplomacy and military effectiveness during World War II.[23] Similar dynamics appear to have been at work in drafting the Maekawa Report of 1986. In that case, a range of relatively bold proposals for policy change, such as setting a target date for Japan to bring its trade surplus to zero, was apparently defeated by complex bureaucratic counterpressures flowing from the lack of decisive central authority.

Domestic interest-group pressures and the Japanese state's unusual

[20] Van Wolferen, "The Japan Problem," *Foreign Affairs* 65 (Winter 1986-87), 289.

[21] On the details of Japanese semiconductor industry development, including the relatively coherent and strategic role of public policy, see Daniel I. Okimoto, ed., *The Competitive Edge* (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 1983).

[22] See the studies by Sadao Asada of the 1922 Washington and the 1930 London Naval Conferences, in Chihiro Hosoya and Jōji Watanuki, eds., *Taigai Seisaku Kettei no Nichibei Hikaku* [A comparison of U.S. and Japanese foreign policy processes] (Tokyo: University of Tokyo Press, 1977); and Chihiro Hosoya and Makoto Saitō, eds., *Washington Taisei to Nichibei Kankei* [The Washington system and U.S.-Japan relations] (Tokyo: University of Tokyo Press, 1978).

[23] See Ryōichi Tobe, Yoshiya Teramoto, Shinichi Kamata, Yoshio Suginō, and Ikujirō Murai, *Shippai no Honshitsu: Nihongun no Soshikiteki Kenkyū* [The essence of failure: Organizational research on the Japanese military] (Tokyo: Diamondo Sha, 1984).

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sensitivity to them also intensify the reactive character of current Japanese foreign economic policy making, particularly in the area of trade policy. In contrast to the United States, France, Britain, and even West Germany, Japan has a relatively weak defense lobby, few emigrés with irredentist concerns, and relatively few powerful indigenous multinational enterprises with far-flung, global geostrategic interests. The most powerful interest groups (aside from large umbrella business federations such as Keidanren, which has 600 corporate members and is too unwieldy to direct an activist foreign policy), are agricultural federations and small-business dominated regional chambers of commerce. These parochial groups have virtually no international interests other than to resist foreign encroachments into Japanese domestic markets. During the 1970s and 1980s, domestic interest groups have been entering into increasingly intimate "iron triangle"-style clientelistic relationships with bureaucrats and politicians, forming "policy tribes" (*zoku*) that impede decisive policy initiatives even further.[24]

Although the evidence is mixed, many knowledgeable analysts suggest that the role of individual conservative politicians and of the Liberal Democratic Party itself in policy making has increased during the 1980s.[25] Improved expertise, information, and staff support, together with the growing ability to control bureaucratic promotions (the result of over thirty years of continuous power) have enhanced the LDP's policy-making influence. So have internal divisions within the bureaucracy, particularly in sectors such as telecommunications and postal finance, where technology and the contours of markets are changing rapidly and spheres of bureaucratic responsibility are poorly defined. Within the LDP itself, career party politicians appear to be gaining influence in policy making at the expense of ex-bureaucrats; since 1968, no former bureaucrat has become chairman of the Policy Affairs Research Council, the LDP's increasingly important policy-making arm (Inoguchi, 56).

Within a Liberal Democratic Party increasingly important in foreign policy formation, there are few incentives to propose clear, independent foreign policy initiatives. Japan's system of medium-size electoral districts forces as many as five members of the largest political parties (especially the ruling LDP) to run against one another in the same electoral district; thus, extremely small shifts in the total vote become crucial to a

[24] On the phenomenon of "policy tribes," see Takashi Inoguchi and Tomoaki Iwai, *Zoku Giin no Kenkyū* [Research on tribal dietmen] (Tokyo: Nihon Keizai Shimbun Sha, 1987).

[25] See, for example, Seizaburō Satō and Tetsuhisa Matsuzaki, *Jimintō Seiken* [The LDP administration] (Tokyo: Kōdansha, 1986), and Nihon Keizai Shimbun Seiji Bu, ed., *Jimintō Seichō Kai* [The LDP policy affairs research council] (Tokyo: Nihon Keizai Shimbun Sha, 1983).

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candidate's election prospects. As a result, LDP legislators tend to be highly sensitive to constituency pressure, especially from relatively well-organized grassroots pressure groups such as agriculture and small business. Most of them have no clear ideology or maxims for conducting international relations other than a pragmatic response to foreign pressure (Funabashi, 33). Empirical analysis shows that politicians specializing in foreign affairs and defense matters tend to do rather poorly at the polls in Japan; the most secure Dietmen—those most likely to advance to the higher ranks of a seniority-oriented conservative political world—devote themselves to service to their constituents, especially in the agricultural and construction areas (Inoguchi, 43). Because these Dietmen often have broad expertise but little personal vision, they are disposed to reactive policy making, in which the impetus to change necessarily comes from outside (Funabashi, 41).

Candidates for prime minister, of course, must have views on the key foreign policy questions of the day; some demonstrated foreign policy expertise is an asset—especially during turbulent periods in the international economy, such as the late 1980s. There have been a few documented cases of LDP initiatives in the process of trade liberalization, mainly by aspirants to the office of prime minister or by foreign affairs specialists.[26] But Japan's numerous "action programs," as well as the LDP's Special Committee for Economic Counter-Measures (Esaki Committee), have achieved little success at dismantling domestic trade barriers in the absence of strong, directed foreign pressure, as the history of Japanese agricultural trade policy in the 1980s demonstrates (Funabashi, 61-62). The common pattern has been for the LDP's complex factional structure, grassroots constituency-sensitive orientation, and strong domestic interest-group ties to inhibit the party from undertaking decisive, independent foreign policy initiatives. The party's welfare-oriented biases also tend to erode the mercantilist cast of Japanese policy making. The LDP thus gains influence at the expense of a more strategically oriented bureaucracy; trade policy is biased in favor of inefficient domestic agriculture and labor-intensive manufacturing.

The prospects for future LDP influence with the bureaucracy are uneven. In areas where the responsible ministries have little international expertise and where the interests of the constituency are strong, such as air transport agreements, the LDP already appears dominant. The ruling party also often plays a decisive mediating role in sectors such as telematics, where bureaucratic jurisdictions are ambiguous and interministerial

[26] Some see the LDP's mediation of the import liberalization controversy of metal baseball bats in the early 1980s as one such case. See *ibid.*, 40-43.

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conflicts correspondingly severe. This role is frequently indirect, however, and not easily visible to outsiders. The area of finance provides a mixed picture. The LDP is deeply involved in mediating the future of the massive postal savings system and in brokering tax reform, but it avoids many controversial issues, such as banking and securities-industry liberalization, that lie within the clear jurisdiction of the Ministry of Finance.

Bureaucracy and big business are still powerful in the policy process—perhaps more than Inoguchi's analysis implies—where their responsibilities are clear and their interests deeply engaged. But the net effect of the party's rising influence in Japanese policy making has generally been to intensify the reactive bias of the Japanese state. This has been especially true on delicate trade-policy questions, where pro-active initiatives directed toward liberalization of existing barriers are often politically controversial within Japan.

Reactive states, as has been mentioned, have their flexible dimensions. Despite the existence of clientelistic "policy tribes" in such areas as agriculture, Japan has totally liberalized imports of lemons (to the point where an industry that was significant until 1962 has almost disappeared) as well as most non-citrus fruits; it currently takes over three-quarters of U.S. global beef and veal exports.[27] During the 1980s, Japan has also made important concessions to its foreign trading partners on telecommunications equipment procurements, copyright protection for software, technical standards for consumer appliances, underwriting opportunities in yen-denominated securities for foreign financial institutions, and access to government credit for foreign subsidiaries operating in Japan. But these concessions, it must be stressed, have always been in response to foreign pressure—usually focused and rendered relevant to business and political realities in Japan by local subsidiaries of Western multinationals, which typically maintain ties to both Japanese and foreign governments. As Daniel Okimoto points out, a strong physical presence in Japan will be crucial for foreign firms as they become more seriously involved in the Japanese market (Okimoto in Pyle, 116). Apart from the business reasons he cites (pp. 101-3), one of the most important reasons for this is the significant role of local subsidiaries of foreign companies, especially well-established entities like IBM-Japan, in helping to mediate relations with the reactive Japanese state while benefiting from its pragmatic, if often subtle and obscure, concessions to outside pressure.

[27] In 1986, 77.7% of global U.S. beef and veal exports went to Japan. So did 86.5%, 73.2%, 55.2%, and 29.2% of U.S. lemon/lime, pork, grapefruit, and orange/tangerine exports, respectively. See Keizai Kōhō Center (fn. 4), 18.

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The Sources of Intermittent Japanese Flexibility

Why is the Japanese state reactive but nevertheless intermittently flexible in the face of foreign pressure? Keenly sensed international vulnerabilities, including a dearth of raw materials, frequent lack of state-of-the-art technology, and a pervasive sense of diplomatic isolation are obvious factors. Dependence on the United States for security and markets is also relevant. But, taken together, these considerations are still underpredictive; an understanding of domestic structure is also important to a full explanation.

Funabashi's *Nichibei Keizai Masatsu* [Japan-U.S. Economic Conflict] and Kusano's *Nichibei Orange Kōshō* [Japan-U.S. Orange Negotiations] illustrate the political dynamics of, as well as the limits to, the Japanese reactive state's flexibility in international economic affairs. They depict the Japanese political system as one that, like its trading partner across the Pacific, is divided internally. That system is in the throes of perpetual domestic conflict, driven by political cycles, interest-group pressures, and bureaucratic machinations in complex interrelationships with one another (Funabashi, 10-11). In the case of the orange negotiations, Japanese consumers, the Japanese Foreign Ministry, and longtime orange-cartel boss Kazuo Fujii all had differing interests with respect to expanded U.S. orange imports into Japan. At the same time, many of these interested Japanese parties to the orange-import controversy had implicit allies in the United States, either because of parallel economic interests or direct political connections. The transnational "managed trade" coalition of Sunkist in California and orange-cartel boss Fujii in Japan were arrayed against Japanese consumers and the Florida citrus interests championed by Florida senator Richard Stone. Similar transnational dynamics were at work in the automobile, rice, and financial negotiations examined by Funabashi (pp. 120-230).

Because of the widening U.S.-Japan trade deficit, the American government was under pressure to take action in the orange case, which is broadly typical of the trade cases presented in the volumes under review. Washington was well-equipped to act, due to the centralization of political power on the American side in the hands of the executive branch and its trade negotiator, Robert Strauss. The Japanese government, faced with conflicting pressures from various ministries and interest groups, and without a centralized forum for resolution, had more trouble in coming to a coherent position. But one point on which both rival interest-group coalitions and the U.S. government agreed was the need for some marginal increase in U.S. orange exports to Japan. Under pressure from

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Strauss, the Japanese negotiators became more flexible regarding an increase in the import quota for oranges; they used this concession effectively to sidestep the issue of full-scale import liberalization, which, due to internal divisions, the U.S. side could not press very strongly (Kusano, 11).

The orange negotiations thus are a case in which the flexibility of the reactive Japanese state—like the demands of the pro-active American state—were both real and limited. While the Japanese political system was not prepared to fully liberalize, it was prepared to *compensate*. Virtually all relevant actors in the orange negotiations, in both the United States and Japan, were given a lucrative piece of what they wanted (Kusano, 205). Although quotas were not dismantled, they were expanded so gradually that both the American exporters and the import cartel increased total revenues. Only the Japanese consumer, unrepresented in the negotiations, failed to reap major benefits—a particularly ironic outcome given basic Ricardian precepts of comparative advantage in international trade.

One major reason for flexibility (albeit often limited flexibility) in Japan's reactive policies is rooted in domestic political structure: the existence of crosscutting communities of interest between Japanese and foreign interest groups. Both U.S. exporters and the Japanese import cartel benefited from a marginal increase in Japanese orange import quotas, for example, as long as that increase was quite limited. As the Japanese economy becomes more and more deeply integrated with those of foreign trading partners—particularly that of the United States—crossnational interest-group coalitions that have the leverage within Japan to induce some flexibility in the Japanese government will grow in number and political influence. The strong yen of the late 1980s, for example, is promoting further coalitions between large Japanese distributors and foreign exporters on behalf of Japanese import expansion. T. J. Pempel points out that Japanese policy making is becoming very much a transnational process on many issues of foreign economic policy as well as on security matters (Pempel in Pyle, 149-50).

Among the strongest forces for reactive foreign economic policy making in Japan is the unusual structure of the Japanese mass media and their relationship to broader policy processes: they encourage some policy flexibility while also inhibiting pro-active Japanese initiatives. Japan has the most powerful mass media in the non-Communist world, with each of the three major national newspapers listing circulations of more than four times that of *The New York Times*. All these national dailies also have powerful television and other mass-media affiliates with whom they co-

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operate closely. The major media organizations operate through a common press-club system that standardizes both access to and timing of release of information from major political and bureaucratic sources. By Western (especially Anglo-American) standards, these are highly unusual characteristics; the integration and power of the media since the advent of television in the late 1950s is unprecedented in Japanese history as well.[28] The size and coordination capabilities of the Japanese media, operating within a homogeneous and relatively conformist society, give them an extraordinary ability to sway grassroots opinion, and to create a plausible pretext for action by the political authorities—probably the strongest such capacity in the world. Politicians and bureaucrats who watch cautiously to see how foreign overtures or domestic trial balloons are received by the media and the grassroots can use the power of the media to advantage; more assertive tactics would probably not be effective. Thus, in the absence of outside pressures for action, the media structure in Japan creates strong incentives toward hesitant initial behavior. However, the media also facilitate policy change once a consensus on the need for it has been reached.

Reactive Japanese Foreign Economic Policy: Implications for Japan and the World

Even in the 1980s, Japan's approach to the international economy, like that of the United States and most other major industrial nations, is in many respects still deeply rooted in the economic crises of the early post-World War II period.[29] During the era of economic and political uncertainty, whose perils were compounded by resource shortages and the effects of wartime destruction, the framework was forged for Japanese participation in the broader global economy. Japan succeeded brilliantly in achieving its objectives as long as the parameters of the global trade system remained stable. The very success of Japanese trade strategies, however, together with that of other newly industrializing nations, had begun to undermine the viability of the prevailing global trade and mon-

[28] On the influence of the Japanese mass media since the late 1950s, see, for example, Mataichi Kido, ed., *Gendai Jyanarisumu: Shimbun* [Modern journalism: Newspapers] (Tokyo: Jiji Tsushin Sha, 1973); Mataichi Kido, ed., *Gendai Jyanarisumu: Hōsō* [Modern journalism: Broadcasting] (Tokyo: Jiji Tsushin Sha, 1973); Ichirō Miyake, Jōji Watanuki, and Ikuo Kabashima, *Byōdō o meguru Elito to Taikō Elito* [Elites and counter-elites who bring about equality] (Tokyo: Sōbun Sha, 1985); and Ikuo Kabashima and Jeffrey Broadbent, "Referent Pluralism: Mass Media and Politics in Japan," *Journal of Japanese Studies* 12 (Summer 1986), 329-61.

[29] Chalmers Johnson, *MITI and the Japanese Miracle* (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 1982); also see McCraw, ed., *America versus Japan*, esp. p. 37.

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etary regimes by the mid-1980s, despite periodic *ad hoc* adjustments since the Nixon Shocks and the Smithsonian Accord of 1971.

As Thomas McCraw and his colleagues point out in the study under review, the growing international economic crisis of the late 1980s, centering on the U.S.-Japan relationship, has deep structural origins and cannot readily be solved by macroeconomic nostrums (McCraw, throughout). Exchange-rate adjustments, such as the greater than 50 percent revaluation of the yen against the dollar during 1985-1987, can exert pressure for change, but cannot themselves produce it. Fundamental structural adjustments within the major trading nations (analogous to those that gradually gave birth to the current status quo of a relatively open America and a more closed and strategically oriented Japan) or thorough changes in international trade and financial arrangements are ultimately required.

The urgency of change is clear from even a cursory examination of emerging global balance-of-payments disequilibria. In 1986, the trade deficit of the United States reached $144 billion. Japan's trade surplus per year, by contrast, was running almost $100 billion.[30] Foreign capital inflows were financing the U.S. current account deficit at an annual rate of around $140 billion, turning the United States into the largest debtor in the world.[31] The bulk of these capital inflows came from Japan.

By mid-1987, the substantial exchange-rate shifts of the previous two years were beginning to have a marginal impact on Japan's trade balance in yen-denominated terms. But Japanese investment earnings—a major share of which represented the converse American debt-service burden—were growing even more rapidly. By the early 1990s, Japan is likely to be a net creditor of at least $500 billion, with annual investment earnings between $25 and $50 billion.[32] The United States, on the other hand, stands to become a massive debtor; I.M.F. estimates suggest a magnitude of around $800 billion by 1990 alone, with debt service payments of approximately $60 billion,[33] or roughly the size of the 1987 U.S.-Japan trade deficit.

Japan will be facing strong economic and political pressures to alter its export-oriented behavior and to assume a major role in reordering the international monetary and trade systems. Japanese self-interest—not to mention the viability of the international economic order—will require

[30] According to Ministry of Finance statistics, Japan's 1986 trade surplus was $92.8 billion. See *Nomura Investment Review*, January 1988, p. 10.

[31] Martin Feldstein, "Correcting the Trade Deficit," *Foreign Affairs* (Spring 1987), 795-96.

[32] C. Fred Bergsten, "Economic Imbalances and World Politics," *Foreign Affairs* 65 (Spring 1987), 770-71.

[33] Feldstein (fn. 31), 801.

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much greater activism on the international economic scene than Japan has manifested at any time over the four postwar decades. What implication does the reactive-state interpretation of Japanese foreign economic policy have for Japan's ability to assume these new roles?

It is essential to recall the dual character of Japan's reactive state. On the one hand, it finds independent initiatives difficult. Yet, on the other hand, it is often pragmatically flexible under outside pressure, particularly in sectors such as finance and high technology where market forces are strong, bureaucratic strength is waning, and domestic interest groups are relatively weak. Even in agriculture, long-run structural changes in the Japanese domestic political economy are laying the basis for growing import dependence in case strategically focused—and strategically limited—foreign pressures should demand it.

Several times during the late 1970s and the early 1980s, foreign pressure induced policy changes in Japan on such matters as restraints on automobile exports to the United States (1981), access to the Japanese market for beef and oranges (1978), macroeconomic stimulation (1978), and market access for American telecommunications equipment (1980). The G-5 Plaza Accord of September 1985 may also have generated pressures for policy change in Japan, together with subsequent but related short-term interest rate increases by the Bank of Japan.[34] The massive imbalances of the international trade and monetary system in the late 1980s, combined with Japan's character as a reactive state, suggest that the importance of *gaiatsu* (foreign pressure) in Japanese foreign economic policy formation will further intensify.

In the short run, the reactive character of the Japanese state in foreign economic policy, particularly in dealings with the United States, helps to prolong a period of U.S. global hegemony in which American commitments have come to exceed American economic power.[35] For example, with the Foreign Exchange and Foreign Trade Control Law of 1980, the Yen-Dollar Agreement of 1984, and other related measures, Japan has responded positively to U.S. pressures for liberalization of outward capital flows;[36] the resulting unprecedented trans-Pacific capital flows played a central role in the ability of the United States to sustain the defense buildup of the 1981-1986 period. Consistent Japanese support for the U.S.

[34] *Ibid.*, 799-800.

[35] See Robert Gilpin, *The Political Economy of International Relations* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1987), 328-36.

[36] For further details on the process of Japanese financial liberalization and its implications for long-term U.S.-Japan capital flows, see Kent E. Calder, "Japanese Capital Outflows: Origins and Implications for the Global Political Economy," testimony before the Joint Economic Committee, U.S. Congress, December 11, 1986.

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at summit conferences of the advanced industrial nations, G-5 financial negotiations, the I.M.F., and the preliminary Uruguay Round of trade negotiations has also allowed Washington's positions to prevail more frequently than American economic power alone would justify.

Yet reactive Japanese economic diplomacy, and the intensifying foreign pressures that motivate it, have potentially fateful long-run consequences within Japan. Most importantly, they are stimulating Japanese nationalism, as the Japanese people become increasingly aware of their country's relatively high economic efficiency and global prominence just as the barrage of global criticism against Japan intensifies.[37] Many see foreign criticism as unjustified. Although the Japanese government continues to respond, at least formally, to most demands from the major Western nations, popular support for such action is growing thinner.

Nationalist forces within Japan have also been stimulated by the sharp exchange-rate realignments of 1985-1987. These pushed weaker export sectors of the Japanese domestic economy, such as shipbuilding and textiles, into deep recession even as they intensified market pressures for enhanced import dependence. If severe exchange-rate induced deflationary pressures persist throughout an extended period of structural transition to a less export-dependent economy, and if they generate serious unemployment in the process, they may ultimately undermine the one-party dominance that has persisted in Japan for well over thirty years.

Perhaps the sharpest potential stimulus to anti-internationalist sentiment in Japan would be determined foreign efforts to force liberalization of labor-intensive import sectors such as wood products, food processing, and metal fabrication, in combination with forced rationalization of the Japanese distribution system. Together, these four sectors employ roughly one-third of Japan's entire work force. Relatively inefficient labor-intensive manufacturing, which had totally lost international competitiveness by the 1980s, employs as many workers as the major export sectors. For example, over twice as many workers are employed in predominantly small-scale metal fabrication as in the entire steel and nonferrous metal production sectors combined.[38] Under the impact of the

[37] Among the growing literature combatively justifying Japanese economic management and blaming others for global imbalances, see Osamu Shimomura, "Ijōna Amerika Keizai, Rifujin na Amerika" [A distorted American economy, and an unfair America], *Next* (July 1985), 90-95; Kenichi Ohmae, "Nichibei ni 'Fukinkō' wa nai" [Between Japan and the U.S. there is no imbalance], *Bungei Shunjū* (April 1986), 94-109; and Osamu Shimomura, "Nihon Mondai kara 'Amerikan Puroburemu' e" [From the Japan problem to the American problem] *Seiron* (July 1987), 40-49.

[38] In 1985 the metal fabrication industry employed 1,278,000 workers, compared to 427,000 for the steel industry, and 202,000 for the nonferrous metals production sector. See Management and Coordination Agency Statistics Bureau, *Japan Statistical Yearbook*, 1987 ed. (Tokyo: Management and Coordination Agency Statistics Bureau, 1987), 74.

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sharp yen revaluation that began in late 1985, unemployment is already rising steadily. Foreign efforts to force rationalization of distribution and labor-intensive manufacturing would exacerbate this problem, and could possibly trigger a sharp antiforeign reaction, particularly within the LDP.

Indefinite continuation of the recent cyclical pattern of unfocused, often insensitive foreign pressure and reactive Japanese policy making could have dangerous consequences in the long run. At an extreme, it could place an unstable, uncertain, but nationalistic Japan in a central position within the global monetary system, inviting disastrous worldwide repercussions. It is therefore necessary to think more systematically about how foreign demands on Japan can be more focused and qualified so as to avoid inflaming Japanese nationalism still further. It is also important to consider means of encouraging Japan to engage in moderate, proactive diplomacy in the interest of the world system as a whole. Japan's economic partners should give particular thought to coordinating trade and monetary policy claims on Japan, so that the two types of policy do not work at cross-purposes.

Economic changes of the past two decades, spawned in the interaction between Japan's reactive foreign economic policy and the international system, are providing some groundwork for a more decisive Japanese global role. Direct foreign investment outward from Japan, like portfolio investment, has been massive, driven by relative costs of production as well as by Japanese fears of Western protectionism. Both these motivations for direct overseas investment are a function of the sharp shifts in exchange rates and the intermittent protectionist measures that followed the demise of the Bretton Woods system in the early 1970s. In 1986, Japanese direct foreign investment surged to $22.3 billion, nearly twice the level of the previous year; it was less than $1 billion in 1971, when Bretton Woods broke down.[39] Although in 1980 only 2 percent of the production of Japanese corporations took place offshore, compared to 10 percent for U.S. firms, this ratio between U.S. and Japanese offshore production was moving rapidly toward equality by the late 1980s.

Japan has also been developing major new stakes in the profile of the international monetary system, as a result of foreign-currency denominated securities holdings that totaled almost $102 billion at the end of 1986.[40] International pressures appear to have given Japanese manufacturing firms, particularly those investing massively in new plants and equipment abroad, a growing interest in a more active Japanese economic diplomacy, including a diplomacy more occupied with national security

[39] Keizai Kōhō Center (fn. 4), 56.
[40] *Nomura Investment Review*, April 1987, p. 11.

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concerns. The growing role of Japan in the international financial system, as the world's largest exporter of capital, has brought about sharply increased prosperity and influence for Japanese financiers domestically; it has also given these financiers an expanded stake in a stable international monetary regime.[41] If the exchange-rate turbulence of the mid-1980s persists as Japanese financial surpluses continue to rise, Japan will have powerful incentives to become more active in global regime formation—through insisting on stronger multilateral foreign investment guarantees or on yen-dominated U.S. Treasury debt, for instance. By the spring of 1986, calls for measures of this sort were already beginning to surface within Japan,[42] although the Japanese government, in classically reactive fashion, was slow to assert its clear national interests in the absence of external pressure to do so.

The economic basis for a gradual revision of Japan's reactive-state approach to economic diplomacy and for the emergence of a more positive Japanese leadership role in the international political economy is now beginning to emerge, just as its analogue did during the 1840s in Britain and during the 1890s in the United States. Do we have, in the rising financial houses, automobile producers, and electronics firms of Japan—newly wealthy as a consequence of Japan's changing role in the world economy—the functional equivalent of the merchants of Bristol and Wall Street who gave the stimulus to the assertive hegemonic roles played in the past by Britain and the United States? The issue is complex, but our analysis provides the basis for some guarded generalizations.

First of all, it seems unlikely that Japan could or would become an overarching hegemon in the international system comparable to the Anglo-Saxon powers in their heyday, even if strong economic reasons for activism gradually transformed the reactive Japanese state. Because of its relatively weak armed forces and the strong domestic constraints on their expansion, Japan could not easily play a hegemonic role in strategic and military affairs. Aside from imports to correct resource shortages, trade is much less fundamental to Japanese economic growth or to the maintenance of domestic employment than is often supposed; less than 20 percent of Japan's work force is employed in sectors generating over 80 per-

[41] After the sweeping reforms of the foreign exchange law in 1980, operating profits of the top four securities houses rose between 29% and 51% in one year. By the end of 1985, they stood at roughly triple the levels of 1979-1980, while those of the major banks quadrupled during the same period. By 1986, all four of the largest banks in the world, and six of the ten largest, were Japanese. See The Oriental Economist, *Japan Company Handbook*, First Half 1986 (Tokyo: Tōyō Keizai Shinpō Sha, 1986), 1010-1113; and Nihon Shimbun Sha, ed., *Nikkei Sōgō Charts* [Nikkei composite charts] (Tokyo: Nihon Keizai Shimbun Sha, 1985), 425-30.

[42] See, for example, Yoshihide Ishiyama, "Utage no ato no Kokusai Tsuka Kaikaku" [International currency reform after the banquet], *Chūō Kōron*, April 1986, pp. 176-87.

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cent of total exports, while total exports comprise only around 15 percent of GNP.[43]

Domestic structural constraints—particularly the lack of a strong central executive, coupled with the presence of strong elite ministries with specialized and at times divergent concerns—will probably combine with national interest to produce a Japanese leadership role that will be technical and sector-specific rather than broadly political. The strongest prospects for Japanese activism will most likely appear in energy and finance, where sharp global price fluctuations and Japan's dependence on world markets create an overwhelming interest in shaping future international regimes. In the short run, Japan may be expected to exert influence in these areas either through multilateral mechanisms or through informal G-2 arrangements with the United States, such as those pioneered in the Baker-Miyazawa Agreement of October 1986.[44] Only an extended period of turbulence in the global economy with discernible, threatening contours would elicit strong movement away from the continuing tradition of the reactive Japanese state.

[43] Bank of Japan Research and Statistics Department, *Keizai Tōkei Nenpō* [Economic statistics annual], 1985 ed. (Tokyo: Nihon Ginkō, 1986), 249-52.

[44] On the G-2 concept, see Funabashi, 194-230 and Bergsten (fn. 32), 789-93.

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IMPLEMENTING THE FINAL SOLUTION: The Ordinary Regulating of the Extraordinary

By HENRY L. MASON

Hans Günther Adler, *Der Verwaltete Mensch: Studien zur Deportation der Juden aus Deutschland* [Bureaucratized man: Studies on the deportation of the Jews from Germany]. Tübingen: J.C.B. Mohr, 1974, 1076 pp.

Eberhard Jäckel and Jürgen Rohwer, eds., *Der Mord an den Juden im Zweiten Weltkrieg: Entschlussbildung und Verwirklichung* [The murder of the Jews in World War II: Decision making and implementation]. Stuttgart: Deutsche Verlags-Anstalt, 1985, 252 pp.

Helmut Krausnick and Hans-Heinrich Wilhelm, *Die Truppe des Weltanschauungskrieges* [Troops for ideological warfare]. Stuttgart: Deutsche Verlags-Anstalt, 1981, 688 pp.

Robert Jay Lifton, *The Nazi Doctors: Medical Killing and the Psychology of Genocide*. New York: Basic Books, 1986, 561 pp.

HUMAN failure of all kinds looms large in the annihilation of the Jews during World War II. Many of the facts relating to the "actions" of the Einsatzgruppen—the killing commandos of the SS—in Soviet territories, the treatment of the sealed-off ghettos in Poland and Lithuania, the deportation process in Germany and elsewhere, and even the ultimate horror of the extermination camps could well have been known to many of the bystanders within and without the Nazi realm and should have provoked fervent reactions from them. Instead, they pretended not to know, and they did nothing; the Jews were abandoned virtually on all sides.[1] Equally shocking is how all kinds of bureaucratic apparatuses—German and non-German, military and civilian, including many professional ranks—allowed themselves to be used as organizers, agents, and legitimators of heinous acts that were crassly in violation of their traditional ethic and professional standards. These bureaucratic implementors of the Final Solution are the principal concern of the present article.

The massive volume by Krausnick and Wilhelm provides the most

[1] There is ample literature on this subject, including David S. Wyman, *The Abandonment of the Jews* (New York: Pantheon Books, 1984); Bernard Wasserstein, *Britain and the Jews of Europe 1939-1945* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1979).

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penetrating insight into the "work" of the Einsatzgruppen, particularly how this work was perceived—and accepted—not only by them, but also by the dominant actor on the Einsatzgruppen's turf, the German army.[2] Adler's even more voluminous study provides an equally penetrating insight into the relationships that a host of German bureaucracies had with the process of deportation of the Jews from Germany—the intricate series of "administrative" actions that preceded the arrival at the ramp in the East.[3] Lifton's book, another in his unmatched studies of "holocaustic" subjects, exposes the surprising and shocking impact of a professional class, the physicians. His concept of medicalization, through which the physicians were intricately involved with the killings, permits analysis of crucial turning points on the road toward the Final Solution. This road is also studied by several German, Israeli, and American scholars in the volume edited by Jäckel and Rohwer, which emphasizes decision making and implementation.

In the first section of the present article, the implementation of the Final Solution is discussed in terms of the conceptual themes characteristic of the Jäckel-Rohwer volume, reflecting the divergence between the so-called functionalists and intentionalists. The second section treats the routines—"what they saw to be their job"—of two sets of implementors of the Holocaust: the mass liquidations perpetrated by the Einsatzgruppen and the "barbaric-civil orderliness" of the bureaucrats carrying out the deportation of the German Jews (as depicted, respectively, by Krausnick-Wilhelm and Adler). Lifton's concept of medicalization is the subject of the third section, which also pays attention to his thoughts on "doubling" and the extention of his concerns "beyond Auschwitz" to the sphere of nuclear catastrophe. The debate between the functionalists and the intentionalists is a continuing theme throughout the article.

I. Functionalists versus Intentionalists

Eberhard Jäckel maintains that decision making and implementation have become the most debated scholarly topics in Holocaust studies. The volume edited by him and Jürgen Rohwer presents the papers and discussion from a symposium on these topics held in Stuttgart in May 1984.

[2] The best coverage in English is Raul Hilberg, *The Destruction of the European Jews*, particularly the three-volume edition of 1985 (New York: Holmes & Meier).

[3] Adler's magnum opus, with its emphasis on bureaucratic behavior in the deportation process, has not received sufficient attention since its publication in 1974. Uwe Adam's worthwhile but very differently focused analysis has been seen as the standard general coverage of the policies against the German Jews. See Adam, *Judenpolitik im Dritten Reich* [Policy on Jews in the Third Reich] (Düsseldorf: Droste Verlag, 1979).

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The deliberations crystallized around two positions, the "functionalists" and the "intentionalists." According to Jäckel and Rohwer (pp. 10-11), this debate began with an article by Martin Broszat, which questioned whether Hitler had formally planned and formally decreed the annihilation of the Jews. Broszat's entirely negative conclusions were challenged by Christopher Browning, writing in the same journal in 1981.[4]

Documentation on issues of decision making and implementation in the Holocaust is hard to find. The Final Solution was supposed to be kept at the very highest level of secrecy; therefore, written decrees and related materials were tabu and, where existing, destroyed before the end of the war. After the war, Allied and German investigators were for many years not much interested in decision making and implementation as such, and therefore failed to ask pertinent questions of the surviving witnesses. Moreover, different sets of German officials had participated in the killing of Jews—e.g., the Einsatzgruppen in the areas from which the Soviet army was driven; the SS leader Odilo Globocnik, who was in charge of the "Aktion Reinhard" (the extermination camps at Treblinka, Belzec, and Sobibor); and the Auschwitz commandant Rudolf Hösz, who worked for the economic branch of the SS. Although there was some coordination by Himmler and Eichmann, the killing agents remained separate and jealous of each other throughout their functioning. Finally, analysis is difficult because the sequence of events is difficult to trace. The first Jews to be killed were those in the regions the Germans conquered from the Soviet army immediately after the invasion of June 1941; the first massive extermination of deported German Jews occurred at Kowno on November 25, 1941, and of ghettoized Polish Jews at Chelmno on December 8, 1941. The slaughter of the other Jews in the German realm began in spring 1942. Each of these actions involved its own kind of decision making, lead time, and style of implementation (Jäckel and Rohwer, 11-14).

The debate between the intentionalists and functionalists concerns the question whether the annihilation of the Jews was based on specific, formal planning by Hitler or whether it followed incrementally—bureaucratically, so to speak—from the accumulation of anti-Jewish and other measures. In the functionalist view, the impression of planned policies and planned implementation reflects the hindsight of the researcher. The intentionalists tend to present the Final Solution as reflecting Hitler's

[4] Broszat, "Hitler und die Genesis der 'Endlösung' " [Hitler and the genesis of the "Final Solution"] *Vierteljahrshefte für Zeitgeschichte* 25 (October 1977), 746-56; Browning, "Zur Genesis der Endlösung: Eine Antwort an Martin Broszat" [On the genesis of the Final Solution; an answer to Martin Broszat], *Vierteljahrshefte für Zeitgeschichte* 29 (January 1981), 99-109.

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precisely expressed wishes, while the functionalists see it as part of the "anarchial polycracy" so typical of the Nazi state (Jäckel and Rohwer, 11, 27, 53).

Although the term functionalism has been used as a convenient label for a variety of concepts in the study of politics and other societal phenomena, it is appropriate "as a rough form of shorthand" reflecting a much-needed emphasis on machinery and structures of government and their effect upon Nazi decision making, particularly with respect to the Final Solution.[5] A leading German functionalist, Hans Mommsen, has emphasized that an understanding of the complex road to Auschwitz must include analysis of the process of *Umsetzung* (transformation) of long-range ideological aims into actual political strategy. All kinds of interim steps were needed for this transformation. These steps have been interpreted as having been based on coherent and consistent dictatorial will; actually, they flowed from a variety of initiatives on the part of a variety of interest groups among the political power brokers and lower-level implementors in the Third Reich. Hitler's "idea" of killing the Jews was not sufficient to start, let alone regularize, the annihilation process. What was required for the realization of the idea was the involvement of several of the German elites—for purposes of their own—and the "servile eagerness" of all kinds of lower-level bureaucrats—basically not ideologically inspired.[6] According to Gerhard Schreiber's summation of the functionalist position, the implementation of the Final Solution must be seen as the consequence of, and reaction to, a set of conditions, particularly inner German ones, "which affected Hitler more profoundly than he affected them." The responsibility did not lie only with Hitler, Himmler, Heydrich, the SS, and the Foreign Office activists, or with ideology, anti-Semitic propaganda, and traditions of German authoritarianism; the ultimately chaotic structures of the Nazi political system and its dependence on jealously competing bureaucratic apparatuses were also to blame.[7]

Intentionalism is the name given by the functionalists to the position of those who regard "the consistent dictatorial will" as the essence of Nazi policy, particularly with respect to the Holocaust. In the intentionalists'

[5] See Tim Mason, "Interaction and Explanation: A Current Controversy about the Interpretation of National Socialism," in Gerhard Hirschfeld and Lothar Kettenacker, eds., *Der "Führerstaat": Mythos und Realität* [The "Führer-state": Myth and reality] (Stuttgart: Ernst Klett, 1981), 24, 27.

[6] Mommsen, "Hitlers Stellung im nationalsozialistischen Herrschaftssystem" [Hitler's position in the national-socialist ruling system], *ibid.*, 62-63, 65, 70. Translations are by the present author.

[7] Schreiber, *Hitler Interpretationen 1923-1983* [Interpretations of Hitler 1923-1983] (Darmstadt: Wissenschaftliche Buchgesellschaft, 1984), 298-99.

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view, the Jews were killed because Hitler wanted to kill them. Such issues as the decision-making process or the dynamics of organizational rivalries and bureaucratic structures were secondary, at best. Hitler's ideas about the annihilation of the Jews were "primary and causative."[8] Joseph Michman points out that Hitler had not only been the supreme commander of the armed forces, but had also attended "to small details of battle"; similarly, according to Michman, Hitler was in full command of the implementation of the Final Solution and "attended to the smallest details of the Jewish question."[9] Sarah Gordon and Gerald Fleming emphatically agree with this position.[10]

Intentionalists argue that the emphasis on the issues raised by the functionalists has tended to trivialize the real subject, "the distinctive murderous will" of the dictator. Mommsen's reply is that, because they see in Hitler alone the determinator and originator of the killings, intentionalists have failed to understand the real causal processes. This flaw is most serious because such killings might be undertaken again—along analogous lines, even if under different political auspices.[11] In any case, maintains Tim Mason, however morally responsible and evil-intentioned Hitler was, "his will cannot carry the main burden of explanation"; "Hitler *cannot* be a full or adequate explanation, not even of himself."[12]

A number of case studies, as presented in the Jäckel and Rohwer volume, contribute important points to the debate, including those on deci-

[8] Mason (fn. 5), 27-28; Mommsen (fn. 6), 87.

[9] Michman, "Planning for the Final Solution against the Background of Developments in Holland in 1941." *Yad Vashem Studies*, Vol. XVII (Jerusalem: Yad Vashem, 1986), 179.

[10] Sarah Gordon, *Hitler, Germans, and the "Jewish Question"* (Princeton University Press, 1984), 300, 312; Gerald Fleming, *Hitler und die Endlösung* [Hitler and the Final Solution] (Wiesbaden: Limes Verlag, 1982), 62-68, 76-77, 123.

[11] Mason (fn. 5), 29; Mommsen (fn. 6), 70.

[12] Mason (fn. 5), 30. Browning, the initiator of the debate, describes his own position as "moderate functionalist," as opposed to Broszat's more extreme stand. (See Jäckel and Rohwer, 185.) An elaboration of Browning's position appears in his *Fateful Months: Essays on the Emergence of the Final Solution* (New York: Holmes & Meier, 1985), 3-38. An excellent analysis of this debate is contained also in Ian Kershaw, *The Nazi Dictatorship; Problems and Perspectives of Interpretation* (London: Edward Arnold, 1985), esp. 110-14. In a volume edited by Gerhard Hirschfeld, *The Politics of Genocide* (Winchester, MA: Allen & Unwin, 1986), Lothar Kettenacker and Hans Mommsen contributed articles that focus on the debate between intentionalists and functionalists (73-96; 97-144, respectively). Both these authors, as well as Kershaw and Browning, recognize the danger of reducing the analysis of origins and implementation of the Final Solution to a debate between two contrasting positions; still, all of them find themselves considerably closer to the functionalist pole. So does Christian Streit, whose article in Hirschfeld's volume (pp. 1-14) describes the German army's relationship with the policies of genocide.

Tim Mason considers the functionalist position vulnerable in one respect: no full-length study along functionalist lines had as yet been undertaken. Such a study would require language capable of "conveying the complexity of its findings." He finds the intentionalists' position easy to summarize because they have been "less explicit about their methods." See Mason (fn. 5), 28, 35.

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sion making on "euthanasia" (by Karl Schleunes), on the implementation of the Aktion Reinhard (by Raul Hilberg), and on Heydrich's need of a legitimization for the Wannsee Conference (by Jäckel).

At the end of October 1939, shortly after the victory over Poland, Hitler instructed the head of his chancellery, Philipp Bouhler, and his personal physician, Karl Brandt, to set up a system through which a panel of physicians, as selected by Hitler himself, would be empowered to grant the "*Gnadentod*" (mercy death) to mentally impaired patients considered incurable "according to the best available human judgment." Hitler issued this order on his private stationery, back-dating it to September 1, 1939, the day of the attack on Poland. Two crucial "euthanasia" decisions by the Führer are known to us: one decreeing the start of the program in 1939 and one terminating it in 1941. In contrast to the lack of documentation on the Final Solution, there is the authenticated paper with Hitler's signature for the former and, equally authenticated, an oral command by Hitler of August 24, 1941, which stopped at least part of the euthanasia program. However, and very much along the lines of the functionalist interpretation (as also seen in the Final Solution), the euthanasia killings were characterized by jurisdictional conflicts among various agencies of the Nazi state—Bouhler, Brandt, and Viktor Brack of the chancellery on one side, and various party and state officials on the other. Equally functionalist was the phenomenon of the "cumulative radicalization" of the killings—again, typical also of the Final Solution. The role of Hitler's chancellery in both the euthanasia program and the Final Solution is characteristic of the bizarre bureaucratic chaos of the Nazi state. The euthanasia personnel—the doctors and the lower-level medical personnel on actual killing duty—who had been employed by the chancellery were later transferred *as a group* to the killing centers of the Aktion Reinhard in the East. A weekly courier continued to deliver salary, food, and scarce luxuries, as well as the mail directly from the chancellery in Berlin to the transferred personnel (Jäckel and Rohwer, 70, 77-81, 85).

Hilberg's depiction of the implementation of the Aktion Reinhard has strong functionalist overtones. In the summer of 1941, Himmler, claiming to transmit a command by the Führer, charged Odilo Globocnik (the SS leader in the Lublin district) with the establishment of three killing centers for Jews. These camps—Treblinka, Sobibor, and Belzec—were built in Poland under the most primitive conditions with minimal expenditure. The construction workers for Treblinka were taken from the Warsaw ghetto, and the building materials also came from there—the very ghetto whose inhabitants were to be gassed there by the hundred thousands. The three camps were quite small, some two- to three-

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hundred square meters in circumference. The trains delivering the victims had to enter backwards so that several of the box cars could be emptied at the same time on the minuscule ramp. There were only a few structures: a barracks for the guards (mostly Ukrainians), the shack where the victims had to shed their clothes (and hair), the room for the gassing, and the "funnel" through which the victims were driven to the gas. There were no crematoria; the corpses were burned in the open. The gas was produced by a diesel motor, usually from a captured Soviet vehicle.

In Hilberg's words, the set-up of the Aktion Reinhard establishments was "frightfully primitive." He suspects that their designers and builders did not know about the nature and scope of their ultimate usage. The bureaucratic preparations for the Aktion Reinhard had to be rudimentary because the Final Solution—typically, the functionalists would argue—had no central bureaucratic "home" in Nazi Germany and no budgetary allotments of its own. What moneys became available for the building of the camps, the payment of the guards and other staff, and the cost of the transports and the killings, had to be "organized" in irregular ways. Because Auschwitz had other purposes in addition to the killing of Jews, various budget designations could be used there to cover the killings. Treblinka, Sobibor, and Belzec were "pure" killing centers, however, and no official budget line was available for them. Their cost had to be kept minimal and "financially inconspicuous." The killing personnel had to remain dependent on funds from Hitler's chancellery and the guards had to be mostly Ukrainians—ex-prisoners of war who came virtually free of charge (Jäckel and Rohwer, 126, 129-31). No matter how primitive and underfinanced, the three camps of the Aktion Reinhard were responsible for killing more than 1.5 million Jews, most of them originating in the nearby Polish ghettos. There were virtually no survivors: 60 to 70 at Treblinka, fewer than 50 at Sobibor, 2 at Belzec. Aktion Reinhard took care of much of the implementation of the Final Solution during 1942. During 1943 and 1944, the more sophisticated facilities at Auschwitz were used.[13]

Göring's desk calendar for July 31, 1941, showed the following entry,

[13] Chelmno, where the very first gassings of Jews took place, was even more primitive than the establishments of the Aktion Reinhard. As Wolfgang Scheffler put it, it was not a camp but merely a "station for gas trucks," a transfer point. At the famed Chelmno castle, the victims were loaded into one of three available gas trucks, which then drove to a point in the nearby woods—the so-called forest camp—where the victims, gassed during the ride, were unloaded and burned. Chelmno preceded the killing centers; it was the link, in Browning's view, between the Einsatzgruppen and Treblinka (Jäckel and Rohwer, 148, 152). The designing and building of the gas trucks is described by Browning (fn. 12), 57-67.

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"18:15-19:15 Uhr Heydrich." Jäckel is convinced that this entry does not refer to an order from Göring to Heydrich, but rather—again in confirmation of the functionalist view of lower-level personnel as initiators of action in the sphere of the Final Solution—an eager Heydrich making an appointment with Göring to obtain a signature from him. What Heydrich really needed from Göring was "a legitimization for third persons." The ongoing early phases of the annihilation of the Jews had reached a point at which third persons had to be involved, persons who might not be ready to string along without some kind of written authorization seemingly from the very top leaders of the Third Reich. These "third persons" included the future participants at the Wannsee Conference who represented all sectors of the Nazi state. The Wannsee Conference made official the plans for the total annihilation of all Jews in the Nazi realm and even outside it, and the legitimacy of these plans could be seen as confirmed, however adequately, by Göring's signature. This signature was appended to a letter not even written on Göring's own stationery (Jäckel and Rohwer, 15-16).

Several of the participants in the Stuttgart symposium maintained that a synthesis between intentionalists and functionalists was quite feasible. According to Saul Friedländer, the functionalists correctly emphasize the chaotic nature of the Nazi governance system, while the intentionalists are right in stressing Hitler's obsession with *Lebensraum* and with the Jews, as well as his concern with the implementation of his aims in these spheres. Friedländer points to the unique emergence of a messianic and apocalyptic vision of history *within* the political, bureaucratic, and technological system of a highly developed industrial society. What took place within Nazi Germany were interactions between totally heterogeneous phenomena: messianic fanaticism *and* bureaucratic structure, pathological ideology *and* routinized administrative decrees, archaic modes of thinking *and* a highly complex modern society. Otto Dov Kulka also notes a convergence between the two schools, with the intentionalists stressing the ideological and the functionalists the structural aspects of the Nazi system. Jäckel sees no basic contradiction: Hitler could govern only in a polycratic milieu (Jäckel and Rohwer, 33-35, 48-49, 67-68, 234).

In the debate, members of the two schools could not arrive at consensus with respect to the role of Hitler. Friedländer does not comprehend how, as the functionalists insist, a pathological hater like Hitler would hesitate to give the order to kill the Jews, leaving this issue to the gradual, incremental, and even accidental, steps of underlings. He points to the discrepancy between this alleged hesitation and Hitler's known recklessness with respect to ordering the war in the West, the euthanasia killings, and

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the abrupt action against the Soviet Union. Hitler was not a fanatic dreamer who left the fanatic deeds to others (Jäckel and Rohwer, 36-37). In response, Jäckel argues that Hitler could undertake the Jewish annihilation only *stück- und schubweise* (incrementally) because he anticipated opposition. He did not dare to expect blind obedience in this sphere where no justification, or even rationalization, had been provided for the killing of defenseless men, women, and children. Even Göring, Himmler, and Goebbels had seemed dubious. Hans Mommsen also sees Hitler as having initially been ambivalent with respect to the Final Solution, simply because he was aware that it could not be carried out without the congruence of certain political, social, and psychological factors within German society that he could not manipulate at will. Hilberg is convinced that Hitler was essential to the "success" of the Final Solution, and cites Himmler and Göring as admitting that it could not have been carried off without him. Broszat agrees that Hitler was essential—but only as the indispensable legitimator (Jäckel and Rohwer, 189-90, 196-97, 211).

There is much consensus on the phenomenon of "cumulative radicalization." The internal bureaucratic struggle for the control of "Jewish affairs"—concerning which jurisdictions had never been clearly assigned among the various state and party structures—led to the growing radicalization of anti-Jewish measures. Political jurisdictions in general had not been rationally delimited in the governance system of the Nazi state. With respect to Jewish matters, it was considered good politics to meddle as fervently and violently as possible. Whenever Hitler *talked* about the Jews—as he did in all of his speeches—party and state agencies felt that they might as well *do* something about them. There was constant competition to exert oneself *in der Judenpolitik*: to suggest a "solution" of Jewish affairs brought prestige and power. The cumulative radicalization that resulted from this competition contributed its share to the outcome of the Final Solution (pp. 23, 80-81).

As early as 1961, in the first edition of *The Destruction of the European Jews*, Raul Hilberg emphasized that the implementation model used by him for analyzing the destruction process was but a heuristic device: he did not presume the existence of a plan, a preconceived system, nor even a progression of steps thought out ahead of time by the Nazi leaders. According to Hilberg, the Holocaust developed "blow by blow," without a "master plan."[14] Hitler's fanaticism and his charisma were preconditions for accomplishing the Final Solution. Yet, its implementation was determined ultimately by Hitler's sense of the politically feasible in the pecul-

[14] Hilberg, *The Destruction of the European Jews* (Chicago: Quadrangle Books, 1961), 640.

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iar political structures of the Nazi state and particularly by the fortuitous interactions of bureaucracies and lower-level decision makers whose relationship to the killing of the Jews was more complex and more indirect—in other words, functionalist—than follows from the interpretation favored by the intentionalists.

II. What They Saw to Be Their Job

Mass Liquidations as Routines under Army Auspices

Krausnick and Wilhelm's definitive investigation into the operations of the Einsatzgruppen of the SS points to a crucial factor: their ability to kill some 1.5 million Jews was dependent on an attitude of toleration, if not cooperation, on the part of the German army vis-à-vis these operations.

"It is not really the task of German men and soldiers to kill defenseless human beings, particularly not in territories under the German army's civil administration." Although such reflections by army personnel had surfaced during the Russian campaign, they did not impede the killers. During the earlier campaign in Poland, as relatively lesser misdeeds by the Einsatzgruppen became known, the high command of the army had had a real chance to present a unified stand against such criminal occupation policies. The chance was missed. Supreme commander von Brauchitsch did receive evidence of the crimes from all kinds of horrified army sources; yet, he saw his task only as keeping at bay the indignation expressed by army personnel. With respect to the anti-Jewish (and anti-Polish) actions, the army remained at best "ambivalent" during the Polish campaign and throughout 1939, even though numerous army protests were on record (Krausnick and Wilhelm, 15, 77-81, 102-6).

Hitler's triumph in the French campaign (during which, at the army's insistence, no Einsatzgruppen had been used) contributed to the complete surrender of the army with respect to the Einsatzgruppen in any future military action. The astounding victory against France turned out to be the "pacemaker for moral indifference": Hitler was able to convince the army, in early 1941, that the East War would require the most brutal methods—no mere military struggle as against the French, but a fight for survival between two eternally and inevitably opposed philosophies. Such a fight made necessary the carrying out of "special tasks" of such sensitivity and difficulty that one could not expect the army to handle them. In Krausnick's view, the ties between the army and the Nazi regime became tighter than ever in the period between the French victory and the begin-

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ning of the war against the Soviet Union. The description of the proposed task of the Einsatzgruppen—"to combat all elements hostile to the Reich or to 'German-ness' in enemy territory in the rear of the troops engaged in combat"—lent itself to being interpreted as broadly as needed for the occasion. What really was to take place was the ever-escalating extension, and perversion, of supposedly preemptive tasks in the security sphere. Very soon, the jurisdiction of the Einsatzgruppen extended beyond any previous limits and collided in all kinds of ways with traditional jurisdictions of the army (pp. 111-15).

The original orders from Himmler and Heydrich to the Einsatzgruppen had mentioned the "cleansing" of "undesirable" elements. The cleansing, or for that matter the annihilation, of the Jews in the Eastern areas was not singled out as a task the Einsatzgruppen would engage in. However, the army had received "signals" about some killings: Heydrich had issued a written order on July 2, 1941 (after the start of the invasion!), that all Jews holding *party* or *state* positions in the Soviet Union were to be shot. Krausnick speculates that Heydrich did not want to say more at that moment, at least not in a written order. Possibly, the original order to kill "selected" Jews was formally (if not in writing) enlarged in scope later in July to include all Jews, including women and children. According to the report of one Einsatzgruppe, the killing of all Jews had already become "routine (*sich eingespielt*)" by July 13, 1941. Mass killings of Jews were treated as well-known and "regular" happenings in minutes of top-level meetings of August 1941 (pp. 164-65, 250, 515).

The army's own "Rules of Behavior for the Conduct of the Troops in the Soviet Union," distributed before the invasion, had specified "ruthless measures" against Bolshevik *Hetzer* (hatemongers), partisans, saboteurs—and Jews. Only the Jews were listed without specifying the commitment of punishable acts on their part. Krausnick thinks, nevertheless, that most army leaders did not realize how total the annihilation of the Jews was to be, not even after the first large-scale "actions" were undertaken by the Einsatzgruppen in towns and villages near their headquarters. After a while, numerous army reports did suggest a growing awareness of the crimes of the Einsatzgruppen. Krausnick cites one staff officer who traveled extensively over the entire eastern front in December 1941. His report shows that the killings of the Jews were then known to many officers at the front, that they talked about them frequently, and that some, at least, were quite upset. Many of the "actions," however, drew crowds of spectators from neighboring army units. In one case reported by Krausnick, navy personnel in a Baltic port were given special leave to watch the Jewish "events" (pp. 124-25).

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Krausnick was able to find considerable evidence for the actual participation of army units in the killings of Jews. Even where participation was avoided, Krausnick discovered a widespread, thorough adaptation of army routines and general outlook to the annihilation program. Not only were the army leaders in basic agreement with Hitler's assumptions about the exceptional nature of the East War, but they also seemed ready to believe the "security" motives for the shootings: that "Jewry" was the treacherous middleman between the Red Army and the Soviet units acting as guerrillas behind the German lines. Army leaders declared themselves grateful that the "delicate political" tasks could be left to the Einsatzgruppen and that the army did not have to interfere in "political" or "philosophical" disputes—typical ways of referring to matters affecting the Jews. In getting the army used to killing practices, the concept of "the Kommissar" played a crucial role. This official in the Red Army had been singled out as a special enemy even before the attack on the Soviet Union, to be "taken care of" by the army itself. He became the convenient first scapegoat, one the army could readily see as evil. The Kommissar was pictured as the symbol of Bolshevik-Jewish conspiring and also as a political functionary meddling with the troop commander's authority, a person who would be despicable even if he were not a Bolshevist or a Jew (pp. 226, 251-58, 541).

The members of the Einsatzgruppen had not been selected by rigid standards. There was no real political screening, although old-time party members were preferred. Many of the Einsatzgruppen had not belonged to the SS, particularly those coming from the police. They did agree with the aims of the regime in the East War, but the feeling for their "work," according to Krausnick, came from small-group consensus and team spirit, from "comradeship." Their training did not include preparation for killing, not even antipartisan activities—tasks that appear to have been revealed to the lower ranks only after the invasion of Russia. Even then, the briefings were superficial; they were equally superficial with respect to the geography and demography of the Russian regions where they were to operate (pp. 142-49).

The Einsatzgruppen boasted of having developed a "system" for the killings that was superior to the "premature" and "unplanned" excesses perpetrated by native populations or foreign auxiliaries. "It was primarily a question of organization": there had to be a suitable locality for the collection of the Jews; a number of pits had to be prepared that would be sufficient for the number of intended victims; there had to be an approach road of some four or five kilometers to the place of "execution" on which the Jews could be marched in groups of 500, separated by at

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least two kilometers. Because of the number of victims and the expanse of occupied Russia, the small core of Einsatzgruppen had to rely increasingly on non-German auxiliaries. Almost all the killings were by shooting; gas trucks were available, but their use was seen as "unmanly" and "cowardly." Although killing in gas trucks was less "noisy" than shooting, it took much longer and the "burial" work was more difficult and "dirty." However, since the shooting of children and women was considered especially hard on "family men" among the Einsatzgruppen, five gas trucks were in constant use (pp. 546-51).

The language used by the men of the Einsatzgruppen reveals something about their own view of their "work," especially in the original German. For example, at one of the larger "actions," only Jews with families were "used (*verwandt*)." The Einsatzgruppen had counted on the "participation (*Beteiligung*)" of five to six thousand Jews, but actually more than 30,000 "turned up (*fanden sich ein*)." After the first wave of actions at the time of the military advance, the Einsatzgruppen engaged in the "stationary implementation (*stationäre Bearbeitung*)" of their "security tasks." Sometimes there was the "involvement (*Einbeziehung*)" of Gypsies in the "fate" of the Jews, and then their "elimination (*Ausmerzung*)" took place together with the "real (*eigentlichen*)" Jews. A sergeant of an Einsatzkommando reported that he had been "attending to (*betreuen*)" a transport of Jews by "handing them over to the earth (*der Erde übergeben*)" (pp. 189-91, 198, 271, 595).

Christian Streit, in his masterful analysis of the German army's direct involvement in the "second Holocaust," the murder by means of shooting, starvation, freezing, and other "natural" means of some three and one-half million Soviet prisoners of war, provides a largely functionalist explanation. The German army had not planned the commitment of such a crime before the invasion of the Soviet Union—except perhaps indirectly, by not undertaking the proper anticipatory logistic measures that would have been needed to feed, house, and transport huge masses of Soviet prisoners. When these masses of prisoners appeared (in much greater numbers than could have been expected), "one thing led to another." Of course, this did occur within the ideological framework of Hitler's East War, which for opportunistic, political, and ideological reasons, the army had seen fit to swallow. Similarly, with respect to the army's attitude concerning the killing of the Jews by the Einsatzgruppen, Streit is convinced that the army's toleration and sometime participation were unplanned. Hitler decided to proceed with the wanton killing of all the Jews in his domain, argues Streit, only after he was assured that the army was putting up with the "actions" of the Einsatzgruppen; he had

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not dared to be certain of this attitude on the part of the army before the summer of 1941.[15]

"What they saw to be their job"—that is, the killing of all the Jews in the territories conquered from the Soviet army—had not been perceived as the job by most of the members of the Einsatzgruppen before the attack on Russia. That it could become their job required all kinds of improvisations, particularly because the reaction of the army was unforeseeable. In this sense, one must understand the behavior of the Einsatzgruppen in a largely functionalist framework. But again, the ideology of the East War has to be included in the calculation—and that ideology, whatever "actions" were to be possible under its aegis, had been propagated by Hitler.

"Barbaric-Civil Orderliness": Bureaucratic Aspects of the Deportation of the German Jews

Adler describes the events in Germany leading up to the act of deportation. In this sphere, intentionalism did play a large role. There were detailed laws and a profusion of administrative decrees, all planned by the Nazi top echelon to provide for graduated but ever more severe steps toward the ultimate deprivation of all rights from the Jewish population—the "stripping," as Helen Fein calls it.[16] Since so many lower-level officials from all kinds of agencies were involved, however, the functionalist element was present too. The way the anti-Jewish measures were implemented often depended on interpretation, misinterpretation, or perhaps just the mood of these officials. To Adler, the most shocking aspect was that the Jewish deportations took place "in a barbaric-civil orderliness" (p. xxi).

Before and during the deportation process, the victims were subjected to what Adler calls several kinds of administrative deaths. "Legal death" began to be implemented after the *Kristallnacht* of November 10, 1938; it culminated in the legislation of July 1, 1943, on which date the courts were, in effect, closed to Jewish claimants for civil as well as criminal cases. This legal death was followed by "civil death." As each victim was "prepared" for deportation, he was entered into the population register as having moved "to an unknown address," or simply "migrated away

[15] Christian Streit, *Keine Kameraden* [Not comrades] (Stuttgart: Deutsche Verlags-Anstalt, 1978), 28, 126-27. Alfred Streim, the other analyst of this "second Holocaust," estimated that "*at least*" 2,530,000 Soviet prisoners of war in German hands died through "natural death" or execution. See Streim, *Die Behandlung sowjetischer Kriegsgefangener im "Fall Barbarossa"* [The treatment of Soviet prisoners of war in "Case Barbarossa"] (Heidelberg-Karlsruhe: C. F. Müller, 1981).

[16] Helen Fein, *Accounting for Genocide* (New York: Free Press, 1979), 60.

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(*abgewandert*)." Just before being loaded onto the train, the following items were taken from each deportee: birth certificate, marriage certificate, any emigration documents, passport photos, records of military service, certificates testifying to decorations or other honors, occupational records and testimonials, and even listings of addresses of relatives and friends and all private photographs. Thus, the deportees were deprived of the wherewithal of a civil existence. With the surrender of their documents and papers—in times of excessive demand for these—the possibility was closed, seemingly, for any future reentry into normal life.

"Financial death" accompanied the other types of deprivation. The German Ministry of Finance probably did not reveal to its lower officials what fate awaited the Jews in the East, but all of these officials worked diligently to achieve the total expropriation of the deportees. All German Jews were automatically deprived of their citizenship at the moment the deportation train crossed the frontiers of Germany. With this act of denationalization, they were also "legally" stripped of all their property, which had to be surrendered to "the German people." The stated justification for the expropriations was simple enough: all Jewish properties were held to have been acquired either through theft, trading in stolen goods, or violation of rationing decrees (Adler, 41, 183, 405-08, 521, 569, 832-34).

A variety of German civil servants of all ranks were involved in these forms of administrative death. They included mayors, county heads (*Landräte*), city and county police, finance ministry officials, and railroad employees. One of the most significant, and depressing, facts of the Final Solution is the extent to which large numbers of ordinary Germans were involved with or aware of the measures leading to the deportation of the Jews. These included the officials themselves, but also many others in their bureaucratic or social surroundings, in addition to those close to the deportees in their place of work or residence.[17] By the winter of 1941-42,

[17] An analysis of wartime German public opinion toward the deportation and other crimes committed against the Jews has been provided by Ian Kershaw, "German Popular Opinion and the 'Jewish Question,' 1939-1943: Some Further Reflections," in Arnold Paucker, ed., *Die Juden im nationalsozialistischen Deutschland: The Jews in Nazi Germany 1933-1943* (Tübingen: J.C.B. Mohr, 1986), 366-86. He grants that the evidence was far from plentiful and that German attitudes toward the gradual radicalization of anti-Jewish measures "were far from uniform." He also grants that "amid the general atmosphere of alienation and hostility there were pockets of sympathy. . . ." Nevertheless, Kershaw is convinced that the prevailing attitude on the "Jewish question" was apathy combined with "a deliberate turning away" from any feelings of personal responsibility, let alone concern, for the fate of the Jews. Kershaw concludes that "it is plain that so far in history no other advanced society has experienced a collapse of collective moral consciousness and individual civil morality approximating the steepness of the decline in Germany after 1933." Similarly, Rainer Baum found the German elites "capable of a level of moral indifference to the suffering of concrete human beings that

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at latest, all these persons must have been aware of the gruesomeness of the various acts relating to the "preparation" for deportation. Despite whatever they may have thought about it, Adler concludes, they collaborated with utter efficiency. In the large cities it was the Gestapo who did much of the *Abfertigung* (dispatching) of the Jews and their ejection from civil life. In the smaller towns and villages, these ultimate tasks were performed by ordinary officials. Particularly intensive was the cooperation between Himmler's officials and the Finance Ministry. Adler notes the introduction of all kinds of new bureaucratic duties of a seemingly routine character intended to cloak the basic outrage, the act of deportation.

Many of the participating officials apparently were convinced of the appropriateness of at least a number of Hitler's anti-Jewish measures. In addition to being dependable Nazis and anti-Semites, they displayed a frightening degree of "conscience-killing coldness of heart," which was cultivated by the SS, but, according to Adler, came naturally to many others, especially the younger generation. Adler cites from a letter of one of the officials involved with a shipment of Jews, who reflected on the "cozy" spirit among the Würzburg Gestapo as they worked together on the *Behandlung* (servicing) of the transport. It was hard yet satisfactory work, he wrote, and he particularly enjoyed the "nice," "harmonious," and "comradely" social gatherings afterwards. Also typical were the jokes and laughter coming from the young Gestapo secretaries amid the utter grimness of the deportation scenes. Amateur and professional photographers wandered about, taking pictures of "typical" Jews. Very few of the officials of the Würzburg Gestapo were members of the SS; none were members of the SA and none had been party members before 1933. Most of them had transferred to the Gestapo from the Bavarian political police for opportunistic reasons.

Adler regards the Jewish victims of Nazi Germany as extreme examples of contemporary mass-man, totally "administered" as well as totally dehumanized. The method for this total administration of human beings

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has scarcely its equal in human history generally." See Baum, *The Holocaust and the German Elite* (London: Croom Helm, 1981), 301.

The writer Jochen Klepper, an "Aryan" with a "non-Aryan" wife and stepdaughters, has left a moving account of the humiliations experienced by "starred" individuals. Klepper, a fervent "Prussian" and old-style nationalist, found the indifference of the German public to the fate of the Jews his most unbearable burden among the many horrors of the Nazi period. Officials, his colleagues at the publishing house where he worked (and later was dismissed), and many of his friends refused to acknowledge what was happening to the Jews, let alone worry about it—although very few seemed to consider themselves Nazis. Virtually none showed even the slightest spark of human kindness toward the Jews. The Kleppers committed suicide in December 1942. See Klepper, *Unter dem Schatten Deiner Flügel; Aus den Tagebüchern der Jahre 1932-1942* [Beneath the shadow of your wings; from the diaries of the years 1932-1942] (Stuttgart: Deutsche Verlags-Anstalt, 1956).

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was ordained in a manual that described the "collection" of Jews for their deportation. Adler considers this manual to be the most blatant expression of the pedantic, "precisionistic" treatment imposed on the Jews. The process began with the victim receiving the so-called *Eröffnung* (initial notification) concerning his imminent deportation, delivered to his home by one or two officials of the Gestapo or the local police. It had to be signed on receipt, in two copies. The *Eröffnung* was followed within a few hours by the "police-imposed pick-up" and the transport, usually in a truck, to the local "collection" point. From there followed the *Durchschleusung der angelieferten Juden* (transmission of the supplied Jews) to railroad sidings where the train to the East (or Theresienstadt) awaited them.

As specified in the manual, the deportation process consisted of a set of administrative routines carried out by "professionals." Not based on any law or decree that authorized or ordered it, the deportation was conducted as a "purely administrative measure." This measure was sufficient to tear hundreds of thousands of victims from their homes to transport them somewhere where even bureaucracy ceased and the plain act of murder was committed. The act of deportation was the final decree for its victims: "they simply disappeared." Once a person had been loaded onto the train to the East, there was no way to get him off or to know his further whereabouts—as even Eichmann had to admit in a case where highest-level support had been voiced for an individual after his being loaded. At the ramp in the East, no names were permitted to be kept for that great majority of arrivals who were sent directly to the gas chamber (Adler, 331, 362-65, 483-86, 506, 566, 868-69).

Before the beginning of the large-scale deportations from Germany in late 1941, the Nazis undertook "exercises" in the deportation of Jews. These (largely mishandled) experimental projects reveal much about the motives and methods of what ultimately became an efficient administrative routine. The Madagascar Plan seems to have been taken quite seriously by Eichmann. It provided for the "unlimited surrender" of the Jews everywhere in the world to the Germans. The aim was their deportation to the tropical island off the African coast, where they would dwell in total isolation from the rest of the world. The victims were to be seized by three "resettlement" staffs (West, Middle, East) who would have 120 ships at their disposal. Two ships per day would arrive in Madagascar, each with three thousand Jews on board—which would make for some two million arrivals per year.[18]

[18] Joseph Michman maintains that the Nazi concept of the Final Solution had always included forced emigration from Europe as an acceptable alternative to extermination. Hitler's

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The "re-education camp" Nisko, in the Lublin region of Poland, was more than a plan. It was Eichmann's first real effort at deportation, carried out in September 1939. Some five thousand Jewish "volunteers," mostly from Vienna, were involved. Although the Nisko camp turned out to be a total failure, Adler thinks that it enabled Eichmann to gain valuable experience in the handling of Jewish officials who recruited the "volunteers." The Jewish authorities were assured that the Nisko group would be happy and thankful; there would be "regular conditions of work" and plentiful food. The workers would be treated "humanely," and foreign officials and the press would be invited for inspections. There would be Jewish self-administration. When the "volunteers" arrived in what turned out to be swampy fields near Nisko, they found total chaos; the "experiment" remained a complete fiasco, and the operation was soon terminated by Himmler. By April 1940, all the "volunteers" had returned to their homes.

The Stettin experiment differed drastically from the Nisko affair: the twelve hundred Jews who "participated" were not sent home after it failed; they were killed, or died a "natural" death, under the most horrible conditions. On February 12, 1940, the Jewish inhabitants of the Pomeranian city of Stettin were suddenly "collected," without any warning, and shipped to Lublin in occupied Poland. On arrival there, they were distributed among three neighboring villages, to which they had to march in subfreezing temperatures and deep snow. Many froze to death during the march. The survivors were told to seek shelter in the Jewish homes in the villages, inhabited by very poor Jews who did not speak German. Virtually all the deportees from Stettin were dead before the "real" Final Solution could affect them.

Another deportation experiment took place in October 1940. Affected were some sixty-five hundred to seven thousand Jews from the states of Baden and Saarpfalz in western Germany. These victims were shipped to Vichy-France, apparently on the private initiative of the governors (*Gauleiter*) of the two states. The Vichy-French, who had not been notified, were outraged when the deportees arrived; they dumped them into camps formerly used for Spanish refugees. A few of the victims managed to leave the French camps and succeeded in escaping to freedom via Spain. The great majority were handed over to the Gestapo in summer

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aim was to "disinfect" Europe of Jews, by killing *or* removal to other continents. The stop to emigration that Heydrich announced in January 1942 reflected disappointment with the outcome of emigration policies as well as anticipation of "great advances" in methods of mass killing. Michman cites evidence, however, that emigration to Palestine and elsewhere overseas was considered acceptable by the Nazi leadership until the end of the war (fn. 9, pp. 145-80).

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1942, for direct shipment to Auschwitz. This experiment, according to Adler, reveals the extent of bureaucratic discretion in the treatment of the Jews. Most likely, there had been no prior authorization for this action, yet the two *Gauleiter* had all the cooperation they needed from the Gestapo and other German officials. These deportations, as well as those from Stettin, were undertaken without the involvement of Jewish officials.

Adler considers one other deportation action as "irregular," or experimental. In October 1941, just before the main process began, some twenty thousand Jews, mostly from Berlin, were suddenly "collected" and transported to the Lodz ghetto, apparently in response to a whim of Hitler's to render Berlin *judenrein* (clean of Jews). The German authorities in Lodz had not been warned about their arrival and immediately voiced strong protests about the overcrowded conditions in the ghetto. Significantly, the first use of a killing center, at nearby Chelmno, occurred soon after these deportees arrived; the gassing at Chelmno of Polish Jews from Lodz apparently was seen as necessary to relieve the overcrowding of that city (Adler, 73-79, 127-46, 156-61, 172-74).

It is this last experiment, resulting in the transports from Lodz to Chelmno, that gave impetus to the functionalist concept. In his article of 1977, Martin Broszat argues that the first extermination camp, at Chelmno, was opened on December 8, 1941, in order to provide "breathing space (*Luft machen*)" in the Lodz ghetto after the twenty thousand Jews from Berlin had been dumped there. Thus, as the functionalists see it, Chelmno resulted from improvisation on a local problem—excessive shipments to a ghetto. What had started as improvisation gradually turned into the practice of annihilation with the introduction of several killing centers. As more and more trains arrived from Germany, *Luft machen* in more and more ghettos was seen as convenient, and what had started as an experiment became the regular solution to ghetto overcrowding. Thus, the Final Solution was routinized.[19]

Adler's main conclusion about the various experiments is that the deportation of Jews became an efficient process only during the summer of 1942, and that much of the efficiency was achieved by the automatic killing of those deported, immediately upon their arrival in the East. The Jews were destroyed through both physical violence and bureaucratic systems. The cloak of legality, or legalisms, was given up only at the extermination camp; all other phases of the Final Solution were built into a seemingly regular bureaucratic process and systematized. The utter raw-

[19] Broszat (fn. 4). Cf. the analysis of this issue in Henry L. Mason, "Imponderables of the Holocaust," *World Politics* 34 (October 1981), 90-113, at 97-100.

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ness of the anti-Jewish measures was being manipulated and gradualized by bureaucratic channeling (pp. 35-38, 245, 519-20, 560).

The killings perpetrated by the Einsatzgruppen and the measures leading to deportation fit into the framework of the debate between functionalists and intentionalists, thereby suggesting the need for synthesis between the two concepts. The extent of the "actions" by the Einsatzgruppen had not been delimited before the invasion of the Soviet Union; whatever was intended at the highest Nazi level could be implemented only if the army seemed inclined to tolerate extreme brutalities. The elaborate schemes resulting in the "stripping" of the German Jews and their "preparation" for the transport to the East depended on the cooperation, the initiatives, and even the inventiveness of all kinds of layers of officials. Without their eager and coordinated cooperation, the deportation process could not have taken place—and had not taken place efficiently during the earlier "experiments." (Nor did it take place later in such locales as Denmark, Italy, and Belgium, where the officials were not eager.) While functionalist elements played an important role, intentionalist factors were also present. The ideological predisposition of the Einsatzgruppen and the army reflected the East War mentality propagated by Hitler; various kinds of anti-Semitic postures, promoted assiduously by the regime, had made their impact on German officialdom.

III. Crossing the Boundary in the Medicalized Setting

The Role of the Doctors

Robert Lifton's book deals with the participation of German physicians in the "euthanasia" program and at the various extermination camps. The concept of medicalization is introduced by Lifton in his analysis of the process of adaptation to evil on the part of a professional elite, a process that proceeded in important respects along functionalist lines. Lifton uses a further concept, "doubling," in an attempt to provide a second level of explanation that reflects a more intentionalist mode.

In the Holocaust, a crucial boundary was crossed: between "violent imagery and periodic killing of victims (as of Jews in pogroms)" and "systematic genocide in Auschwitz and elsewhere." Lifton posits that what he calls the medicalization of killing made feasible the crossing of that boundary (p. 14). A series of mass killings in the Nazi state, from 1936 to 1941, had already been medically-related. In several centers for "euthanasia," killings had been undertaken for allegedly "therapeutic genetic" reasons, but the depiction of the various "euthanasia" programs as med-

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ical operations was ludicrous. Typically, in the program known as T4, a physician had to complete 2,109 "evaluations" during a seventeen-day period, on the basis of a two-page questionnaire, without access to a medical history or other medical records or a medical examination of the victim. Not surprisingly, the definition of "the life considered medically unworthy for life" developed slippage. The killing net was widened constantly. For example, in the children's program the age limit moved upward to affect older children, adolescents, and "even at times overlapped with the adult killing project." Grounds for killing were expanded and came to include mongolism (not listed at first) as well as "various borderline or limited impairments in children . . . , culminating in the killing of those designated as juvenile delinquents" (Lifton, 56, 66-67).

The link between "euthanasia" and the Final Solution was a close one. The head of one of the main T4 killing facilities, Dr. Irmfried Eberl, became the first commandant (not just chief medical officer) of a major killing center for Jews, Treblinka. It is reported that he wore his white physician's coat as he supervised the proceedings at Treblinka. The terms *Sonderbehandlung* (special treatment) and *sonderbehandelt* (specially treated) were introduced during one of the "euthanasia" programs and transferred for use in the Final Solution. These euphemisms were key terms in what Lifton calls the "healing-killing" reversal inherent in medicalization, implying not only some sort of medical therapy but also a medically determined imperative in the killing of the Jews (pp. 124, 136, 150-51).

The physicians had the major responsibility "for the murderous ecology of Auschwitz." Lifton distinguishes as many as twelve "medical" tasks that related directly to the killings. (1) When the victims arrived at the ramp, the doctors performed the initial large-scale selections through which the great majority were sent immediately to the gas chamber. (2) A doctor was in charge of the team implementing the killing process (mostly SS medical technicians) and supervised the administration of the gas. (3) At the end of the killing process, a doctor had to signal when those inside the gas chamber were to be considered dead. (4) Doctors performed the secondary selections, at various locales in the camp, so as to make room for "healthier" replacements from new transports. (5) Doctors performed selections in the medical blocks, dispatching to the gas chambers those diagnosed as significantly ill or debilitated (the so-called reverse triage). (6) Doctors conducted a "murderous form of epidemiology," routinely condemning to death not only those suffering from such diseases as typhus, scarlet fever, or diarrhea, but also the other inmates in the block who were still free of disease. (7) Doctors ordered, supervised,

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and often administered the direct killing of "hopeless" patients in the medical blocks by means of phenol injections. (8) Doctors signed fake death certificates, which attributed the death of each inmate to a "regular" illness—except for the great majority of the victims assigned to immediate death upon arrival, who were considered as never having entered the camp, and therefore required no death certificate. (9) In the case of "official" (as opposed to "wild") corporal punishment, typically whipping, a doctor had to certify in writing the inmate's capacity to absorb such punishment and had to be in attendance during the administration of the punishment. (10) Doctors were consulted regularly on how to keep the selections running smoothly, making recommendations, for example, "whether women and children should be separated or allowed to proceed along the line [to the gas chamber] together." (11) Doctors also advised on "policies" concerning numbers of people permitted to stay alive, balancing the need for Jewish workers against the "need" for Jews to be killed. (12) Finally, the doctors' "technical knowledge" was called upon with regard to the problem of the burning of the corpses, particularly during the summer of 1944 with the arrival (and immediate gassing) of hundreds of thousands of Hungarian Jews (pp. 147-49).

The Auschwitz doctors performed their tasks in a milieu where "medical metaphor blended with concrete biomedical ideology." The ideology proclaimed the doctrine of a deadly "racial" disease among the Aryans; the cure was the killing of all the Jews. The diagnosis determined that the Jews were "the gangrenous appendix in the body of mankind," the agents of "racial pollution" and "racial tuberculosis," and the "parasites and bacteria" causing sickness, deterioration, and death to the Aryan people whom they infected as they lived among them. Spouting Darwinian language, the Nazis boasted of assuming "the functions of nature (natural selection) and God . . . in orchestrating their own 'selections,' their own version of human evolution." Zyklon-B became the preferred "medicine," to be handled only by medical personnel and stored in the Auschwitz pharmacy. The "disinfectors" who applied this ultimate prescription were selected from an elite of SS medical corpsmen, of course under the supervision of a doctor (pp. 16-17, 161).

Lifton characterizes "selections" as "the quintessential Auschwitz ritual" which epitomized and maintained "the healing-killing paradox." Upon his arrival at Auschwitz, each doctor had to attend to ramp selection as "his ritual of initiation, his transition from ordinary life to the Auschwitz universe. . . ." Although virtually any person could have performed the selections, they had to be presented as a "public health" measure. Only doctors were authorized to perform this all-important ritual;

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even during the arrival of the Hungarian transports, when the incoming victims were too numerous for the available physicians, their ranks were augmented only by dentists and pharmacists. Ramp duty and the later selections were said to require "precise medical judgment," even if that meant that one doctor had to examine five hundred persons in ten minutes (pp. 150, 172-73, 181-82).

Before the appearance of Lifton's book, the role of the Nazi physicians had been epitomized in the literature (and at some of the postwar trials) by Dr. Joseph Mengele's experiments, particularly with twins. Lifton pays relatively little attention to these bizarre, incredibly sadistic, pseudoscientific practices that victimized people whose dispatch to the gas chamber was merely delayed while the experiments were conducted (if they survived them). It is Lifton's achievement that he pinpoints an even more ominous contribution of the physicians to the Final Solution. As members of the most respected elite in matters of life and death, they provided a sort of legitimization to the gas chamber proceedings, proceedings that even today, after some forty years of more than ample documentation, remain unimaginable—even more so than the "actions" of the Einsatzgruppen. Legitimization came from the doctors' handling of the "medical" procedures listed above, the medicalized routines which seem to fit the functionalist mode. The intentionalist mode also applied, through the metaphors of biomedical ideology: the Jews as parasites and the doctors as "Darwinian" selectors of the unfit. The emphasis is on the functionalist interpretation, with the selections as the ultimate Auschwitz routine.

"Doubling"

The psychological pattern that Lifton calls "doubling" is described as "the division of the self into two functioning wholes, so that a part-self acts as an entire self." Doubling is seen as the psychological device through which the doctors could accept a "Faustian bargain": becoming "the theorists and implementers of a cosmic scheme of racial cure by means of . . . mass murder." Doubling solved the tension between two selves: the doctor needed his "Auschwitz-self" to be able to function in an Auschwitz environment that was totally antithetical to the standards of his "medical self." The Auschwitz-self managed to render the Auschwitz milieu coherent to the individual doctor; it was a device for psychological survival in a "death-dominated environment." The major function of doubling was the avoidance of feelings of guilt; it produced "a significant change in moral consciousness" (pp. 418-19).

Lifton finds that some of the most notorious participants in the medicalization process displayed clear evidence of the doubling phenomenon.

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For example, Dr. Karl Brandt, the Führer's choice for initiating the "euthanasia" program (and its ultimate medical authority), came from a distinguished medical family. He professed to have had two heroes in his life, Hitler and Albert Schweitzer. He was seen by many as a "highly ethical person" and "one of the most idealistic physicians." Lifton depicts Brandt as the prototype of the "decent Nazi," whose "religious-romantic" involvement with "euthanasia" was quite indispensable to the Third Reich. Another such doubler, Dr. Edward Wirths, the highest medical authority in Auschwitz, had the reputation of being a most dedicated physician and was described by Auschwitz inmates as kind, decent, polite, and honest. Yet it was he who set up the camp's system of medicalized selections and medicalized killings and supervised these processes during the two years of the most extensive mass murders at Auschwitz. Wirths provides "the specter of a 'good man' becoming a leading figure in a project of unprecedented evil." He presents the ultimate example of doubling: on the one hand, his Auschwitz-self with fervent attachment to such themes as racial purification and national revitalization; on the other, his "human medical self," which gave him a reputation of decency and integrity. Doctors Brandt and Wirths, insists Lifton, revealed themselves as men rather than demons—men "whose multifaceted harmony with Auschwitz can give us insight into . . . the human capacity to convert healing into killing" (pp. 114, 117, 383-86, 413, 446-47).[20]

Lifton introduces the phenomenon of doubling to provide a clue to the doctors' willingness to participate in medicalization at the extermination camps—that is, the legitimization of the killings. Whatever its validity as a concept of psycho-politics, as a heuristic device doubling does provide insight into one of the most puzzling aspects of the Final Solution. It was beyond Lifton's scope to estimate how representative the Nazi doctors he studied were of the German medical profession. He establishes that a good number of the doctors who were active in "euthanasia" and at the extermination camps were well-reputed professionally, even in academic circles. In spite of his painstaking research and intensive interviewing, Lifton does not profess to know to what extent these doctors were typical of German doctors under the Third Reich. He does speculate that German psychiatry was more directly involved with Nazi policies than the medical profession in general.[21]

[20] In a recent article, Zdenek Zofka concludes that Dr. Joseph Mengele was "neither a sadist nor fanatical National Socialist"—which, Zofka thinks, made his crimes at Auschwitz even more serious. See Zofka, "Der KZ-Arzt Joseph Mengele; zur Typologie eines NS-Verbrechers" [The concentration camp physician Joseph Mengele; aspects of the typology of a Nazi criminal], *Vierteljahrshefte für Zeitgeschichte* 34 (April 1986), 243-67, at 266-67.

[21] In a volume depicting the relations of the German medical profession with all kinds of

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BEYOND AUSCHWITZ

Lifton views the behavior of the Nazi doctors as "an overall key to human evil." Through his analysis he hopes to have derived principles "that apply more widely—principles that speak to the extraordinary threat and potential for [nuclear] self-annihilation that now haunt mankind." A nuclear physicist may have experienced a form of doubling from which emerged his "nuclear-weapons self," causing him to become a proponent of nuclear weapons and nuclear strategies (pp. 424, 464).

The Nazi Holocaust "can help us avoid the next one." Our predicament with respect to nuclear weapons has resulted in doubling on all sides as "genocidal principles" have developed around us. These principles include, on the one hand, the fear of "contagious illness" such as Soviet communism (or American capitalism), which threatens the life of the nation; and, on the other hand, the promise of a "revitalizing cure via an absolutized vision . . . that justifies 'killing them all'. . . ." This kind of vision ("of American virtues and Soviet evil, or reverse") leads, once again, to the planning of mass killing in the name of healing (p. 503).

Like the Nazi doctors, the "killing professionals" are a part of society—the physicians, scientists, engineers, military leaders, lawyers, clergy, academics "who combine to create not only the technology of [nuclear] genocide *but much of its ideological rationale, moral climate, and organizational process*" (emphasis added). Also among us are the professional killers, the less knowledgeable hit men on the frontline of the killings. In the Holocaust, they did the shooting or inserted the gas pellets; in the case of nuclear annihilation, they will be ready and trained to carry out the tasks and scenarios formulated by the "killing professionals." No individual is inherently evil, murderous, or genocidal; but "under certain conditions virtually any self is capable of becoming all of these." It is not a problem of individual psychology, but of "collective currents" that press large numbers of people in the wrong direction (pp. 489-91, 497).

It comes as no surprise that Lifton extends his analysis of the Nazi doctors "beyond Auschwitz." Much of his work has been concerned with "nuclearism," a concept reflecting his fears of man's fatal relationship with nuclear weapons.[22] If one concludes from Robert Tucker's recent ac-

aspects of the Nazi state, Fridolf Kudlieu concludes that it is impossible to determine the percentage of "real" Nazis among the physicians or the intensity of their commitment to Nazi doctrine. See Kudlieu, ed., *Ärzte im Nationalsozialismus* [Physicians under National Socialism] (Köln: Kiepenhauer & Witsch, 1985).

[22] Lifton, *Death in Life: Survivors of Hiroshima* (New York: Simon & Schuster, 1967); *The Broken Connection* (New York: Simon & Schuster, 1979); *Indefensible Weapons: The Political and Psychological Case Against Nuclearism*, with Richard Falk (New York: Basic Books, 1982);

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count, *The Nuclear Debate*, that there are two basic positions with respect to man's view of his nuclear predicament—relying on "existential deterrence" or fearing "existential disaster"—Lifton clearly takes the latter.[23] He is close to such writers as Günther Anders, Jonathan Schell, Louis Beres, and George Kennan.[24]

Lifton's approach to nuclearism fits the functionalist view of the Final Solution in several ways. While acknowledging the role of perhaps more intentionalist factors such as relying on "genocidal principles" or fearing "contagious ideological illness," he is mainly concerned with the habits, the ambitions, and especially the organizational rationales and processes of the nuclear "killing professionals." These professionals, in turn, determine the routines of the implementors, the obedient "professional killers" who push the buttons.

This approach places Lifton fairly close to observers of the nuclear scene who are not necessarily believers in "existential disaster." Lord Zuckerman, for example, has denounced the scientists and technologists who "saw it to be their job" to propel the nuclear arms race and to preempt strategic decisions.[25] Similar charges have been voiced by Lawrence Freedman, Freeman Dyson, and Fred Kaplan, among others.[26] Paul Bracken has in truly functionalist terms worried about man's probable failure in attempting to command and control nuclear forces in times of crisis.[27]

Lifton's step beyond Auschwitz in the discussion of "killing professionals" is much more than a display of his antinuclearist stance dragged in at the end of a book on Nazi doctors. Lifton is convinced that there is an important connection between the Holocaust and the threatening nuclear catastrophe. More than any other writer, he has insisted that the les-

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In a Dark Time, with Nicholas Humphrey (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1984); *The Future of Immortality* (New York: Basic Books, 1987).

[23] Those on the side of "existential deterrence" proclaim their trust in the stability of nuclear deterrence because of our very knowledge of the inordinate, uncontrollable destructiveness of nuclear weapons; the "deterrence faithful" believe in the strategic status quo and are hostile to what they term apocalyptic visions. Those fearing "existential disaster" argue that the very existence of nuclear weapons renders disaster inevitable; no "social contrivance" of man, such as nuclear deterrence, can go on indefinitely without a breakdown—a breakdown likely to have apocalyptic dimensions. See Robert W. Tucker, *The Nuclear Debate* (New York: Holmes & Meier, 1985), 8-10.

[24] Anders, *Die atomare Drohung* [The nuclear threat] (Munich: C. H. Beck, 1981); Schell, *The Fate of the Earth* (New York: Avon Books, 1982); Beres, *Apocalypse* (University of Chicago Press, 1980); Kennan, *The Nuclear Delusion* (New York: Pantheon Books, 1983).

[25] Lord Solly Zuckerman, *Nuclear Illusion and Reality* (New York: Viking, 1982), 103-8.

[26] Freedman, *The Evolution of Nuclear Strategy* (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1981), xv, 214, 392-400; Dyson, *Weapons and Hope* (New York: Harper & Row, 1984), throughout; Kaplan, *The Wizards of Armageddon* (New York: Simon & Schuster, 1983), throughout.

[27] Bracken, *The Command and Control of Nuclear Forces* (Yale University Press, 1983).

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sons of the Jewish catastrophe must be applied to a developing nuclear one—a connectedness that he demonstrated in his book on the Hiroshima survivors as early as 1967. It is the kind of connectedness felt by many a student of the Final Solution. To those who have occupied themselves with such total human and societal failure as affected the Jews, it comes natural to draw parallels, to be fearful of a similar failure with respect to the nuclear predicament in its impact on man's moral and societal capabilities.

The functionalist mode of analyzing the Holocaust system provides links to the analysis of the nuclear milieu. In his current book, Lifton merely suggests such links. A work devoted to "nuclear doctors" would certainly be an appropriate sequel to *The Nazi Doctors*.

The extraordinary was handled during the Final Solution as if it involved ordinary routines. The mighty and old-fashionedly "Prussian" army did appear to be disturbed by the early misdeeds of the Einsatzgruppen in Poland, but it was eager to tolerate and to adapt itself to the killing of the entire Jewish population in the territories conquered from the Russians after June 1941. Within Germany, the complex apparatus of state and party bureaucracies, many of them also proud of their "Prussian" ethic, fitted readily into the outrageous procedures inflicted upon the Jews, which culminated in the act of deportation. Medicalization, as implemented and legitimatized by the physicians, helped to make feasible the crossing of the boundary toward the crassly unthinkable—the events on the ramp and elsewhere at Treblinka, Auschwitz, and the other extermination centers.

The Einsatzgruppen and their tolerant army bystanders described by Krausnick and Wilhelm, the officials analyzed by Adler, and the doctors studied by Lifton were undoubtedly influenced by the ideological loadings of their milieu and the long-range plans of the Nazi leadership along the lines suggested by the intentionalist interpretation. But their sliding into unprecedented brutality against their fellow men may well be primarily a consequence of factors stressed by the functionalists: the routine acceptance into their ordinary bureaucratic or professional universe of the most extraordinary steps, the kind that would ultimately lead to the Final Solution.[28] In any case, a comprehension of the process of transforming

[28] The debate between the functionalists and the intentionalists was overshadowed in vehemence by the so-called *Historiker-Streit* (Historians' feud) of 1986. The key protagonists were Jürgen Habermas and Ernst Nolte, but a wide array of historians and other academics entered the fray. The feud was carried out at several academic conferences and produced a host of letters to the editors of such publications as the *Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung*, *Der Spiegel*, and *Die Zeit*. An article by Nolte in the *Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung* of June 6, 1986,

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the implementation of the "extraordinary" into the "ordinary, routine, and bureaucratic" should help us to understand genocidal acts other than the Holocaust, as well as sharpen our awareness of the probability of such acts' occurring in the future—in nuclear as well as non-nuclear ways.

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followed by a vehement response by Habermas in *Die Zeit* of July 11, 1986, set the stage. Habermas accused Nolte and some others of attempting to "trivialize" and "regularize" the Nazi period, particularly the Holocaust. Functionalists like Martin Broszat and Hans Mommsen and intentionalists like Klaus Hildebrand joined in the battle even though it did not really directly concern their disagreements.

An excellent coverage of the controversy, reflecting the intense concern of the West German academic world with the *Bewältigung* (overcoming) of the Nazi past, is provided in *Historiker-"Streit"* (Munich: R. Piper, 1987) (no editor listed). Cf. also Reinhard Kühnl, ed., *Vergangenheit, die nicht vergeht* [The past that does not pass away] (Cologne: Pahl-Rugenstein, 1987); also Hilmar Hoffmann, ed., *Gegen den Versuch, Vergangenheit zu verbiegen* [Against the attempt to distort the past] (Frankfurt am Main: Athenäum Verlag, 1987). Gordon Craig has described the feud in "The Battle of the German Historians," *New York Review of Books*, January 15, 1987.

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

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

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